11 research outputs found
An optimal time incentive/disincentive -based compensation in contracts with multiple agents
This paper establishes an optimal time incentive/disincentive-based compensation in a contract between a principal and a team of agents. The establishment is based on solving an optimization problem. In order to validate the paper's theoretical development practitioners were engaged in a designed exercise. The paper demonstrates that, at the optimum: the proportion of time incentive/disincentive compensation among agents with the same risk-attitude should reflect the levels of their contributions; the proportion of time incentive/disincentive among agents with the same level of contribution should be lowered for agents with higher levels of risk aversion; and the proportion of time incentive/disincentive to a team of risk averse agents should reduce, and the fixed component of the team fee should increase, when the agents in the team become more risk-averse or the level of the uncertainty in project completion time increases. The paper’s outcome provides guidance to those involved in contracts design for choosing the best way to reward (penalise) multiple agents, form a team, and allow for any time saving (overrun) through the terms of a contract.
Optimal outcome sharing with a consortium of contractors
Where a consortium of contractors is involved, there exist no guidelines in the literature on what the outcome sharing arrangement should be. The paper addresses this shortfall. It derives the optimal outcome sharing arrangement for risk-neutral and risk-averse contractors within the consortium, and between the consortium and a risk-neutral owner. Practitioners were engaged in a designed exercise in order to validate the paper’s propositions. The paper demonstrates that, at the optimum: the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same risk-attitude should reflect the levels of their contributions; the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same level of contribution should be lower for contractors with higher levels of risk aversion; a consortium of risk-neutral contractors should receive or bear any favourable or adverse project outcome respectively; and the proportion of outcome sharing to a consortium of risk-averse contractors should reduce, and the fixed component of the consortium fee should increase, when the contractors become more risk-averse or the level of the project outcome uncertainty increases. The paper proposes an original solution to the optimal sharing problem in contracts with a consortium of contractors, thereby contributing to current practices in contracts management.
First published online: 14 Sep 201
WATER FOOTPRINT MODEL OF CEMENT PRODUCTION: A CASE STUDY IN WESTERN IRAN
Cement production is of particular importance in the construction industry.
However, cement production is dependent on water consumption. Iran is located
in a dry region; thus, investigating water consumption of Iranian cement
production and providing solutions for water crisis of such production is of
high interest among cement industry practitioners. Few studies have considered
virtual water consumption and water footprint of cement production in Iran and
all of the world. This paper addresses this knowledge gap. It proposes a
comprehensive model for evaluating water footprint of cement production based
on the type of energy consumption, transportation, and human's effect using a
system boundary analysis. The relationship between water footprint and energy
consumption is highlighted, and solutions to the water consumption problem of
cement production are provided. To demonstrate the application of the proposed
method, a cement manufacturer located on the western Iran as a case study is
analyzed. A sensitivity analysis is conducted to show the effects of considered
parameters on the proposed water footprint model. The paper shows that the
total water footprint among the selected cement manufacturer accounts for
3614\times10^{3}m^{3} in 2017, highlighting a high contribution to cement production in water consumption and risk of maintaining the cement industry in dry regions. The paper also shows that, for the selected cement manufacturer, virtual water footprint is estimated to be 11 times more that direct water consumption, which contributes to 90 percent of the total water footprint. In addition, the paper demonstrates that water consumption intensity in the selected case study is estimated to be 2.126 per each ton of cement produced, while direct water consumption of each ton of cement is estimated to be 0.2.
The paper's findings cast a new insight into water consumption of cement
production wider than currently available. This paper contributes to producing
environmentally-friendly cement in Iran and all of the world