Acquaintance and first-person attitude reports

It is often assumed that singular thought requires that an agent be epistemically acquainted with the object the thought is about. However, it can sometimes truthfully be said of someone that they have a belief about an object, despite not being interestingly epistemically acquainted with that object. In defense of an epistemic acquaintance constraint on singular thought, it is thus often claimed that belief ascriptions are context sensitive and do not always track the contents of an agent’s mental states. This paper uses first-person attitude reports to argue that contextualism about belief ascriptions does not present an adequate defense of an acquaintance constraint on singular thought

Acts of desire

ABSTRACT Act-based theories of content hold that propositions are identical to acts of predication that we perform in thought and talk. To undergo an occurrent thought with a particular content is just to perform the act of predication that individuates that content. But identifying the content of a thought with the performance of an act of predication makes it difficult to explain the intentionality of bouletic mental activity, like wanting and desiring. In this paper, I argue that this difficulty is insurmountable: the contents of occurrent desires cannot be determined by acts of predication

The Nyāya Argument for Disjunctivism

The Nyāya school of classical Indian epistemology defended (by today’s standards) a radical version of epistemic externalism. They also gave arguments from their epistemological positions to an early version of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this paper I assess the value of such an argument, concluding that a modified version of the Nyāya argument may be defensible

Phenomenal dispositions

In this paper, I argue against a dispositional account of the intentionality of belief states that has been endorsed by proponents of phenomenal intentionality. Specifically, I argue that the best characterization of a dispositional account of intentionality is one that takes beliefs to be dispositions to undergo occurrent judgments. I argue that there are cases where an agent believes that p, but fails to have a disposition to judge that p

This Paper Might Change your Mind

Rational decision change can happen without information change. This is a problem for standard views of decision theory, on which linguistic intervention in rational decision-making is captured in terms of information change. But the standard view gives us no way to model interventions involving expressions that only have an attentional effects on conversational contexts. How are expressions with non-informational content - like epistemic modals - used to intervene in rational decision making? We show how to model rational decision change without information change: replace a standard conception of value (on which the value of a set of worlds reduces to values of individual worlds in the set) with one on which the value of a set of worlds is determined by a selection function that picks out a generic member world. We discuss some upshots of this view for theorizing in philosophy and formal semantics

Cost of saving natural gas through efficiency programs funded by utility customers: 2012–2017

This study estimates the cost of saving a therm of natural gas from energy efficiency programs funded by utility customers during the period 2012 to 2017. Berkeley Lab researchers compiled and analyzed efficiency program data reported by investor-owned utilities and other program administrators in a dozen states representative of the four U.S. Census regions — Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island and Utah. Depending on the year, the dataset accounts for about 50 percent to 70 percent of annual national spending on natural gas efficiency programs. The estimated cost of saving natural gas during the study period is $0.40 per therm. The analysis also includes estimates of the program administrator cost of saved energy for three core sectors for natural gas: commercial and industrial, residential, and low-income households. It aggregates these sectors to provide regional and national values. Our metrics include savings-weighted averages, unweighted medians, and interquartile ranges (25th and 75th percentiles) of the levelized program administrator cost of saving gas, in constant 2017 dollars. In addition, the study analyzes cost trends during the study period, finding that average program costs trended downward. The U.S. Department of Energy’s Building Technologies Office supported this work

Applying Non-Energy Impacts from Other Jurisdictions in Cost-Benefit Analyses of Energy Efficiency Programs: Resources for States for Utility Customer-Funded Programs

Avoided energy and capacity costs are the primary yardstick utilities use to determine which energy efficiency programs are cost-effective for their customers. But sometimes "non-energy impacts" — not commonly recognized as directly associated with energy generation, transmission and distribution — represent substantial benefits, such as improving comfort, air quality and public health.Considering whether and how to include non-energy impacts is an important part of cost-benefit analyses for these programs. This report offers practical considerations for deciding which non-energy impacts to include and how to apply values or methods from other jurisdictions.Researchers reviewed studies quantifying non-energy impacts used in 30 states and applied a five-point system to indicate transferability of a value or method from each study for 16 categories of non-energy impacts:Water resource costs and benefitsOther fuels costs and benefitsAvoided environmental compliance costsEnvironmental impactsProductivityHealth and safety Asset valueEnergy and/or capacity price suppression effectsAvoided costs of compliance with Renewable Portfolio Standard requirementsAvoided credit and collection costsAvoided ancillary servicesComfortEconomic development and job impactsPublic health impactsEnergy security impactsIncreased reliabilityThe U.S. Department of Energy’s Building Technologies Office supported this work

Régression robuste bayésienne à l'aide de distributions à ailes relevées

Dans ce mémoire nous nous intéressons à des méthodes d'estimations robustes de la pente de la droite de régression linéaire simple ainsi que du paramètre d'échelle de la densité des erreurs en présence de valeurs aberrantes dans l'échantillon de données. Une revue des méthodes d'estimations des paramètres de la droite de régression est présentée. Nous y analysons numériquement les différentes méthodes afin de décrire le comportement des estimateurs en présence d'une valeur aberrante dans l'échantillon. Une méthode d'estimation bayésienne est présentée afin d'estimer la pente de la droite de régression lorsque le paramètre d'échelle est connu. Nous exprimons le problème d'estimation de la pente de la droite de régression en un problème d'estimation d'un paramètre\ud de position, ce qui nous permet d'utiliser les résultats de robustesse bayésienne pour un paramètre de position. Le comportement de cet estimateur est ensuite étudié numériquement lorsqu'il y a une valeur aberrante dans l'échantillon de données. Enfin, nous explorons une méthode bayésienne d'estimation simultanée du paramètre d'échelle et de la pente de la droite de régression. Nous exprimons le problème comme une estimation des paramètres de position et échelle même si les résultats de robustesse bayésienne pour ce cas ne sont pas encore publiés. Nous étudions tout de même le comportement des estimateurs de façon numérique. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Régression linéaire, Inférence bayésienne, Robustesse, Valeurs aberrantes, Densités à ailes relevées, Densités GEP (Generalized exponential power), P-credence

Genericity and Inductive Inference

We can be justified in acting on the basis of evidence confirming a generalization. I argue that such evidence supports belief in non-quantificational – or generic – generalizations, rather than universally quantified generalizations. I show how this account supports, rather than undermines, a Bayesian account of confirmation. Induction from confirming instances of a generalization to belief in the corresponding generic is part of a reasoning instinct that is typically (but not always) correct, and allows us to approximate the predictions that formal epistemology would make