Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups

AbstractMany rebel organizations receive significant assistance from external governments, yet the reasons why some rebels attract foreign support while others do not is poorly understood. We analyze factors determining external support for insurgent groups from a principal-agent perspective. We focus on both the supply side, that is, when states are willing to support insurgent groups in other states, and the demand side, that is, when groups are willing to accept such support, with the conditions that this may entail. We test our hypotheses using new disaggregated data on insurgent groups and foreign support. Our results indicate that external rebel support is influenced by characteristics of the rebel group as well as linkages between rebel groups and actors in other countries. More specifically, we find that external support is more likely for moderately strong groups where support is more likely to be offered and accepted, in the presence of transnational constituencies, international rivalries, and when the government receives foreign support.</jats:p

Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad

Although research on conflict has tended to separately study interstate conflict and civil war, states experiencing civil wars are substantially more likely to become involved in militarized disputes with other states. Scholars have typically focused on opportunistic attacks or diversionary wars to explain this domestic–international conflict nexus. The authors argue that international disputes that coincide with civil wars are more often directly tied to the issues surrounding the civil war and emphasize intervention, externalization, and unintended spillover effects from internal conflict as important sources of international friction. They empirically demonstrate that civil wars substantially increase the probability of disputes between states. An analysis of conflict narratives shows that the increased risk of interstate conflict associated with civil wars is primarily driven by states' efforts to affect the outcome of the civil war through strategies of intervention and externalization and not by an increase in conflicts over unrelated issues. </jats:p

A House Divided: Threat Perception, Regime Factionalism and Repression in Africa

The Ohio State University Mershon Center for International Security StudiesWhy do governments in Africa repress certain contentious challenges but not others? This study adopts a blended approach to studying repression by taking seriously both the characteristics of contentious events as well as nature of the regime in power. We argue that the more threatening a movement is — as measured by the use of violence, opposition demands, and targets — the more likely the state is to use repressive force. However, we relax the assumption that the state is a unitary actor, and allow for the preferences of state leaders and of the security forces to diverge when it comes to carrying out repressive policies. Countries with a history of factionalism in their security forces face an additional challenge: orders to crack down on protesters, rioters, strikers, etc., may not be followed or could even cause police and military forces to defect. We argue this potential is greatest when the challenge is has ethnoreligious aims. We test these propositions using the Social Conflict in Africa Database, and find significant support for our core theoretical conjecture: regimes with a history of past military factionalism are generally less likely to use repression. Such regimes are especially unwilling to repress ethnoreligiously based, ascriptive movements. These results are robust to several estimators that address the hierarchical nature of the event data. These findings demonstrate the benefits of a blended, event-based approach to studying state repression.Mershon Center for International Security StudiesEvent Web Page, Streaming Video, Event Photo

Forum: conflict delegation in civil wars

This forum provides an outlet for an assessment of research on the delegation of war to non-state armed groups in civil wars. Given the significant growth of studies concerned with this phenomenon over the last decade, this forum critically engages with the present state of the field. First, we canvass some of the most important theoretical developments to demonstrate the heterogeneity of the debate. Second, we expand on the theme of complexity and investigate its multiple facets as a window into pushing the debate forward. Third, we draw the contours of a future research agenda by highlighting some contemporary problems, puzzles, and challenges to empirical data collection. In essence, we seek to connect two main literatures that have been talking past each other: external support in civil wars and proxy warfare. The forum bridges this gap at a critical juncture in this new and emerging scholarship by offering space for scholarly dialogue across conceptual labels

It Takes Two

Theories of conflict emphasize dyadic interaction, yet existing empirical studies of civil war focus largely on state attributes and pay little attention to nonstate antagonists. We recast civil war in a dyadic perspective, and consider how nonstate actor attributes and their relationship to the state influence conflict dynamics. We argue that strong rebels, who pose a military challenge to the government, are likely to lead to short wars and concessions. Conflicts where rebels seem weak can become prolonged if rebels can operate in the periphery so as to defy a government victory yet are not strong enough to extract concessions. Conflicts should be shorter when potential insurgents can rely on alternative political means to violence. We examine these hypotheses in a dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcomes, using new data on nonstate actors and conflict attributes, finding support for many of our conjectures. </jats:p

