Ecological conflicts and valuation - mangroves vs. shrimp in the late 1990s

Shrimps are produced in two different ways. They are fished in the sea (sometimes at the cost of turtle destruction) or they are "farmed" in ponds in coastal areas. Such aquaculture is increasing around the world as shrimps become a valuable item of world trade. Mangrove forests are sacrificed for commercial shrimp farming. This paper considers the conflict between mangrove conservation and shrimp exports in different countries.Who has title to the mangroves, who wins and who loses in this tragedy of enclosures? Which languages of valuation are used by different actors in order to compare the increase in shrimp exports and the losses in livelihoods and in environmental services? The economic valuation of damages is only one of the possible languages of valuation which are relevant in practice. Who has the power to impose a particular language of valuation

On Combining Stated Preferences and Revealed Preferences Approaches to Evaluate Environmental Resources Having a Recreational Use

This work aims at analysing the value of recreational water uses for the Idro Lake (Lombardy, Northern Italy), which has been experiencing dramatic fluctuations in its levels in recent years, due to excessive productive withdrawal that affected recreational uses. It estimates the economic benefits deriving from recreational uses, by considering the current recreational demand and the hypothetical one obtained by considering an “improved quality” scenario. Through an on-site survey, we built a panel dataset. Following Whitehead et al. (2000) and Hanley et al. (2003) we get welfare estimates by combining SP and RP responses. The present CS is estimated in €134 per individual, whilst the increase in CS is estimated in €173 per individual. These figures can be confronted with the economic value of competitive uses and with the clean up costs, respectively, to infer some policy indications

Multifaceted value profiles of forest owner categories in South Sweden: The river helge å catchment as a case study

Forest landscapes provide benefits from a wide range of goods, function and intangible values. But what are different forest owner categories\u27 profiles of economic use and non-use values? This study focuses on the complex forest ownership pattern of the River Helge å catchment including the Kristianstad Vattenrike Biosphere Reserve in southern Sweden. We made 89 telephone interviews with informants representing the four main forest owner categories. Our mapping included consumptive and non-consumptive direct use values, indirect use values, and non-use values such as natural and cultural heritage. While the value profiles of non-industrial forest land owners and municipalities included all value categories, the forest companies focused on wood production, and the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency on nature protection. We discuss the challenges of communicating different forest owners\u27 economic value profiles among stakeholders, the need for a broader suite of forest management systems, and fora for collaborative planning. © 2013 The Author(s)

Property rights and the dynamics of renewable resources in North-South trade, Chapter 1

To explain the patterns of world trade of resources, this paper combines the biological dynamics of the renewable resource and game theoretical explanations of its extraction under different property regimes, with a general equilibrium model of North South trade (Chichilnisky, 1981, 1986). The two regions produce, consume and trade two goods using two inputs, a renewable resource E and capital. To expose the importance of property rights in explaining trade, the two regions are taken as identical except for the property rights regimes on the pool from which the resource is extracted: the South has common property and the North private property. The paper formulates the Nash equilibrium of a game which explains the harvesting of the resource under different property rights regimes: more is supplied at each price under unregulated property rights than it is with private property (Lemma 1). Theorem 1 proves that the difference in property rights by itself explains trade between otherwise identical regions: the South exports the environmentally intensive product even though it has no comparative advantage and the North the capital intensive products. The North overconsumes the resource intensive products which it imports at prices which are below social costs. This occurs even though in equilibrium the prices of all goods and all factors of production are equal across the world. Resources are overextracted and the world pattern of consumption and trade of resources is Pareto inefficient. Several policies which could redress the inefficiency, particularly recent property rights policies towards biodiversity and land ownership in the Americas, are discussed in this paper