EURAFRICAN GEOPOLITICS? A Qualitative Textual Analysis of the French Geopolitical Construction of Africa in the Post-Cold War Period

Françafrique is a neo-colonial practice characterized by frequent armed interventions in Africa that defined France’s Africa-strategy during the Cold War. French leaders have announced a rupture with Françafrique since the early 1990’s. In the meantime, France has increasingly included the EU in its Africa-strategy. The scholarly literature draws diverging conclusions on if France is Europeanizing a neo-colonial strategy or not, and to what extent the Europeanization is linked to the concept of Eurafrica. Eurafrica denotes a (neo-)colonial idea of forming a Euro-African geographical entity and had its heydays in the late 1950’s. There is however no comprehensive definition of the concept and its underlying ideas and assumptions. This thesis has set out to examine how the concept of Eurafrica can be defined, to what extent French Africa-strategy can be labeled Eurafrican, and if this has evolved in the post-Cold War period, as well as if the announced “rupture” with Françafrique is indeed a change or merely a transfer of a neo-colonial practice to a European level. The thesis concludes that Eurafrica is composed of six subcategories, characterized by constructivist, neo-liberal and neo-realist theoretical assumptions. A frame of analysis is created based on the unpacked definition of Eurafrica and used in a textual analysis of three French White Papers on Defense. It is determined that French Africa-strategy bears less Eurafrican traits than some scholars suggest and is considerably less neocolonial in the 21st century than in 1994

Political Order and Disorder in Weak States : Comparing Explanations of State Failure and non-Failure in two West African and two Central Asian States

States that lack complete control of peripheral regions might be qualified as weak, and previous research suggests that they face an increased risk of state failure. Yet, in the periphery of many states, authority is shared by the government and non-state actors. Far from all these “weak” states are “failed” in the sense of failing to provide services and political order to their inhabitants. Before exploring this enigma, an attempt to clear the conceptual haze surrounding the notions of weakness and failure is made. An investigation into when state weakness leads to state failure – and when it does not – is thereafter undertaken, using a process-tracing method. The thesis explores the structure of state-society relations in two pairs of most similar cases: first Mali and Niger, then Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. All cases are studied over a period of 15 to 25 years and with the aim of determining whether any of two theoretical mechanisms developed from former research holds more value in explaining when weak states fail and when they do not. The first mechanism portrays how weak states construct informal networks of power and fail when these break down, the other depicts how a weak state’s survival is dependent on its ability to uphold a negotiated relationship with non-state actors. State failure in Mali is found to be explained by the failure of negotiated relationships between state and non-state actors. State failure in Tajikistan, on the other hand, can be explained by the government’s incapacity to dominate non-state actors through informal networks of power. However, support for the conclusion that weak states generally seek to govern through negotiated agreements with non-state actors, in line with the second theoretical perspective, is found

Political Order and Disorder in Weak States : Comparing Explanations of State Failure and non-Failure in two West African and two Central Asian States

States that lack complete control of peripheral regions might be qualified as weak, and previous research suggests that they face an increased risk of state failure. Yet, in the periphery of many states, authority is shared by the government and non-state actors. Far from all these “weak” states are “failed” in the sense of failing to provide services and political order to their inhabitants. Before exploring this enigma, an attempt to clear the conceptual haze surrounding the notions of weakness and failure is made. An investigation into when state weakness leads to state failure – and when it does not – is thereafter undertaken, using a process-tracing method. The thesis explores the structure of state-society relations in two pairs of most similar cases: first Mali and Niger, then Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. All cases are studied over a period of 15 to 25 years and with the aim of determining whether any of two theoretical mechanisms developed from former research holds more value in explaining when weak states fail and when they do not. The first mechanism portrays how weak states construct informal networks of power and fail when these break down, the other depicts how a weak state’s survival is dependent on its ability to uphold a negotiated relationship with non-state actors. State failure in Mali is found to be explained by the failure of negotiated relationships between state and non-state actors. State failure in Tajikistan, on the other hand, can be explained by the government’s incapacity to dominate non-state actors through informal networks of power. However, support for the conclusion that weak states generally seek to govern through negotiated agreements with non-state actors, in line with the second theoretical perspective, is found