A Himalayan Challenge

Ever since 1962, when soldiers from the People’s Republic of China inflicted a humiliating defeat on Indian forces, India and China have maintained an uneasy coexistence along the world’s longest disputed frontier. While certain aspects of the Sino-Indian security dynamic have improved markedly, others have given rise to growing unease. On the positive side of the ledger, the two nations have succeeded in avoiding a direct, armed conflict since a bloody skirmish in 1967, and have developed a number of confidence building measures to prevent isolated incidents from spiraling out of control

Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean

This study seeks to raise awareness on an issue that is destined to become of great importance, not only to those who closely follow security issues in South Asia, but also to all those with an interest in the fascinating -- and often troubling -- intersections of naval and nuclear strategy. In particular, it seeks to explore how naval nuclear interactions might lead to friction, misperception, and escalation -- and what can be done to prevent or forestall such developments. The report is divided into three main sections. The first section engages in a granular analysis of South Asia's current naval nuclear developments, describing the motivations and aspirations of both actors, as well as the current limitations to these same ambitions. The report then draws on the history of naval nuclear operations during the Cold War before detailing how some of the debates and discussions held during that rich and variegated period in history could potentially apply to contemporary South Asia. Notwithstanding the reflexive skepticism of many in New Delhi and Islamabad, the intellectual contortions of previous generations of nuclear strategists hold an immense value in terms of thinking more deeply about issues as complex as conventional operations under a nuclear shadow, naval nuclear signaling, and escalation control. The third and final section of the report explores the clouded future of naval nuclear dynamics in the Indian Ocean. Beijing might come to play a more important role, both as an enabler for Pakistani naval nuclearization and as a naval nuclear actor in its own right. Finally, ongoing technological developments in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) might have a sizable impact on sea-based deterrence and naval crisis stability in the region

India: the next superpower?: the military dimensions of India's rise

Power is a notoriously elusive concept. The question of how one can define, list, and identify the different facets of national power is one that has long preoccupied social scientists. In our rapidly changing world, which is witnessing a major diffusion in wealth from west to east, the question of power is accompanied by an added sense of urgency, as we seek to understand which states will wield true power in the emerging international system. The first, and most immediately identifiable form of power is a nation’s military strength. The numbers and characteristics of infantry battalions, fleets of vessels and columns of tanks seem to provide clear, straightforward, and easily quantifi able indicators of a country’s growing clout. This apparent simplicity, however, is highly deceptive. The study of military power cannot solely be based on an assessment of resources. Rather, the question is how a nation decides to convert those same resources into favourable outcomes, or to put it more bluntly, how it translates military hardware into military effectiveness, and how that same military effectiveness is harnessed as a means of grand strategy. To study military power, we therefore need to examine the interwoven human, institutional and doctrinal aspects which undergird the manner in which military resources are both procured and used

Raison d'Etat: Richelieu's Grand Strategy During the Thirty Years' War (May 2019)

Renowned for his fierce intellect, mastery of the dark arts of propaganda, and unshakeable belief in the centralizing virtues of the French monarchy, Cardinal Richelieu’s actions as chief minister under Louis XIII from 1624 to 1642 have been heatedly debated by generations of historians, political philosophers, novelists, and biographers. The polarizing figure is best known for three things: his unabashed authoritarianism, his efforts to stiffen the sinews of the French state, and his decision to position France as a counterweight to Habsburg hegemony through a network of alliances with Protestant powers. This article focuses on this last aspect of Richelieu’s life and legacy: his conception and practice of great power competition. What philosophy of power and statecraft underpinned the cardinal’s approach to counter-hegemonic balancing? To what extent was Richelieu truly successful, and what insights can contemporary security managers derive from his policies and actions? Drawing on both primary and secondary literature, this essay engages in a detailed and interdisciplinary study of Richelieu’s grand strategy during the Thirty Years’ War.LBJ School of Public Affair

