Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process

In this Article, the authors develop an economic theory of the constitutional amendment process under Article V, focusing particularly on the roles that Congress and interest groups play in that process. The authors construct a model to predict when an interest group will seek an amendment rather than a statute to further its interests, highlighting how interest group maintenance costs and anticipated opposition affect that choice. They then discuss the efficiency goals of constitutionalism—precommitment and reduction of agency costs—and argue that the structure of the amendment process under Article V prevents realization of these goals. The authors contrast the Bill of Rights amendments, which established precommitments and reduced the agency costs of government, with the latter seventeen amendments, which expanded the federal government and increased agency costs. They attribute the change in the nature of the amendments to the interest-group domination of the political process and Congress\u27 control over the constitutional amendment agenda. The authors conclude that the Founders\u27 intent to put the Constitution beyond the reach of factions backfired: although factions cannot control the content of the Constitution, neither can the majority. In fact, Article V prevents the majority from precommiting itself and hinders its ability to control the agency costs of government, as evidenced by the history of the failed amendments. Although the authors conclude that Article V thwarts the efficiency goals of constitutionalism, they predict that little can be done to remedy this flaw

A Military Training System Perspective and Model for Training Program Management

A perspective of the Naval Education and Training System (NETS) is developed and utilized as a framework on which a simulation model of general training system activities is constructed. The simulation model, which is based on functional activities, emphasizes the interdependent consequences of decisions and actions created through management planning, analysis, and control of training programs. A simulation experiment was conducted using a test situation description (scenario) to reflect the impact of management decisions and actions on the resulting allocation of resources and timeliness of training program activities. Conclusions are drawn regarding the utility and implications of the system dynamics model as a management tool with which to improve training. Recommendations are made regarding future experimentation and analysis which is required for sufficient development of a useful management tool

The Quintessential Best Case for Takings Compensation - A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying the Elements of Land-Use Regulations That Present the Best Case for Government Compensation

What types of land use regulation require compensation to land owners continues to bedevil trial judges, landowners and agents of government. This article proposes a best case model for compensation focusing on fairness. The best case for compensating a landowner whose property value is diminished by a land use regulation is where the regulation imposes adverse effects on a small number of landowners; entails widely distributed benefits to the community; the landowner appears relatively innocent with regard to public harms associated with the land use. The author applies his proposal to such common land use regulations as zoning, Wetland regulation, local anti-growth measures, and shoreline conservation

Institutional quality and the wealth of autocrats

One frequently given explanation for why autocrats maintain corrupt and inefficient institutions is that the autocrats benefit personally even though the citizens of their countries are worse off. The empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis. Autocrats in countries with low-quality institutions do tend to be wealthy, but typically, they were wealthy before they assumed power. A plausible explanation, consistent with the data, is that wealthy individuals in countries with inefficient and corrupt institutions face the threat of having their wealth appropriated by government, so have the incentive to use some of their wealth to seek political power to protect the rest of their wealth from confiscation. While autocrats may use government institutions to increase their wealth, autocrats in countries with low-quality institutions tend to be wealthy when they assume power, because wealthy individuals have the incentive to use their wealth to acquire political power to protect themselves from a potentially predatory government

Innocence Lost: Bennis v. Michigan and the Forfeiture Tradition

In Bennis v. Michigan, the Supreme Court upheld the State of Michigan\u27s forfeiture of Tina Bennis\u27s joint ownership interest in a car used by her husband for a tryst with a prostitute. Surveying its prior cases, the Court found that Tina Bennis\u27s innocence of the offending conduct was irrelevant to the constitutionality of Michigan\u27s forfeiture of her ownership interest. In so finding, the Court relied on the tradition of forfeiture to affirm the constitutionality of the tyranny and avarice condemned by James Wilson-a leading framer of the Constitution. The Anglo-American tradition of civil forfeiture, however, is considerably narrower than the Court\u27s account. The forfeiture known to the common law never would have reached the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture in Bennis. The modern Court\u27s careless reading of forfeiture tradition has allowed state and federal governments to expand forfeiture well beyond its historical boundaries. Consequently, forfeiture has come to be an instrument of oppression that would have appalled Wilson and the rest of America\u27s founding generation

Innocence Lost: Bennis V. Michigan and the Forfeiture Tradition

In Bennis v. Michigan, the Supreme Court upheld the State of Michigan\u27s forfeiture of Tina Bennis\u27s joint ownership interest in a car used by her husband for a tryst with a prostitute. Surveying its prior cases, the Court found that Tina Bennis\u27s innocence of the offending conduct was irrelevant to the constitutionality of Michigan\u27s forfeiture of her ownership interest. In so finding, the Court relied on the tradition of forfeiture to affirm the constitutionality of the tyranny and avarice condemned by James Wilson-a leading framer of the Constitution. The Anglo-American tradition of civil forfeiture, however, is considerably narrower than the Court\u27s account. The forfeiture known to the common law never would have reached the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture in Bennis. The modern Court\u27s careless reading of forfeiture tradition has allowed state and federal governments to expand forfeiture well beyond its historical boundaries. Consequently, forfeiture has come to be an instrument of oppression that would have appalled Wilson and the rest of America\u27s founding generation

Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from Economics and History

This Article uses economic analysis to show how civil forfeiture’s role in the war on drugs creates contrary incentives for law enforcement officials and encourages abuses. The Article then reviews the history of civil forfeiture and the Supreme Court’s forfeiture jurisprudence, which seems incoherent. The Authors warn that the judiciary should be skeptical of civil forfeiture and its importance to the war on drugs. The Article proposes a constitutional framework, grounded in economics and history, to limit forfeiture abuses

Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from Economics and History

This Article uses economic analysis to show how civil forfeiture’s role in the war on drugs creates contrary incentives for law enforcement officials and encourages abuses. The Article then reviews the history of civil forfeiture and the Supreme Court’s forfeiture jurisprudence, which seems incoherent. The Authors warn that the judiciary should be skeptical of civil forfeiture and its importance to the war on drugs. The Article proposes a constitutional framework, grounded in economics and history, to limit forfeiture abuses