21 research outputs found

    Simple Pricing Schemes for the Cloud

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    The problem of pricing the cloud has attracted much recent attention due to the widespread use of cloud computing and cloud services. From a theoretical perspective, several mechanisms that provide strong efficiency or fairness guarantees and desirable incentive properties have been designed. However, these mechanisms often rely on a rigid model, with several parameters needing to be precisely known in order for the guarantees to hold. In this paper, we consider a stochastic model and show that it is possible to obtain good welfare and revenue guarantees with simple mechanisms that do not make use of the information on some of these parameters. In particular, we prove that a mechanism that sets the same price per time step for jobs of any length achieves at least 50% of the welfare and revenue obtained by a mechanism that can set different prices for jobs of different lengths, and the ratio can be improved if we have more specific knowledge of some parameters. Similarly, a mechanism that sets the same price for all servers even though the servers may receive different kinds of jobs can provide a reasonable welfare and revenue approximation compared to a mechanism that is allowed to set different prices for different servers.Comment: To appear in the 13th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017. A preliminary version was presented at the 12th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon), 201

    Adult and Embryonic GAD Transcripts Are Spatiotemporally Regulated during Postnatal Development in the Rat Brain

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    GABA (gamma-aminobutyric acid), the main inhibitory neurotransmitter in the brain, is synthesized by glutamic acid decarboxylase (GAD). GAD exists in two adult isoforms, GAD65 and GAD67. During embryonic brain development at least two additional transcripts exist, I-80 and I-86, which are distinguished by insertions of 80 or 86 bp into GAD67 mRNA, respectively. Though it was described that embryonic GAD67 transcripts are not detectable during adulthood there are evidences suggesting re-expression under certain pathological conditions in the adult brain. In the present study we systematically analyzed for the first time the spatiotemporal distribution of different GADs with emphasis on embryonic GAD67 mRNAs in the postnatal brain using highly sensitive methods. hybridizations confirmed the occurrence of embryonic GAD67 transcripts in the olfactory bulb and furthermore detected their localization mainly in the subventricular zone and the rostral migratory stream.Embryonic GAD67 transcripts can hardly be detected in the adult brain, except for specific regions associated with neurogenesis and high synaptic plasticity. Therefore a functional role in processes like proliferation, migration or synaptogenesis is suggested

    Infinite-Duration Poorman-Bidding Games

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    In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or payoff of the game. Such games are central in formal verification since they model the interaction between a non-terminating system and its environment. We study bidding games in which the players bid for the right to move the token. Two bidding rules have been defined. In Richman bidding, in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and the higher bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Poorman bidding is similar except that the winner of the bidding pays the “bank” rather than the other player. While poorman reachability games have been studied before, we present, for the first time, results on infinite-duration poorman games. A central quantity in these games is the ratio between the two players’ initial budgets. The questions we study concern a necessary and sufficient ratio with which a player can achieve a goal. For reachability objectives, such threshold ratios are known to exist for both bidding rules. We show that the properties of poorman reachability games extend to complex qualitative objectives such as parity, similarly to the Richman case. Our most interesting results concern quantitative poorman games, namely poorman mean-payoff games, where we construct optimal strategies depending on the initial ratio, by showing a connection with random-turn based games. The connection in itself is interesting, because it does not hold for reachability poorman games. We also solve the complexity problems that arise in poorman bidding games

    Simple pricing schemes for the cloud

    No full text
    The problem of pricing the cloud has attracted much recent attention due to the widespread use of cloud computing and cloud services. From a theoretical perspective, several mechanisms that provide strong efficiency or fairness guarantees and desirable incentive properties have been designed. However, these mechanisms often rely on a rigid model, with several parameters needing to be precisely known in order for the guarantees to hold. In this paper, we consider a stochastic model and show that it is possible to obtain good welfare and revenue guarantees with simple mechanisms that do not make use of the information on some of these parameters. In particular, we prove that a mechanism that sets the same price per time step for jobs of any length achieves at least 50 % of the welfare and revenue obtained by a mechanism that can set different prices for jobs of different lengths, and the ratio can be improved if we have more specific knowledge of some parameters. Similarly, a mechanism that sets the same price for all servers even though the servers may receive different kinds of jobs can provide a reasonable welfare and revenue approximation compared to a mechanism that is allowed to set different prices for different servers

    Simple pricing schemes for the cloud

    No full text
    The problem of pricing the cloud has attracted much recent attention due to the widespread use of cloud computing and cloud services. From a theoretical perspective, several mechanisms that provide strong efficiency or fairness guarantees and desirable incentive properties have been designed. However, these mechanisms often rely on a rigid model, with several parameters needing to be precisely known in order for the guarantees to hold. In this paper, we consider a stochastic model and show that it is possible to obtain good welfare and revenue guarantees with simple mechanisms that do not make use of the information on some of these parameters. In particular, we prove that a mechanism that sets the same price per time step for jobs of any length achieves at least 50 % of the welfare and revenue obtained by a mechanism that can set different prices for jobs of different lengths, and the ratio can be improved if we have more specific knowledge of some parameters. Similarly, a mechanism that sets the same price for all servers even though the servers may receive different kinds of jobs can provide a reasonable welfare and revenue approximation compared to a mechanism that is allowed to set different prices for different servers

    Simple pricing schemes for the cloud

    No full text
    The problem of pricing the cloud has attracted much recent attention due to the widespread use of cloud computing and cloud services. From a theoretical perspective, several mechanisms that provide strong efficiency or fairness guarantees and desirable incentive properties have been designed. However, these mechanisms often rely on a rigid model, with several parameters needing to be precisely known in order for the guarantees to hold. In this paper, we consider a stochastic model and show that it is possible to obtain good welfare and revenue guarantees with simple mechanisms that do not make use of the information on some of these parameters. In particular, we prove that a mechanism that sets the same price per time step for jobs of any length achieves at least 50 % of the welfare and revenue obtained by a mechanism that can set different prices for jobs of different lengths, and the ratio can be improved if we have more specific knowledge of some parameters. Similarly, a mechanism that sets the same price for all servers even though the servers may receive different kinds of jobs can provide a reasonable welfare and revenue approximation compared to a mechanism that is allowed to set different prices for different servers

    Multiagent Mechanism Design Without Money

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