Separating Agent-Functioning and Inter-Agent Coordination by Activated Modules: The DECOMAS Architecture

The embedding of self-organizing inter-agent processes in distributed software applications enables the decentralized coordination system elements, solely based on concerted, localized interactions. The separation and encapsulation of the activities that are conceptually related to the coordination, is a crucial concern for systematic development practices in order to prepare the reuse and systematic integration of coordination processes in software systems. Here, we discuss a programming model that is based on the externalization of processes prescriptions and their embedding in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). One fundamental design concern for a corresponding execution middleware is the minimal-invasive augmentation of the activities that affect coordination. This design challenge is approached by the activation of agent modules. Modules are converted to software elements that reason about and modify their host agent. We discuss and formalize this extension within the context of a generic coordination architecture and exemplify the proposed programming model with the decentralized management of (web) service infrastructures

What Is an Act of Engagement? Between the Social, Collegial and Institutional Protocols

Engagement is not synonymous with commitment, even though both words are used in translations between English, French, and German. However, engagement is also not some supplementary phenomenon or a technical term that the phrase social acts already includes in itself or that the concepts of ‘commitment’ or ‘joint commitment’ somehow necessarily imply. In this article I would like to describe a special kind of social act and determine the function they have in relation between various agents. Most importantly, I would like to define their significance in the transformation of a group into an institution or higher order entity. My premise is that there are acts whose aim is to engage all others, since they refer to all of us together, and in so doing reduce negative (social) “acts” as well as various asocial behaviors within a group or institution. In this sense, engaged acts could alternatively also belong to a kind of institutional act, since they introduce certain adjustments to the institution, changing or modifying its rules, increasing its consistency and efficiency.First book series in Philosophy of the Social Sciences that specifically focuses on Philosophy of Sociality and Social Ontology. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality Volume 1

How Does Reasoning (Fail to) Contribute to Moral Judgment? Dumbfounding and Disengagement

Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other people’s behavior, that moral reasoning is biased and ineffective, as it rarely makes people change their mind. I present complementary evidence pertaining to self-directed reasoning about what to do. More specifically, Albert Bandura’s experiments concerning moral disengagement reveal that moral reasoning often does contribute effectively to the formation of moral judgments. And such reasoning need not be biased. Once this evidence is taken into account, it becomes clear that both cognition and affect can play a destructive as well as a constructive role in the formation of moral judgments

Mobile Criminals, Immobile Crime: The Efficiency of Decentralized Crime Deterrence

In this paper we examine a class of local crimes that involve perfectly mobile criminals, and perfectly immobile criminal opportunities. We focus on local non-rival crime deterrence that is more efficient against criminals pursuing domestic crimes than criminals pursuing crimes elsewhere. In a standard case of sincerely delegated politicians and zero transfers to other districts, we show that centralized deterrence unambiguously dominates the decentralized deterrence. With strategic delegation and voluntary in-kind transfers, the tradeoff is exactly the opposite: Decentralization achieves the social optimum, whereas cooperative centralization overprovides for enforcement. This is robust to various cost-sharing modes. We also examine the effects of the growing interdependence of districts, stemming from criminals' increasing opportunities to strategically displace. Contrary to the supposition in Oates's decentralization theorem, increasing interdependence makes centralization less desirable

Formal specification of multi-agent systems by using EUSMs

The behavior of e-commerce agents can be defined at different levels of abstraction. A formalism allowing to define them in terms of their economic activities, Utility State Machines, has been proposed. Due to its high level of abstraction, this formalism focuses on describing the economic goals rather on how they are achieved. Though this approach is suitable to specify the objectives of e-commerce agents, as well as to construct formal analysis methodologies, this framework is not suitable to define the strategic behavior of agents. In this paper we develop a new formalism to explicitly define the strategic behavior of agents in a modular way. In particular, we reinterpret the role of utility functions, already used in USMs in a more restrictive manner, so that they define strategic preferences and activities of agents. We apply the formalism to define the agents in a benchmark e-commerce agent environment, the Supply Chain Management Game. Since the strategic behavior of agents is located in a specific part of the formalism, different strategies can be easily considered, which enhances the reusability of the proposed specification