Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems

It is well-known that for several natural decision problems no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist. This has motivated recent research on designing variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as `redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments') that generate reduced deficit. With this in mind, we study sequential mechanisms and consider optimal strategies that could reduce the deficit resulting under the simultaneous mechanism. We show that such strategies exist for the sequential pivotal mechanism of the well-known public project problem. We also exhibit an optimal strategy with the property that a maximal social welfare is generated when each player follows it. Finally, we show that these strategies can be achieved by an implementation in Nash equilibrium.Comment: 19 pages. The version without the appendix will appear in the Proc. 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 200

Federalism as a Public Good

This paper suggests that stabilizing federalism is like solving a public good provision problem. It reviews results in the public good provision literature that are relevant for federalism, and discusses the implications of these results for the institutional design of federalism.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/44798/1/10602_2005_Article_2235.pd

Enhancing Europe’s global power: a scenario exercise with eight proposals

In the present context of intensifying competition between the major trading economies and potentially game-changing technological developments, the European Union is generally seen as the weaker party. Lacking the ‘hard power’ derived from military capabilities, it has laid claim to a ‘soft power’ of normative influence externally, yet even that is only partially utilised. Nor has Europe been able to exercise the power to coerce – ‘sharp power’ – commensurate with its economic weight as a trading bloc equivalent in size and reach to the US or China, its most prominent global competitors. How can Europe strengthen its position, and in what fields? Through a scenario exercise, we develop eight policy proposals aimed at countering Europe´s vulnerabilities and enabling it to assert its sharp and soft power more effectively. Specifically, we consider the feasibility, means and scope for their realisation. Together, they provide a transformative agenda for the EU’s position in the world

Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge

We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multidimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the realized frequency of types (the exact number of agents for each type) is common knowledge, then a mechanism exists, which is consistent with truthful revelation of private information and which implements first-best allocations of resources as the unique equilibrium. The result requires the single-crossing property on utility functions and the anonymity of the Pareto correspondence

Auctions with costly information acquisition

Auctions, Mechanism design, Groves, Adverse selection, Costly information, D44, D82, D83,

A profile of industrial estates and business parks in Kent

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre- DSC:OP-LG/8069 / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design

Although the problem of revelation of preferences for public goods had already been brought up in several instances, it was surely the merit of Leo Hurwicz to show that providing incentives was a fundamental problem in the design of any institution for collective decision based on decentralized information and control

A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types

Mechanism design, Budget balance, Participation constraints, D02, D70, D82,