L'Inde et sa Marine au XXIe siècle

La réorientation stratégique des États-Unis vers l’espace indo-pacifique a été accompagnée par un regain d’intérêt pour ce qui est des questions maritimes. A la différence des théâtres principaux de la Guerre Froide, la géographie stratégique et économique de la région est fortement marquée par ses larges océans, ses détroits congestionnes, et ses eaux contestées. En conséquent, les profils nivaux des deux grandes puissances émergentes asiatiques, l’Inde et la Chine, ont attire une quantité non négligeable de travaux académiques. Cependant, alors que diverses études se sont focalises sur le rôle de la marine chinoise en tant que composante d’une stratégie militaire plus globale, jusqu’a récemment la majorité des explorations détaillées de la puissance navale indienne se sont penches sur la marine indienne elle-même, plutôt que sur la question de comment la quête de la puissance maritime s’articulait au sein d’une “grande stratégie” (grand strategy) plus compréhensive. Se basant sur plusieurs années de travail de terrain en Inde, en Chine, au Sri Lanka, ainsi qu’aux États-Unis, et plus d’une centaine d’entretiens avec des officiers de la marine indienne, ainsi qu’avec des responsables gouvernementaux ou militaires indiens, chinois, pakistanais, ou américains ; cette thèse vise a donner lieu a une meilleure compréhension-a la fois plus nuancée et aboutie-des tenants et des aboutissants de la modernisation navale indienne. Pour être plus précis, cette thèse tente de fournir une réponse a un paradoxe particulièrement troublant: la non juxtaposition, ou le « désalignement » (misalignment) constant entre la stratégie militaire indienne et la géographie maritime du pays. En effet, la position enviable de la péninsule indienne au centre de l’océan indien devrait, a priori, suggérer une prédisposition naturelle pour l’exercice de la puissance maritime. Depuis l’Independence, cependant, la marine indienne, d’une manière consistante, a été la moins bien financée des branches militaires indiennes, et a fréquemment lutté pour remplir un éventail exigeant de missions avec seulement des ressources très limitées. Il est certes vrai que, depuis deux décennies a peu près, le trajectoire de la marine indienne a pris un virage que l’on pourrait qualifier de positif, a la fois en terme de financement, et en terme d’acquisitions. Cela étant dit, la branche dite « Cendrillon » (Cinderella Service) continue de capter la portion la plus infime du budget de défense indien, qui persiste a nettement favoriser une armée indienne particulièrement lourde en effectifs humains. En 2013, par exemple, la marine indienne a seulement reçu 16 % du budget de défense, alors que l’armée a perçu a peu près 58 %, et l’armée de l’air 26%. Depuis plus d’une demie-décennie, des officiers de marine ont affirme a de multiples reprises, au cours de conversations avec cet auteur, que la part de budget de la marine s’élèverait éventuellement a 25 % du budget global, seulement pour voir leurs espoirs brises. La question fondamentale, donc, a laquelle cette thèse s’évertue a répondre est la suivante : cette tendance persistera t’elle, ou peut-on s’attendre a ce qu’une combinaison de facteurs provoque une refonte graduelle de la stratégie militaire indienne, ainsi que du schéma d’acquisitions et financement de son outil militaire ?The United States’ strategic reorientation towards the Indo-Pacific has been accompanied by a heightened interest in matters maritime. In contrast to the primary theaters of the Cold War, the region’s strategic and economic geography is strongly defined by its wide oceans, narrow chokepoints, and meandering waterways. As a result, the naval profiles of Asia’s two great rising powers, India and China, have attracted a hitherto unprecedented level of scholarly attention. However, while various studies have focused on the role of China’s navy within its wider military strategy, until recently most detailed explorations of India’s growing naval power primarily focused on the Indian navy itself-rather than on how the quest for seapower fit into New Delhi’s emerging grand strategy. Building on several years of research in India, China, Sri Lanka, and the United States, and over one hundred interviews of Indian naval officers and government officials, both serving and retired, this dissertation aims to provide a deeper understanding of the context and ramifications of India’s naval rise. In particular, it seeks to explain a troubling paradox: the continued misalignment of New Delhi’s military strategy with its maritime geography. Indeed, the country’s enviable position at the heart of the Indian Ocean, along with its peninsular formation and extensive coastlines, would seem to suggest a natural predisposition towards the exercise of naval power. In reality, however, India’s navy since independence has consistently been the most poorly funded of its military services, and has frequently struggled to make do with limited resources. While the navy’s fortunes have taken a positive turn over the past two decades, both in terms of funding and procurement, the so-called Cinderella service still only captures the smallest portion of the overall defense budget, which remains heavily skewed toward the nation’s manpower-intensive Army. In 2013, for example, the Indian Navy only captured 16% of the defense budget, whereas the Army captured approximately 58%, and the Air Force 26%. Over the past five years, Indian naval officers have repeatedly assured this author that the Navy’s share would eventually rise to 25% of the overall defense budget, only to be sorely disappointed. The core question this dissertation endeavors to address is whether this trend will persist, or whether various factors will combine in order to provoke a gradual rebalancing of the nation’s military strategy and force structure