161,961 research outputs found
Executive Compensation and CEO Equity Incentives in China’s Listed Firms (CRI 2009-006)
This study investigates the economic, ownership and governance determinants of executive compensation and CEO equity incentives in China’s listed firms. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated with firm size, performance, and growth opportunities. CEO incentives are negatively associated with firm size, positively linked with firm performance and growth opportunity. Firm risk has a negative effect on pay and incentives. Compensation and CEO incentives are significantly greater in privately-controlled firms compared to state-run firms and are lower in firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important: firms with compensation committees or a greater fraction of independent directors on the board have higher executive pay and greater CEO equity incentives
Succinct Representations of Dynamic Strings
The rank and select operations over a string of length n from an alphabet of
size have been used widely in the design of succinct data structures.
In many applications, the string itself need be maintained dynamically,
allowing characters of the string to be inserted and deleted. Under the word
RAM model with word size , we design a succinct representation
of dynamic strings using bits to support rank,
select, insert and delete in time. When the alphabet size is small, i.e. when \sigma = O(\polylog
(n)), including the case in which the string is a bit vector, these operations
are supported in time. Our data structures are more
efficient than previous results on the same problem, and we have applied them
to improve results on the design and construction of space-efficient text
indexes
Many-server queues with customer abandonment: numerical analysis of their diffusion models
We use multidimensional diffusion processes to approximate the dynamics of a
queue served by many parallel servers. The queue is served in the
first-in-first-out (FIFO) order and the customers waiting in queue may abandon
the system without service. Two diffusion models are proposed in this paper.
They differ in how the patience time distribution is built into them. The first
diffusion model uses the patience time density at zero and the second one uses
the entire patience time distribution. To analyze these diffusion models, we
develop a numerical algorithm for computing the stationary distribution of such
a diffusion process. A crucial part of the algorithm is to choose an
appropriate reference density. Using a conjecture on the tail behavior of a
limit queue length process, we propose a systematic approach to constructing a
reference density. With the proposed reference density, the algorithm is shown
to converge quickly in numerical experiments. These experiments also show that
the diffusion models are good approximations for many-server queues, sometimes
for queues with as few as twenty servers
Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China
We investigate executive compensation and corporate governance in China’s publicly traded firms. We also compare executive pay in China to the USA. Consistent with agency theory, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated to firm performance. The study shows that executive pay and CEO incentives are lower in State controlled firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important. We find that firms with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link. Non-State (private) controlled firms and firms with more independent directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor performance. Finally, we document that US executive pay (salary and bonus) is about seventeen times higher than in China. Significant differences in US-China pay persist even after controlling for economic and governance factors
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