Approximate well-supported Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games

The $\varepsilon$-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive greater than $\varepsilon$ to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in her mixed strategy. The smallest constant $\varepsilon$ currently known for which there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an $\varepsilon$-well-supported Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games is slightly below $2/3$. In this paper we study this problem for symmetric bimatrix games and we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives a $(1/2+\delta)$-well-supported Nash equilibrium, for an arbitrarily small positive constant $\delta$

Polylogarithmic Supports are required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3

In an epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon in expectation by unilateral deviation. An epsilon well-supported approximate Nash equilibrium has the stronger requirement that every pure strategy used with positive probability must have payoff within epsilon of the best response payoff. Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou conjectured that every win-lose bimatrix game has a 2/3-well-supported Nash equilibrium that uses supports of cardinality at most three. Indeed, they showed that such an equilibrium will exist subject to the correctness of a graph-theoretic conjecture. Regardless of the correctness of this conjecture, we show that the barrier of a 2/3 payoff guarantee cannot be broken with constant size supports; we construct win-lose games that require supports of cardinality at least Omega((log n)^(1/3)) in any epsilon-well supported equilibrium with epsilon < 2/3. The key tool in showing the validity of the construction is a proof of a bipartite digraph variant of the well-known Caccetta-Haggkvist conjecture. A probabilistic argument shows that there exist epsilon-well-supported equilibria with supports of cardinality O(log n/(epsilon^2)), for any epsilon> 0; thus, the polylogarithmic cardinality bound presented cannot be greatly improved. We also show that for any delta > 0, there exist win-lose games for which no pair of strategies with support sizes at most two is a (1-delta)-well-supported Nash equilibrium. In contrast, every bimatrix game with payoffs in [0,1] has a 1/2-approximate Nash equilibrium where the supports of the players have cardinality at most two.Comment: Added details on related work (footnote 7 expanded

Efficient parameterization of waverider geometries

This paper summarizes the results of investigations into the development of parametric waverider geometry models, with emphasis on their efficiency, in terms of their ability to cover a large feasible design space with a sufficiently small number of design variables to avoid the “curse of dimensionality.” The work presented here is focused on the parameterization of idealized waverider forebody geometries that provide the baseline shapes upon which more sophisticated and realistic hypersonic aircraft geometries can be built. Three different aspects of rationalizing the decisions behind the parametric geometry models developed using the osculating cones method are considered. Initially, three different approaches to the design method itself are discussed. Each approach provides direct control over different aspects of the geometry for which very specific shapes would be more complex to obtain indirectly, thus enabling the geometry to more efficiently meet any related design constraints. Then, a number of requirements and limitations are investigated that affect the available options for the parametric design-driving curves of the inverse design method. Finally, the performance advantages that open up with increasing flexibility of the design-driving curves in the context of a design optimization study are estimated. This allows one to reduce the risk of overparameterizing the geometry model, while still enabling a variety of meaningful shapes. Although the osculating cones method has mainly been used here, most of the findings also apply to other similar inverse design algorithms

On the Approximation Performance of Fictitious Play in Finite Games

We study the performance of Fictitious Play, when used as a heuristic for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium of a 2-player game. We exhibit a class of 2-player games having payoffs in the range [0,1] that show that Fictitious Play fails to find a solution having an additive approximation guarantee significantly better than 1/2. Our construction shows that for n times n games, in the worst case both players may perpetually have mixed strategies whose payoffs fall short of the best response by an additive quantity 1/2 - O(1/n^(1-delta)) for arbitrarily small delta. We also show an essentially matching upper bound of 1/2 - O(1/n)

Approximate Well-supported Nash Equilibria below Two-thirds

In an epsilon-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon by changing his behaviour. Recent work has addressed the question of how best to compute epsilon-Nash equilibria, and for what values of epsilon a polynomial-time algorithm exists. An epsilon-well-supported Nash equilibrium (epsilon-WSNE) has the additional requirement that any strategy that is used with non-zero probability by a player must have payoff at most epsilon less than the best response. A recent algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis shows how to compute a 2/3-WSNE in polynomial time, for bimatrix games. Here we introduce a new technique that leads to an improvement to the worst-case approximation guarantee

Approximating Nash Equilibria and Dense Bipartite Subgraphs via an Approximate Version of Carathéodory's Theorem

We present algorithmic applications of an approximate version of Caratheodory's theorem. The theorem states that given a set of vectors X in R^d, for every vector in the convex hull of X there exists an ε-close (under the p-norm distance, for 2 ≤ p < ∞) vector that can be expressed as a convex combination of at most b vectors of X, where the bound b depends on ε and the norm p and is independent of the dimension d. This theorem can be derived by instantiating Maurey's lemma, early references to which can be found in the work of Pisier (1981) and Carl (1985). However, in this paper we present a self-contained proof of this result. Using this theorem we establish that in a bimatrix game with n x n payoff matrices A, B, if the number of non-zero entries in any column of A+B is at most s then an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game can be computed in time n^O(log s/ε^2}). This, in particular, gives us a polynomial-time approximation scheme for Nash equilibrium in games with fixed column sparsity s. Moreover, for arbitrary bimatrix games---since s can be at most n---the running time of our algorithm matches the best-known upper bound, which was obtained by Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta (2003). The approximate Carathéodory's theorem also leads to an additive approximation algorithm for the densest k-bipartite subgraph problem. Given a graph with n vertices and maximum degree d, the developed algorithm determines a k x k bipartite subgraph with density within ε (in the additive sense) of the optimal density in time n^O(log d/ε^2)

