A new argument for mind-brain identity

Cataloged from PDF version of article.In this article, I undertake the tasks: (i) of reconsidering Feigl’s notion of a ‘nomological dangler’ in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality; and (ii) of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being ‘anomic danglers’ (not even nomically correlated) and ‘necessary danglers’ (more than merely nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental–physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favor of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject

Should we fear quantum torment?

The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment. Based on some empirical facts, I argue for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis's terrible scenario. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Hesperus is phosphorus, indeed

Tobias Hansson Wahlberg argues in a recent article that the truth of "Hesperus is Phosphorus" depends on the assumption that the endurance theory of persistence is true. I argue that the premise Wahlberg's conclusion is based upon leads to absurd consequences, therefore, nothing recommends it. As a consequence, "Hesperus is Phosphorus" has to be true, if it is true, regardless of which theory of persistence one is committed to. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V

Quantifier vs. Poetry: Stylistic impoverishment and Socio-Cultural estrangement of Anglo-American philosophy in the last hundred years

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The solo numero paradox

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The reappearing act

In his latest book, Roy Sorensen offers a solution to a puzzle he put forward in an earlier article -The Disappearing Act. The puzzle involves various question about how the causal theory perception is to be applied to the case of seeing shadows. Sorensen argues that the puzzle should be taken as bringing out a new way of seeing shadows. I point out a problem for Sorensen's solution, and offer and defend an alternative view, according to which the puzzle is to be interpreted as showing a new way of seeing objects, in virtue of their contrast with light. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V

Powers and the mind-body problem

This paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument for mind-body property dualism, based on the causal account of properties, according to which properties have their conditional powers essentially. It is argued that the epistemic possibility of physical but not phenomenal duplicates of actuality is identical to a metaphysical (understood as broadly logical) possibility, but irrelevant for establishing the falsity of physicalism. The proposed attack is in many ways inspired by a standard, broadly Kripkean approach to epistemic and metaphysical modality. © 2010 Taylor & Francis

EFFECT OF ACUTE STROKE ON HEART FUNCTION

Background: There are contradictory data on how brain hemispheric localization/side influences the function of the heart. Our aim was to study the pathologic cardiological abnormalities in acute stroke patients without coronary heart disease or rhythm disturbances in the anamnesis. Methods: Between 1st of March, 2009 and 30th of September, 2009 at the Neurointensive Care Unit we monitorized 91 acute stroke patients’ parameters continuously for 24-36 hours: pulse, systolic, diastolic, mean blood pressure, 12 lead ECG. We were interested in the correlation of the above mentioned parameters and age, side and size of the cerebral lesion (by CT/MRI), type of stroke, mortality. Exclusion criteria were: fever, severe hyperglycemia, cardiac failure, myocardial infarct, pulmonary disorders, obstructive sleep apnoe, drug or metabolic caused rhythm disturbances, beta blocker usage. Results: The average age was 62,3±14,6 years. The left hemisphere was affected in 45%, the right in 38,5%, both hemispheres in 3,3%, and 13,2% suffered from VB syndrome. Ischemic stroke was in 74,7%, hemorrhage 14,3%, SAH 3,3%, TIA 7,7%. In the group where no heart disorder was known at admission, altogether 18% had repolarization abnormalities (10 patients had ST depression, 7 ST elevation). In addition, especially during the night, by 33% of the patients supraventricular (SVES) and ventricular extrasystoles (VES) were detected. 35% of patients had tachycardy and 23% bradycardy, both were significantly higher in the right sided lesions (p<0.05). VES was more frequent in left hemispherical lesions and VB syndrome (p<0.05). Less than 90 mmHg systolic pressure could be detected in 27% of patients, this was remarkable at dawn. Nine patients died, in 2 patients fatal rhythm disturbance caused death. Conclusion: Both sided hemispheric lesions and VB syndromes can cause cardiological and ECG abnormalities. Intensive monitoring is essential in acute stroke at least for 36 hours

A new theory of absence experience

Ordering your morning coffee and then realising that your wallet is missing from your bag triggers an experience of the absence of your wallet. Familiar cases like this one provide good evidence for the idea that we frequently experience absences. According to one popular view, we experience absences by perceiving them. I argue that there are a number of problems with the perceptual view, and propose an alternative, cognitive account. Now, a cognitive account of absence experience has already been widely discussed and unequivocally rejected by participants in the debate. However, arguments against it depend upon the important, yet mistaken assumption that cognitive accounts must appeal to beliefs or judgements. I argue that the phenomenology involved in absence experience is not that associated with belief or judgement, but is instead an intellectual seeming. This renders my account immune to the objections that have been made against the existing cognitive view