192 research outputs found
Conviction by Consent? Vulnerability, Autonomy, and Conviction by Guilty Plea
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from SAGE Publications via the DOI in this record.A criminal conviction resulting from a guilty plea rather than a full trial is typically
justified on the basis that the defendant had the ability to go to trial, but instead chose to
admit guilt in exchange for a small sentence reduction. In other words, the conviction,
and associated waiver of rights, occurred by consent. In this article, I challenge that
notion by drawing on psycho-legal research on vulnerability and consent and research
on guilty pleas in the United States. I suggest that whilst plea procedure in England and
Wales has largely escaped criticism due to modest sentence reductions compared to the
United States âplea bargainingâ system, aspects of the system are highly problematic and
are likely to be leading to non-consensual guilty pleas, in which innocent defendants are
pleading guilty
Conviction by Consent? Vulnerability, Autonomy, and Conviction by Guilty Plea
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from SAGE Publications via the DOI in this record.A criminal conviction resulting from a guilty plea rather than a full trial is typically
justified on the basis that the defendant had the ability to go to trial, but instead chose to
admit guilt in exchange for a small sentence reduction. In other words, the conviction,
and associated waiver of rights, occurred by consent. In this article, I challenge that
notion by drawing on psycho-legal research on vulnerability and consent and research
on guilty pleas in the United States. I suggest that whilst plea procedure in England and
Wales has largely escaped criticism due to modest sentence reductions compared to the
United States âplea bargainingâ system, aspects of the system are highly problematic and
are likely to be leading to non-consensual guilty pleas, in which innocent defendants are
pleading guilty
Constrained Waiver of Trial Rights? Incentives to Plead Guilty and the Right to a Fair Trial
This is the final version. Available on open access from Wiley via the DOI in this recordThis article develops an interpretative framework to examine when incentives to plead guilty should be found to constrain defendant choice to waive fair trial rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. This framework is informed by existing jurisprudence, specifically the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Natsvlishvili v. Georgia and Deweer v. Belgium, and socio-legal literature. According to the framework, an incentive to plead guilty should be found to violate fair trial rights where it makes it unreasonable to expect the defendant to exercise their right to a full trial, is independent of the projected outcome at trial, and causes the defendant to plead guilty. An empirical analysis of guilty plea practice in England and Wales informed by this new framework identifies problematic incentives and suggests such incentives may disproportionately influence vulnerable defendants
Expert Decision Making: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Perspective
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Routledge via the ISBN in this recor
From Meaning to Money: Translating Injury Into Dollars
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the American Psychological Association via the DOI in this record.Legal systems often require the translation of qualitative assessments into quantitative
judgments, yet the qualitative-to-quantitative conversion is a challenging, understudied process.
We conducted an experimental test of predictions from a new theory of juror damage award
decision making, examining how 154 lay people engaged in the translation process in
recommending money damages for pain and suffering in a personal injury tort case. The
experiment varied the presence, size, and meaningfulness of an anchor number to determine how
these factors influenced monetary award judgments, perceived difficulty, and subjective
meaningfulness of awards. As predicted, variability in awards was high, with awards
participants considered to be âmediumâ (rather than âlowâ or âhighâ) having the most dispersion.
The gist of awards as low, medium, or high fully mediated the relationship between perceived
pain/suffering and award amount. Moreover, controlling for participantsâ perceptions of
plaintiffs and defendants, as well as their desire to punish and to take economic losses into
account, meaningful anchors predicted unique variance in award judgments: A meaningful large
anchor number drove awards up and a meaningful small anchor drove them down, whereas
meaningless large and small anchors did not differ significantly. Numeracy did not predict
award magnitudes or variability, but surprisingly, more numerate participants reported that it was
more difficult to pick an exact figure to compensate the plaintiff for pain and suffering. The
results support predictions of the theory about qualitative gist and meaningful anchors, and
suggest that we can assist jurors to arrive at damage awards by providing meaningful numbers.Preparation of this article was funded by National Science Foundation grant SES1536238:
âQuantitative Judgments in Law: Studies of Damage Award Decision Makingâ to
Valerie P. Hans and Valerie F. Reyna
Trial by Numbers
This is the final version of the article. Freely available from the publisher via the link in this record.Legal cases often require jurors to use numerical information. They
may need to evaluate the meaning of specific numbers, such as the
probability of match between a suspect and a DNA sample, or they may
need to arrive at a sound numerical judgment, such as a money damage
award. Thus, it is important to know how jurors understand numerical
information, and what steps can be taken to increase juror comprehension
and appropriate application of numerical evidence. In this Article,
we examine two types of juror decisions involving numbersââdecisions
in which jurors must convert numbers into meaning (such as by understanding
numerical evidence in order to determine guilt or liability), and
decisions in which jurors must convert meaning into numbers (such as by
understanding qualitative evidence and converting this into a numerical