Observational study of chromospheric heating by acoustic waves

Aims. To investigate the role of acoustic and magneto-acoustic waves in heating the solar chromosphere, observations in strong chromospheric lines are analyzed by comparing the deposited acoustic-energy flux with the total integrated radiative losses. Methods. Quiet-Sun and weak-plage regions were observed in the Ca II 854.2 nm and H-alpha lines with the Fast Imaging Solar Spectrograph (FISS) at the 1.6-m Goode Solar Telescope (GST) on 2019 October 3 and in the H-alpha and H-beta lines with the echelle spectrograph attached to the Vacuum Tower Telescope (VTT) on 2018 December 11 and 2019 June 6. The deposited acoustic energy flux at frequencies up to 20 mHz was derived from Doppler velocities observed in line centers and wings. Radiative losses were computed by means of a set of scaled non-LTE 1D hydrostatic semi-empirical models obtained by fitting synthetic to observed line profiles. Results. In the middle chromosphere (h = 1000-1400 km), the radiative losses can be fully balanced by the deposited acoustic energy flux in a quiet-Sun region. In the upper chromosphere (h > 1400 km), the deposited acoustic flux is small compared to the radiative losses in quiet as well as in plage regions. The crucial parameter determining the amount of deposited acoustic flux is the gas density at a given height. Conclusions. The acoustic energy flux is efficiently deposited in the middle chromosphere, where the density of gas is sufficiently high. About 90% of the available acoustic energy flux in the quiet-Sun region is deposited in these layers, and thus it is a major contributor to the radiative losses of the middle chromosphere. In the upper chromosphere, the deposited acoustic flux is too low, so that other heating mechanisms have to act to balance the radiative cooling.Comment: 11 pages, 10 figures, 3 table

Observational study of chromospheric heating by acoustic waves

Aims. Our aim is to investigate the role of acoustic and magneto-acoustic waves in heating the solar chromosphere. Observations in strong chromospheric lines are analyzed by comparing the deposited acoustic-energy flux with the total integrated radiative losses. Methods. Quiet-Sun and weak-plage regions were observed in the Ca ii 854.2 nm and H lines with the Fast Imaging Solar Spectrograph (FISS) at the 1.6-m Goode Solar Telescope on 2019 October 3 and in the H and H lines with the echelle spectrograph attached to the Vacuum Tower Telescope on 2018 December 11 and 2019 June 6. The deposited acoustic energy flux at frequencies up to 20 mHz was derived from Doppler velocities observed in line centers and wings. Radiative losses were computed by means of a set of scaled non-local thermodynamic equilibrium 1D hydrostatic semi-empirical models obtained by fitting synthetic to observed line profiles. Results. In the middle chromosphere (h = 1000–1400 km), the radiative losses can be fully balanced by the deposited acoustic energy flux in a quiet-Sun region. In the upper chromosphere (h > 1400 km), the deposited acoustic flux is small compared to the radiative losses in quiet as well as in plage regions. The crucial parameter determining the amount of deposited acoustic flux is the gas density at a given height. Conclusions. The acoustic energy flux is e ciently deposited in the middle chromosphere, where the density of gas is su ciently high. About 90% of the available acoustic energy flux in the quiet-Sun region is deposited in these layers, and thus it is a major contributor to the radiative losses of the middle chromosphere. In the upper chromosphere, the deposited acoustic flux is too low, so that other heating mechanisms have to act to balance the radiative cooling

Inapproximability Results for Approximate Nash Equilibria.

We study the problem of finding approximate Nash equilibria that satisfy certain conditions, such as providing good social welfare. In particular, we study the problem $\epsilon$-NE $\delta$-SW: find an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium ($\epsilon$-NE) that is within $\delta$ of the best social welfare achievable by an $\epsilon$-NE. Our main result is that, if the exponential-time hypothesis (ETH) is true, then solving $\left(\frac{1}{8} - \mathrm{O}(\delta)\right)$-NE $\mathrm{O}(\delta)$-SW for an $n\times n$ bimatrix game requires $n^{\mathrm{\widetilde \Omega}(\log n)}$ time. Building on this result, we show similar conditional running time lower bounds on a number of decision problems for approximate Nash equilibria that do not involve social welfare, including maximizing or minimizing a certain player's payoff, or finding approximate equilibria contained in a given pair of supports. We show quasi-polynomial lower bounds for these problems assuming that ETH holds, where these lower bounds apply to $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria for all $\epsilon < \frac{1}{8}$. The hardness of these other decision problems has so far only been studied in the context of exact equilibria.Comment: A short (14-page) version of this paper appeared at WINE 2016. Compared to that conference version, this new version improves the conditional lower bounds, which now rely on ETH rather than RETH (Randomized ETH