- A MODEL OF VOTING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND OPINION POLLS

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with incomplete information is developed.It is assumed that voters care about the distribu-tion of votes among the two candidates. Votershave an incomplete infor-mation about the distribution of voters´ types. We provide conditions forwhich the publication of opinion polls may solve the informational problem voters face. The mainresult states that only when the distribution of voters is polarized we could expect that voters actas if they were fully informed.Spatial competition, Incomplete Information, Opinion Polls.

- IDEOLOGICAL VERSUS DOWNSIAN POLITICAL COMPETITION

We analyze a one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with two parties and uncertainty on the distribution of voters types. We assume that parties are formed by regular members and professional politicians; members care about the policy enacted, while professional politicians, on the contrary, only care about winning the election. We consider two possibilities: that members choose the political platforms and that professional politicians are the ones who choose such platforms. The expected utility for party members is analyzed under these two cases. We find that when professional politicians have no informational advantage, it is on the interest of both parties to let professional politicians choose the platforms. Only in the case in which professional politicians have much better information than the members of the party about voters is it possible that party members obtain a greater expected utility choosing the platforms themselves rather than letting the professional politicians choose.party competition, delegation, asymmetric information

Tax enforcement problems

We study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal-agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions. These are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and satisfies certain social norms. We prove that, for a large family of penalty functions, this policy is such that honesty implies regressiveness. This result does not depend on the fact that agents know the true probability of inspection.Publicad

Income taxation, uncertainty and stability

This paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules. It is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than the status quo. A tax policy is stable if it is a Condorcet winner. It is well known that in a model without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare. We show, however, that in real cases this might not be a serious problem since small amounts of uncertainty can bring stability to the status quo. It is also shown that linear tax functions can only be stable in economies with very egalitarian income distributions and high taxation levelsPublicad

IS REGIONALISM BETTER FOR ECONOMIC INTEGRATION? NATIONS, REGIONS, AND RISK SHARING

Our analysis yields some conclusions about the political role of regions in the formation of supranational economic areas, which turns out to be quite different from the role of nations. The claim that regions have more incentives than nations to attain a fiscal agreement implying full economic integration is likely to be correct when nations are economic stable arrangements, i.e. when the rich region of a nation is not "exploited" by the poor region. When, on the other hand, it is not on the interest of a rich region to be part of a nation, attempts to achieve full economic integration among a group of nations is more likely to be successful if nations, instead of regions, are the decision makers.Federalism; Fiscal coinsurance; Migration.

PUBLIC FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES

This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parties receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds finance electoral campaigns. Two cases are investigated. In the first some voters are policy motivated and some are "impressionable" - their vote depends directly on campaign expenditures. In the second campaigning is informative and all voters are policy motivated. Public funds increase policy convergence in both cases. The effect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. When campaigns are informative, there may be multiple equilibria. Intuitively, a large party can stay large since it receives large funds.Public Funding, Political Competition, Information.

ALTRUISM VS. EXCHANGE IN INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS: NEW EVIDENCE FROM CHILDREN'S HEALTH CARE

We put in perspective two competing hypothesis on the nature of intergenerational transfers: altruism vs. exchange motivation. Unlike previous approaches, we concentrate on non-monetary transfers measured as the effort that parents need to make in order to prevent children?s fatal health episodes. It is shown that, under the pure altruism hypothesis richer parents should be more prompt than poorer ones to exert this effort in the face of a bad-health signal. Inversely, richer parents would need to observe a higher signal than poorer when parents consider raising healthy children as an investment for the future times. Using data on frequency of utilization of the emergency room services and doctor?s office visits by low-age children, infant mortality and home-accident preventive care, we reject the null of altruism. Instead, we conclude that exchange motives do not enter into contradiction with the evidence.Intergenerational transfers, altruism and exchange motivations, child

RATIONAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT

We propose a two-region two-sector model of uneven development,where technological change benefits either the lagging or the leading region. Inthis framework inter-regional transfers may lead to persistentunderdevelopment; by raising wages, transfers reduce the chance of thebackward region adopting a new technology and taking o.. Due to uncertaintyabout which region benefits from technological change, the backward regionmay rationally choose to remain underdeveloped, while the advanced regioncontinues to pay transfers. The model provides a rationale for cases, such asItaly’s Mezzogiorno, where the same rich region subsidizes the same poorregion on a continuous basis.inter-regional transfers, regional policy, uneven development.

DELEGATION AND POLARIZATION OF PLATFORMS

We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.Political Parties, Delegation, Polarization.

ENDOGENOUS PARTY FORMATION AND THE EFFECT OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION ON POLICY

We develop a model of spatial political competition with ideological parties and uncertainty. The political issue is the income tax rate and the amount of a public good. The ideology of each party is determine endogenously. We show that the tax rate does not coincide with the ideal policy of the median voter. Moreover, the tax rate is not increasing in the difference between the mean income and the median income.Party formation, redistribution, growth.