Las tramas del conflicto prolongado en la frontera colombo-venezolana: un análisis de las violencias y actores armados en el contexto del posacuerdo de paz

Objetivo/contexto: con base en el estudio de caso del departamento de Norte de Santander, el artículo presenta un análisis de las transformaciones en las dinámicas de violencia y conflicto y en la constelación de actores armados no estatales en la frontera colombo-venezolana luego de la firma del acuerdo de paz con las FARC. El estudio se basa en una perspectiva que considera las dinámicas del conflicto prolongado en Colombia y sus legados en los órdenes sociales, así como las particularidades que la condición de frontera trae consigo en términos de seguridad. Metodología: estudio de caso empírico basado en información recogida mediante entrevistas y observación no participante, así como en revisión de informes, prensa y bibliografía secundaria. Conclusión: la situación de violencia e inseguridad actual es el resultado de las dinámicas de un conflicto prolongado donde tres tipos de conflicto confluyen, interactúan y se retroalimentan: la guerra civil en Colombia, la violencia criminal, y la crisis migratoria y humanitaria producto de la crisis venezolana. En este marco se ha dado un fortalecimiento de un orden no estatal, mayor fragmentación de actores armados no estatales y competencia criminal. Originalidad: la existencia de abundante información sobre la situación de seguridad y violencia en la frontera colombo-venezolana en el periodo reciente contrasta con los pocos análisis académicos y desarrollos conceptuales al respecto. Este artículo intenta hacer una contribución mediante: a) un marco conceptual que conecta las literaturas sobre conflicto armado, órdenes sociales y seguridad en territorios fronterizos; b) análisis con base en información primaria que da cuenta tanto del fenómeno como del contexto.Objective/Context: Based on a case study of the Department of Norte de Santander, Colombia, this article analyzes the changes in the dynamics of violence and the composition of the armed non-State actors on the Colombian-Venezuelan borders after the signing of the peace agreement between the Colombian State and the FARC guerrilla. It focuses on the dynamics of the protracted conflict in Colombia, its impact on the social orders of this territory and the particular implications of the 'border effect' in terms of security. Methodology: This empirical study is based on information gathered from interviews and non-participatory observations, complemented by a review of official reports, newspaper articles and the secondary literature. Conclusion: The current situation of violence and insecurity is the result of the overlapping of three types of conflict which interact and mutually influence each other and have been caused by the civil war in Colombia, the activities of criminal gangs and the humanitarian crisis arising from the mass migration of Venezuelans to Colombia. Against this backdrop, there has been a strengthening of a non-State order, an increasing fragmentation of the armed non-state actors and an internecine warfare between criminal gangs. Originality: While a large body of information about the violent situation on the Colombian-Venezuelan border has emerged in recent years, there have been few academic studies of the subject so far. This article aims to make a contribution to this field of study, by presenting: a) a conceptual framework that draws on studies of the armed conflicts, social orders and security of borderlands in other regions, and b) an analysis, based on primary sources, of the phenomenon and the context

Replication data for: Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups

To what extent do international factors affect domestic conflict processes? How do external conditions affect the state’s repressive capabilities and the opportunities for opposition groups to mobilize, launch an insurgency, and sustain it? This article argues that because state strength is limited by international boundaries, rebel groups often organize transnationally in order to evade repression. External bases, refugee communities, and characteristics of neighboring states are expected to increase the likelihood of civil war onset and continuation. Importantly, external mobilization is difficult for states to monitor and verify, a factor that exacerbates bargaining problems and increases the probability of armed conflict. These claims are tested through a quantitative analysis of civil conflicts from 1951 to 1999. Results suggest that weak neighbors, rival neighbors, and refugee diasporas contribute to rebellion and that conflicts endure longer when rebels have access to external bases