Illusory perceptions of space and time preserve cross-saccadic perceptual continuity

When voluntary saccadic eye movements are made to a silently ticking clock, observers sometimes think that the second hand takes longer than normal to move to its next position. For a short period, the clock appears to have stopped (chronostasis). Here we show that the illusion occurs because the brain extends the percept of the saccadic target backwards in time to just before the onset of the saccade. This occurs every time we move the eyes but it is only perceived when an external time reference alerts us to the phenomenon. The illusion does not seem to depend on the shift of spatial attention that accompanies the saccade. However, if the target is moved unpredictably during the saccade, breaking perception of the target's spatial continuity, then the illusion disappears. We suggest that temporal extension of the target's percept is one of the mechanisms that 'fill in' the perceptual 'gap' during saccadic suppression. The effect is critically linked to perceptual mechanisms that identify a target's spatial stability

Emergence of qualia from brain activity or from an interaction of proto-consciousness with the brain: which one is the weirder? Available evidence and a research agenda

This contribution to the science of consciousness aims at comparing how two different theories can explain the emergence of different qualia experiences, meta-awareness, meta-cognition, the placebo effect, out-of-body experiences, cognitive therapy and meditation-induced brain changes, etc. The first theory postulates that qualia experiences derive from specific neural patterns, the second one, that qualia experiences derive from the interaction of a proto-consciousness with the brain\u2019s neural activity. From this comparison it will be possible to judge which one seems to better explain the different qualia experiences and to offer a more promising research agenda

Adaptation to motor-visual and motor-auditory temporal lags transfer across modalities

Previous research has shown that the timing of a sensor-motor event is recalibrated after a brief exposure to a delayed feedback of a voluntary action (Stetson et al. 2006). Here, we examined whether it is the sensory or motor event that is shifted in time. We compared lag adaption for action-feedback in visuo-motor pairs and audio-motor pairs using an adaptation-test paradigm. Participants were exposed to a constant lag (50 or 150 ms) between their voluntary action (finger tap) and its sensory feedback (flash or tone pip) during an adaptation period (~3 min). Immediately after that, they performed a temporal order judgment (TOJ) task about the tap-feedback test stimulus pairings. The modality of the feedback stimulus was either the same as the adapted one (within-modal) or different (cross-modal). The results showed that the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) was uniformly shifted in the direction of the exposed lag within and across modalities (motor-visual, motor-auditory). This suggests that the TRE of sensor-motor events is mainly caused by a shift in the motor component

Recurrent Activity in Higher Order, Modality Non-Specific Brain Regions: A Granger Causality Analysis of Autobiographic Memory Retrieval

It has been proposed that the workings of the brain are mainly intrinsically generated recurrent neuronal activity, with sensory inputs as modifiers of such activity in both sensory and higher order modality non-specific regions. This is supported by the demonstration of recurrent neuronal activity in the visual system as a response to visual stimulation. In contrast recurrent activity has never been demonstrated before in higher order modality non-specific regions. Using magneto-encephalography and Granger causality analysis, we tested in a paralimbic network the hypothesis that stimulation may enhance causal recurrent interaction between higher-order, modality non-specific regions. The network includes anterior cingulate/medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate/medial parietal cortices together with pulvinar thalami, a network known to be effective in autobiographic memory retrieval and self-awareness. Autobiographic memory retrieval of previous personal judgments of visually presented words was used as stimuli. It is demonstrated that the prestimulus condition is characterized by causal, recurrent oscillations which are maximal in the lower gamma range. When retrieving previous judgments of visually presented adjectives, this activity is dramatically increased during the stimulus task as ascertained by Granger causality analysis. Our results confirm the hypothesis that stimulation may enhance causal interaction between higher order, modality non-specific brain regions, exemplified in a network of autobiographical memory retrieval

Free will debates: Simple experiments are not so simple

The notion that free will is an illusion has achieved such wide acceptance among philosophers and neuroscientists that it seems to be acquiring the status of dogma. Nonetheless, research in this area continues, and this review offers a new analysis of the design limitations and data interpretations of free-will experiments. This review presents 12 categories of questionable conclusions that some scholars use to promote the idea that free will is an illusion. The next generation of less ambiguous experiments is proposed

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, we find, for the most part, nothing to suggest that free will is inconsistent with the presence of unconscious neural precursors to choices. It is only if we adopt highly non-naturalistic assumptions about the mind (e.g. if we embrace Cartesian dualism and locate free choice in the non-physical realm) that it seems plausible to suppose that the neuroscientific data generates a threat to free will

Freedom in Nature

The paper starts with the proposal that the cause of the apparent insolubility of the free-will problem are several popular but strongly metaphysical notions and hypotheses. To reduce the metaphysics, some ideas are borrowed from physics. A concept of event causality is discussed. The importance of Hume's Principle of Causality is stressed and his Principle of Causation is weakened. The key concept of the paper, the so-called relative freedom, is also suggested by physics. It is a kind of freedom that can be observed everywhere in nature. Turning to biology, incomplete knowledge is defined for all organisms. They cope with the problem by Popper's trial and error processes. One source of their success is the relative freedom of choice from the basic option ranges: mutations, motions and neural connections. Finally, the conjecture is adopted that communicability can be used as a criterion of consciousness and free will is defined as a conscious version of relative freedom. The resulting notion is logically self-consistent and it describes an observable phenomenon that agrees with our experience.Comment: Changes: Improved formulation, three references added; 22 pages, no figure. Comments are welcom

How much does emotional valence of action outcomes affect temporal binding?

Temporal binding refers to the compression of the perceived time interval between voluntary actions and their sensory consequences. Research suggests that the emotional content of an action outcome can modulate the effects of temporal binding. We attempted to conceptually replicate these findings using a time interval estimation task and different emotionally-valenced action outcomes (Experiments 1 and 2) than used in previous research. Contrary to previous findings, we found no evidence that temporal binding was affected by the emotional valence of action outcomes. After validating our stimuli for equivalence of perceived emotional valence and arousal (Experiment 3), in Experiment 4 we directly replicated Yoshie and Haggard’s (2013) original experiment using sound vocalizations as action outcomes and failed to detect a significant effect of emotion on temporal binding. These studies suggest that the emotional valence of action outcomes exerts little influence on temporal binding. The potential implications of these findings are discussed

Time perception and the experience of agency in meditation and hypnosis

Mindfulness meditation and hypnosis are related in opposing ways to awareness of intentions. The cold control theory of hypnosis proposes that hypnotic responding involves the experience of involuntariness while performing an actually intentional action. Hypnosis therefore relies upon inaccurate metacognition about intentional actions and experiences. Mindfulness meditation centrally involves awareness of intentions and is associated with improved metacognitive access to intentions. Therefore, mindfulness meditators and highly hypnotizable people may lie at opposite ends of a spectrum with regard to metacognitive access to intention‐related information. Here we review the theoretical background and evidence for differences in the metacognition of intentions in these groups, as revealed by chronometric measures of the awareness of voluntary action: the timing of an intention to move (Libet's “W” judgments) and the compressed perception of time between an intentional action and its outcome (“intentional binding”). We review these measures and critically evaluate their proposed connection to the experience of volition and sense of agency