531 research outputs found
Paying for Performance in Hospitals
A frequent form of pay-for-performance programs increase reimbursement for all services by a certain percentage of the baseline price. We examine how such a ?bonus-for-quality? reimbursement scheme a¤ects the wage contract given to physicians by the hospital management. To this end, we determine the bonus inducing hospitals to incentivize their physicians to meet the quality standard. Additionally, we show that the health care payer has to complement the bonus with a (sometimes negative) block grant. We conclude the paper relating the role of the block grant to recent experiences in health care market.Paying-for-Performance; Quality; Hospital Financing
The Inefficiency of Market Transparency – A Model with Endogenous Entry
Including the entry decision in a Bertrand model with imperfectly informed consumers, we introduce a trade-off at the level of social welfare. On the one hand, market transparency is beneficial when the number of firms is exogenously given. On the other, a higher degree of market transparency implies lower profits and hence makes it less attractive to enter the market in the first place. It turns out that the second effect dominates: too much market transparency has a detrimental effect on consumer surplus and on social welfare.Market transparency; endogenous entry; homogenous products
Paying for Performance in Hospitals
A frequent form of pay-for-performance programs increase reimbursement for all services by a certain percentage of the baseline price. We examine how such a “bonus-for-quality” reimbursement scheme affects the wage contract given to physicians by the hospital management. To this end, we determine the bonus inducing hospitals to incentivize their physicians to meet the quality standard. Additionally, we show that the health care payer has to complement the bonus with a (sometimes negative) block grant. We conclude the paper relating the role of the block grant to recent experiences in the American health care market.Paying-for-Performance; Quality; Hospital Financing
Equilibrium selection in supermodular games with mean payoff technologies
We examine an evolutionary model of equilibrium selection, where all individuals interact with each other, recurrently playing a strictly supermodular game. Individuals play (myopic) best responses to the current population profile, occa- sionally they pick an arbitrary strategy at random. To address the robustness of equilibrium selection in this simultaneous play scenario, we investigate whether different best-response approximations can lead to different long run equilibria.equilibrium selection; supermodular games; simultaneous play; best-response approximation
Imitators and Optimizers in a Changing Environment
We analyze the dynamic interaction between imitation and myopic optimization in an environment of changing marginal payoffs. Focusing on finite irreducible environments, we unfold a trade-off between the degree of interaction and the size of environmental shocks. The optimizer outperforms the imitator if interaction is weak or if shocks are large. We use the example of Cournot duopoly to give economic meaning to this condition. To establish our main result, we rely on continuous state space Markov theory. In particular, it turns out that introducing a stochastic environment with finitely many states suffices to make an otherwise deterministic process ergodic.imitation; optimization; evolution; heterogeneous learning rules; changing environments
Monitor Energy Markets 2007 - Analysis of developments on the Dutch wholesale markets for gas and electricity
The Dutch wholesale markets for energy are still impeded by various bottlenecks, as a result of which the costs for energy consumers are higher than they should be in well-functioning markets. Simply making more efficient use of the import infrastructure could save energy consumers several tens of millions of euros. The bottlenecks occur primarily in the gas market, where various impediments are impeding the quicker introduction of competition.Monitoring, electricity, gas, competition, infrastructure
Spatial competition and price formation
We look at price formation in a retail setting, that is, companies set
prices, and consumers either accept prices or go someplace else. In contrast to
most other models in this context, we use a two-dimensional spatial structure
for information transmission, that is, consumers can only learn from nearest
neighbors. Many aspects of this can be understood in terms of generalized
evolutionary dynamics. In consequence, we first look at spatial competition and
cluster formation without price. This leads to establishement size
distributions, which we compare to reality. After some theoretical
considerations, which at least heuristically explain our simulation results, we
finally return to price formation, where we demonstrate that our simple model
with nearly no organized planning or rationality on the part of any of the
agents indeed leads to an economically plausible price.Comment: Minor change
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