damage award amount). In each of these areas we analyze legal cases
and research to examine areas in which dealing with numbers leads to
sound or sub-optimal decision making in jurors. We then examine psychological
theory and research on numerical decision making to understand
how informed, fair, and consistent juror decision making about
numbers can be promoted. We conclude that what is often most important
is juror understanding of the meaning of numbers in context rather
than technically precise numerical ability, supporting the role of the lay
jury. We also suggest how to improve juror understanding, so that jury
decisions better reflect considered community judgment.Preparation of this Article was supported
in part by the Martha E. Foulk Fellowship awarded to Rebecca K. Helm, by National Science
Foundation award SES-1536238: âQuantitative Judgments in Law: Studies of Damage Award
Decision Makingâ to Valerie P. Hans and Valerie F. Reyna, by a grant from Cornell Universityâs
Institute for Social Sciences to Valerie P. Hans and Valerie F. Reyna, and by National
Institute of Health (National Institute of Nursing Research) award RO1NR014368-01 to Valerie
F. Reyna
Wrongful Conviction in England and Wales: An Assessment of Successful Appeals and Key Contributors
This is the final version. Available on open access from the University of Alberta via the DOI in this recordThis paper presents an analysis of 88 criminal convictions that have since been quashed on the basis of error of fact (wrongful convictions) that have occurred in England and Wales since 2007, in the context of a wider set of 389 wrongful convictions that have occurred in England and Wales since 1970. Based on this analysis, three key contributors of concern are identified as having been influential in leading to wrongful convictions recently - digital evidence, guilty pleas, and misleading testimony. Cases involving each of these factors are discussed, including cases from the Post Office Scandal, which make up many of the identified wrongful convictions during this period. In considering each factor, failings in the criminal justice system that leave defendants vulnerable to wrongful conviction are discussed. The paper concludes with brief initial suggestions for reform to provide greater protection against highlighted vulnerabilities.UK Research and Innovatio
Adaptive lie detection and perceived prevalence of false reports in evaluation of sexual offence allegations
This is the author accepted manuscriptAll materials underlying studies and the final datasets are available at
https://osf.io/6c8pw/?view_only=a03a52056e9647af88d1cb5d1d836574.Research suggests that perceptions of the prevalence of truth and lies are important in informing evaluations of the honesty of others and, relatedly, the accuracy of the statements made by others. This research investigates these perceptions of prevalence and their influence specifically in the context of sexual offence reports. Results provide insight into perceptions of the prevalence of true and false statements in this context, and the influence of these perceptions on legal decision-making. Importantly, results support predictions informed by the Adaptive Lie Detector Framework and Fuzzy-Trace Theory by showing that providing evidence-based information on prevalence changes evaluations of witness testimony, but that this change is influenced by the framing of information provided as well as precise information itself. These findings provide new insight into how juries function as lie detectors, and into why juries may convict relatively few defendants in cases primarily reliant on defendant and complainant testimony.UK Research and Innovatio
Pleading guilty online: enhanced vulnerability and access to justice
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is freely available from Wiley via the link in this recordOnline courts have the potential to create or exacerbate pressures to plead guilty,
particularly for vulnerable defendants. I explore these pressures in the context of the
Covid-19 pandemic in which increasing use of online justice has coincided with a
significant increase in guilty pleas.Medical Research Council (MRC
Predicting and projecting memory: Error and bias in metacognitive judgments underlying testimony evaluation
This is the final version. Available on open access from Wiley via the DOI in this recordPreregistration, data, and materials underlying the proposed work are available on OSF at:
https://osf.io/ms3f4/?view_only=f6ddb94b127045b1b3b7a487bbe8d874Purpose: Metacognitive judgments of what another person would remember had they experienced a stimulus â i.e., social metamemory judgments, are likely to be important in evaluations of testimony in criminal and civil justice systems. This paper develops and tests predictions about two sources of error in social metamemory judgments that have the potential to be important in legal contexts â errors resulting from beliefs informed by own memory being inappropriately applied to the memory of others, and errors resulting from differential experience of an underlying stimulus. Method: We examined social metamemory judgments in two experimental studies. In Experiment 1 (N = 323) participants were required to make either social metamemory judgments relating to faces or predictions relating to their own memory for faces. In Experiment 2 (N = 275), we manipulated participant experience of faces, holding the described experience of the person whose memory was being assessed constant and asked participants to make social metamemory judgments. Results: As predicted, judgments relating to the memory of others were prone to inaccuracy. While participants making predictions relating to their own memory performed above chance, participants making social metamemory judgments performed no better than chance. Social metamemory judgments were also influenced by the way stimuli were experienced by an assessor, even where this experience did not correspond to the experience of the person whose memory they were assessing. Conclusions: Having our own experiences of memory does not necessarily make us well-placed to assess the memory of others and, in fact, our own experiences of memory can even be misleading in making judgments about the memory of others.UK Research and Innovatio
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