Lessons from the United States: For Legal Change and Delay in Energy Law in the United Kingdom

Reflects on the delays experienced by the UK in developing its nuclear energy sector, particularly in respect of new-builds, and the lessons it could learn from the US approach. Reviews the UK energy and planning provisions relating to nuclear power plants, and analyses the factors which have contributed to delays in the construction of such plants in the US despite the passage of the Energy Policy Act 2005, including: (1) a failure to implement incentive schemes sufficiently rapidly; (2) policy inaction over the management of nuclear waste; and (3) regulatory uncertainties and test cases.Legislation Cited: Energy Policy Act 2005 (United States

Nuclear energy policy in the united states 1990-2010: A federal or state responsibility?

This paper examines from a policy perspective nuclear energy policy in the United States (US) from 1990 to 2010 and questions whether it is or has become a Federal or State responsibility. The present study, as befits policy research, engages with many disciplines (for example, in particular, law and politics) and hence the contributions move beyond that of nuclear energy policy literature and in particular to that on nuclear new build and other assessments of large infrastructure projects. Several examples at the Federal level are identified that demonstrate that the nuclear industry has evolved to a stage where it requires a focus on the power of actions at a more localised (state) level in order to re-ignite the industry. The research concludes that there remains a misunderstanding of the issue of project management for complex construction projects, and it is highly arguable whether many of its issues have been resolved. Further, the research asserts that the economics of nuclear energy are not the most nfluential reason for no nuclear new build in the US

Compensating for severe nuclear accidents: An expert elucidation

We present the results of a structured discussion held in London in July 2014 involving a panel of experts drawn from three communities: specialists on aspects of risk and insurance; lawyers concerned with issues of nuclear law; and safety and environmental regulators. The discussions were held on the basis of participant anonymity. The process emphasised three considerations: conceptions of loss arising from a severe nuclear accident; the specifics of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident and what it means for policy and strategy going forward; and the future of liability regimes. We observe some stoicism from those closest to implementation of policies and procedures associated with nuclear risks, but a lower level of certainty and confidence among those concerned with nuclear energy regulation

The global nuclear liability regime post Fukushima Daiichi

Nuclear liability regimes are important as they ensure that potential victims will be compensated promptly and efficiently after a nuclear accident. The accident at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan in 2011 prompted a review of the global nuclear liability regime that remains on-going. Progress has been slow, but over the next few years the European Union is set to announce its new proposals. Meanwhile, in 2015, another global nuclear liability regime, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, has entered into force. This paper aims to move the debate in the literature on nuclear liability and focuses on the four following major issues: (1) reviews third-party nuclear liability regimes currently in operation around the world; (2) analyses the international nuclear liability regime following the accident at Fukushima Daiichi; (3) comparatively assesses the liability regimes for nuclear energy and the non-nuclear energy sector; and (4) presents the future outlook for possible developments in the global nuclear liability regime