6,162 research outputs found
Similarity based cooperation and spatial segregation
We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the
previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players.
This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen
and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. E 68, 046129 (2003)]. Here, the spatial
extension to a two-dimensional lattice is studied, where each player interacts
with eight players in a Moore neighborhood. The system shows a strong
segregation independent on parameters. The introduction of a local conversion
mechanism towards tolerance allows for four-state cycles and the emergence of
spiral waves in the spatial game. In the case of asymmetric costs of
cooperation a rich variety of complex behavior is observed depending on both
cooperation costs. Finally, we study the stabilization of a cooperative fixed
point of a forecast rule in the symmetric game, which corresponds to
cooperation across segregation borders. This fixed point becomes unstable for
high cooperation costs, but can be stabilized by a linear feedback mechanism.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure
Geometric Prequantization of the Moduli Space of the Vortex equations on a Riemann surface
The moduli space of solutions to the vortex equations on a Riemann surface
are well known to have a symplectic (in fact K\"{a}hler) structure. We show
this symplectic structure explictly and proceed to show a family of symplectic
(in fact, K\"{a}hler) structures on the moduli space,
parametrised by , a section of a line bundle on the Riemann surface.
Next we show that corresponding to these there is a family of prequantum line
bundles on the moduli space whose curvature is
proportional to the symplectic forms .Comment: 8 page
Spatial patterns and scale freedom in a Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata with Pavlovian strategies
A cellular automaton in which cells represent agents playing the Prisoner's
Dilemma (PD) game following the simple "win-stay, loose-shift" strategy is
studied. Individuals with binary behavior, such as they can either cooperate
(C) or defect (D), play repeatedly with their neighbors (Von Neumann's and
Moore's neighborhoods). Their utilities in each round of the game are given by
a rescaled payoff matrix described by a single parameter Tau, which measures
the ratio of 'temptation to defect' to 'reward for cooperation'. Depending on
the region of the parameter space Tau, the system self-organizes - after a
transient - into dynamical equilibrium states characterized by different
definite fractions of C agents (2 states for the Von Neumann neighborhood and 4
for Moore neighborhood). For some ranges of Tau the cluster size distributions,
the power spectrums P(f) and the perimeter-area curves follow power-law
scalings. Percolation below threshold is also found for D agent clusters. We
also analyze the asynchronous dynamics version of this model and compare
results.Comment: Accepted for publication in JSTA
Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata revisited: evolution of cooperation under environmental pressure
We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma cellular
automata, introduced by Nowak and May \cite{nm92}, in which the pressure of the
environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that
individuals need to collect a minimum score , representing
indispensable resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc.) to prosper in this
environment. So the agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour
of the most successful neighbour (who got ), also take into account if
is above or below the threshold . If an
individual has a probability of adopting the opposite behaviour from the one
used by its most successful neighbour. This modification allows the evolution
of cooperation for payoffs for which defection was the rule (as it happens, for
example, when the sucker's payoff is much worse than the punishment for mutual
defection). We also analyse a more sophisticated version of this model in which
the selective rule is supplemented with a "win-stay, lose-shift" criterion. The
cluster structure is analyzed and, for this more complex version we found
power-law scaling for a restricted region in the parameter space.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures; added figures and revised tex
Emotional Strategies as Catalysts for Cooperation in Signed Networks
The evolution of unconditional cooperation is one of the fundamental problems
in science. A new solution is proposed to solve this puzzle. We treat this
issue with an evolutionary model in which agents play the Prisoner's Dilemma on
signed networks. The topology is allowed to co-evolve with relational signs as
well as with agent strategies. We introduce a strategy that is conditional on
the emotional content embedded in network signs. We show that this strategy
acts as a catalyst and creates favorable conditions for the spread of
unconditional cooperation. In line with the literature, we found evidence that
the evolution of cooperation most likely occurs in networks with relatively
high chances of rewiring and with low likelihood of strategy adoption. While a
low likelihood of rewiring enhances cooperation, a very high likelihood seems
to limit its diffusion. Furthermore, unlike in non-signed networks, cooperation
becomes more prevalent in denser topologies.Comment: 24 pages, Accepted for publication in Advances in Complex System
Altruistic Contents of Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma
We examine the classical contents of quantum games. It is shown that a
quantum strategy can be interpreted as a classical strategies with effective
density-dependent game matrices composed of transposed matrix elements. In
particular, successful quantum strategies in dilemma games are interpreted in
terms of a symmetrized game matrix that corresponds to an altruistic game plan.Comment: Revised according to publisher's request: 4 pgs, 2 fgs, ReVTeX4. For
more info, go to http://www.mech.kochi-tech.ac.jp/cheon
Distinguishing the opponents in the prisoner dilemma in well-mixed populations
Here we study the effects of adopting different strategies against different
opponent instead of adopting the same strategy against all of them in the
prisoner dilemma structured in well-mixed populations. We consider an
evolutionary process in which strategies that provide reproductive success are
imitated and players replace one of their worst interactions by the new one. We
set individuals in a well-mixed population so that network reciprocity effect
is excluded and we analyze both synchronous and asynchronous updates. As a
consequence of the replacement rule, we show that mutual cooperation is never
destroyed and the initial fraction of mutual cooperation is a lower bound for
the level of cooperation. We show by simulation and mean-field analysis that
for synchronous update cooperation dominates while for asynchronous update only
cooperations associated to the initial mutual cooperations are maintained. As a
side effect of the replacement rule, an "implicit punishment" mechanism comes
up in a way that exploitations are always neutralized providing evolutionary
stability for cooperation
Nonequilibrium phase transition in a model for social influence
We present extensive numerical simulations of the Axelrod's model for social
influence, aimed at understanding the formation of cultural domains. This is a
nonequilibrium model with short range interactions and a remarkably rich
dynamical behavior. We study the phase diagram of the model and uncover a
nonequilibrium phase transition separating an ordered (culturally polarized)
phase from a disordered (culturally fragmented) one. The nature of the phase
transition can be continuous or discontinuous depending on the model
parameters. At the transition, the size of cultural regions is power-law
distributed.Comment: 5 pages, 4 figure
Aspiring to the fittest and promotion of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we
introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter ,
influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of
the new strategy. For positive players with high payoffs will be considered
more likely, while for negative the opposite holds. Setting equal to
zero returns the frequently adopted random selection of the opponent. We find
that increasing the probability of adopting the strategy from the fittest
player within reach, i.e. setting positive, promotes the evolution of
cooperation. The robustness of this observation is tested against different
levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different
interaction network. Since the evolution to widespread defection is tightly
associated with cooperators having a lower fitness than defectors, the fact
that positive values of facilitate cooperation is quite surprising. We show
that the results can be explained by means of a negative feedback effect that
increases the vulnerability of defectors although initially increasing their
survivability. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of
effectively alters the interaction network and thus also the impact of
uncertainty by strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical
Review
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