Is voting for a cartel a sign of cooperativeness?

This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels—collective but costly and non-binding price agreements—lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are willing to form price agreements are more likely to be less competitive and pick higher prices in general. To test this hypothesis we run an experiment where participants play two consecutive Bertrand pricing games: first a standard version without the opportunity to form agreements; followed by a version where participants can vote whether to have a (costly) non-binding agreement as a group to pick the highest number. We find no statistically significant difference between the numbers picked in the first game by participants who vote for and against an agreement in the second game. We do confirm that having a non-binding agreement to cooperate leads to higher numbers being picked on average. Both participants who voted for and against the agreement increase the number they pick in situations with an agreement. However, this effect is bigger for participants who voted in favour

Tunable Entanglement, Antibunching and Saturation effects in Dipole Blockade

We report a model that makes it possible to analyze quantitatively the dipole blockade effect on the dynamical evolution of a two two-level atom system driven by an external laser field. The multiple excitations of the atomic sample are taken into account. We find very large concurrence in the dipole blockade regime. We further find that entanglement can be tuned by changing the intensity of the exciting laser. We also report a way to lift the dipole blockade paving the way to manipulate in a controllable way the blockade effects. We finally report how a continuous monitoring of the dipole blockade would be possible using photon-photon correlations of the scattered light in a regime where the spontaneous emission would dominate dissipation in the sample.Comment: 5 pages, 5 figure

Fast quasi-adiabatic dynamics

We work out the theory and applications of a fast quasi-adiabatic approach to speed up slow adiabatic manipulations of quantum systems by driving a control parameter as near to the adiabatic limit as possible over the entire protocol duration. Specifically, we show that the population inversion in a two-level system, the splitting and cotunneling of two-interacting bosons, and the stirring of a Tonks-Girardeau gas on a ring to achieve mesoscopic superpositions of many-body rotating and non-rotating states, can be significantly speeded up.Comment: 5 pages, 6 figure

Melting and Pressure-Induced Amorphization of Quartz

It has recently been shown that amorphization and melting of ice were intimately linked. In this letter, we infer from molecular dynamics simulations on the SiO2 system that the extension of the quartz melting line in the metastable pressure-temperature domain is the pressure-induced amorphization line. It seems therefore likely that melting is the physical phenomenon responsible for pressure induced amorphization. Moreover, we show that the structure of a "pressure glass" is similar to that of a very rapidly (1e+13 to 1e+14 kelvins per second) quenched thermal glass.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures, LaTeX2

Tunneling, self-trapping and manipulation of higher modes of a BEC in a double well

We consider an atomic Bose-Einstein condensate trapped in a symmetric one-dimensional double well potential in the four-mode approximation and show that the semiclassical dynamics of the two ground state modes can be strongly influenced by a macroscopic occupation of the two excited modes. In particular, the addition of the two excited modes already unveils features related to the effect of dissipation on the condensate. In general, we find a rich dynamics that includes Rabi oscillations, a mixed Josephson-Rabi regime, self-trapping, chaotic behavior, and the existence of fixed points. We investigate how the dynamics of the atoms in the excited modes can be manipulated by controlling the atomic populations of the ground states.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figure

Do negative random shocks affect trust and trustworthiness?

We report data from a variation of the trust game aimed at determining whether (and how) inequality and random shocks that affect wealth influence the levels of trust and trustworthiness. To tease apart the effect of the shock and the inequality, we compare behavior in a trust game where the inequality is initially given and one where it is the result of a random shock that reduces the second mover’s endowment. We find that first-movers send less to second-movers but only when the inequality results from a random shock. As for the amount returned, second-movers return less when they are endowed less than first-movers, regardless of whether the difference in endowments was initially given or occurred after a random shock

First principles calculation of vibrational Raman spectra in large systems: signature of small rings in crystalline SiO2

We present an approach for the efficient calculation of vibrational Raman intensities in periodic systems within density functional theory. The Raman intensities are computed from the second order derivative of the electronic density matrix with respect to a uniform electric field. In contrast to previous approaches, the computational effort required by our method for the evaluation of the intensities is negligible compared to that required for the calculation of vibrational frequencies. As a first application, we study the signature of 3- and 4-membered rings in the the Raman spectra of several polymorphs of SiO2, including a zeolite having 102 atoms per unit cell.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figures, revtex4 Minor corrections; accepted in Phys. Rev. Let

Trust and trustworthiness after negative random shocks

We experimentally investigate the effect of a negative endowment shock that can cause inequality in a trust game. Our goal is to assess whether different causes of inequality have different effects on trust and trustworthiness. In our trust game, we vary whether there is inequality (in favor of the second mover) or not and whether the inequality results from a random negative shock (i.e., the outcome of a die roll) or exists from the outset. Our findings suggest that inequality causes first-movers to send more of their endowment and second-movers to return more. However, we do not find support for the hypothesis that the cause of the inequality matters. Behavior after the occurrence of a random shock is not significantly different from the behavior in treatments where the inequality exists from the outset. Our results highlight the need to be cautious when interpreting the effects on trust and trustworthiness of negative random shocks in the field (such as natural disasters). Our results suggest that these effects are primarily driven by the inequality caused by the shock and not by any of the additional characteristics of the shock, like saliency or uncertainty