Two sides of the same mind: How our beliefs about the artist's moral mind influence the way we respond to the artistic mind

Thesis advisor: Ellen WinnerIn two studies I examine how contextual information about the moral mind of the artist affects both children's and adults' response to works of art. Study 1 examined liking ratings of artworks as well as utilitarian objects. Factors varied were whether the items were said to have been made vs. owned by people of negative vs. positive moral character. Forty adults, 20 7-8-year-olds, and 23 4-5-year-olds were shown 12 artworks and 12 utilitarian objects and were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale how much they liked each one. Each item was presented as either owned or made by a person of positive or negative moral character. Moral character was predicted to affect liking ratings, with artworks expected to be affected more by the moral character of the maker than the owner, and utilitarian objects expected to be affected more by the moral character of the owner than the maker. Moral character had a significant effect on liking ratings: both artworks and utilitarian objects were liked less when believed to have been owned or made by someone of negative rather than positive moral character, demonstrating a moral contagion effect. Contrary to prediction, believing that an artwork was made by a person of negative moral character did not depress liking ratings more than believing that the artwork was owned by an artist of negative character. But consistent with prediction, believing that a utilitarian object was owned by a person of negative moral character depressed liking ratings more than believing that the object was made by someone of negative character. These findings held for all three age groups. Study 2 examined both liking and evaluative judgment ratings for two kinds of artworks: those whose content is related to the artist's moral character and those whose content is unrelated to the artist's character. Sixty-seven adults, 24 7-8 year-olds, and 23 4-5-year-olds were shown 12 representational paintings and were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale how much they liked each one and how good they thought each one was. Moral character was expected to affect both liking and evaluative judgment ratings, and content-related works were expected to be liked less than content unrelated works for artists of negative moral character; no effect of content-relatedness was expected for the putatively more objective evaluative judgments. Results replicated the moral contagion effect found in Study 1 for liking as well as judgment ratings with negative moral character linked to lower ratings than positive moral character. As predicted, liking ratings were lower for related than unrelated content for works by artists of negative moral character. Contrary to prediction, the same result held for works by artists of positive moral character. Evaluative judgment ratings were not affected by whether the content was related or unrelated in the case of artists of negative character (as predicted), but for artists of positive character, unrelated images were judged better. Children ages 7-8 behaved like adults for both liking and judgment ratings. Children ages 4-5 liked and judged as better the images with unrelated content for both mean and nice artists. Thus, adults and children ages 7-8-years old liked images more when the artist's moral mind was not visibly displayed but judged the related/unrelated images as equally good--indicating that the artistic mind (displayed through the arrangement of the composition, colors etc.) was more important for evaluations than was the moral mind. For 4-5-year-olds, preferences did not diverge from evaluative judgments. Thus, what they liked was what they thought was good, and moral "right" was equivalent to aesthetic "right". Taken together, results lead to the conclusion that artworks are affected by moral contagion, but moral contagion affects liking more strongly than it affects evaluative judgment.Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013.Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.Discipline: Psychology

Behavioral Norms for Condensed Moral Vignettes.” SCAN

Moral judgment is an evaluation of the actions and character of a person made with respect to societal norms. Although many types of vignettes have been used in previous studies on moral beliefs and judgment, what is missing is a set of standardized common vignettes based in real life. The goal of this study was to provide researchers with stimuli that have values on several dimensions pertaining to moral judgment and whose underlying components are known. These values will allow researchers to select stimuli based on standardized ratings rather than on the results of pilot studies, while avoiding the limitations of the classic, abstract moral scenarios. Our study was composed of three phases, (i) collecting and shortening the vignettes, (ii) obtaining ratings of the vignettes on several dimensions including emotional intensity, degree of social norm violation, and level of harm or benefit caused and (iii) determining the underlying components of the vignettes by performing a factor analysis. We found three components that accounted for most of the variance: norm violation, social affect and intention. The resulting vignettes can be used in future parametric studies on moral judgment in behavioral, neuropsychological and functional imaging experiments

Canagliflozin and renal outcomes in type 2 diabetes and nephropathy

BACKGROUND Type 2 diabetes mellitus is the leading cause of kidney failure worldwide, but few effective long-term treatments are available. In cardiovascular trials of inhibitors of sodium–glucose cotransporter 2 (SGLT2), exploratory results have suggested that such drugs may improve renal outcomes in patients with type 2 diabetes. METHODS In this double-blind, randomized trial, we assigned patients with type 2 diabetes and albuminuric chronic kidney disease to receive canagliflozin, an oral SGLT2 inhibitor, at a dose of 100 mg daily or placebo. All the patients had an estimated glomerular filtration rate (GFR) of 30 to <90 ml per minute per 1.73 m2 of body-surface area and albuminuria (ratio of albumin [mg] to creatinine [g], >300 to 5000) and were treated with renin–angiotensin system blockade. The primary outcome was a composite of end-stage kidney disease (dialysis, transplantation, or a sustained estimated GFR of <15 ml per minute per 1.73 m2), a doubling of the serum creatinine level, or death from renal or cardiovascular causes. Prespecified secondary outcomes were tested hierarchically. RESULTS The trial was stopped early after a planned interim analysis on the recommendation of the data and safety monitoring committee. At that time, 4401 patients had undergone randomization, with a median follow-up of 2.62 years. The relative risk of the primary outcome was 30% lower in the canagliflozin group than in the placebo group, with event rates of 43.2 and 61.2 per 1000 patient-years, respectively (hazard ratio, 0.70; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.59 to 0.82; P=0.00001). The relative risk of the renal-specific composite of end-stage kidney disease, a doubling of the creatinine level, or death from renal causes was lower by 34% (hazard ratio, 0.66; 95% CI, 0.53 to 0.81; P<0.001), and the relative risk of end-stage kidney disease was lower by 32% (hazard ratio, 0.68; 95% CI, 0.54 to 0.86; P=0.002). The canagliflozin group also had a lower risk of cardiovascular death, myocardial infarction, or stroke (hazard ratio, 0.80; 95% CI, 0.67 to 0.95; P=0.01) and hospitalization for heart failure (hazard ratio, 0.61; 95% CI, 0.47 to 0.80; P<0.001). There were no significant differences in rates of amputation or fracture. CONCLUSIONS In patients with type 2 diabetes and kidney disease, the risk of kidney failure and cardiovascular events was lower in the canagliflozin group than in the placebo group at a median follow-up of 2.62 years

Whose Mind Matters More: The moral agent or the artist? The role of intent in ethics and aesthetics

The current study directly investigates the similarities and differences in theory of mind for moral judgment versus aesthetic evaluation. We target the role of intent, the mind of the moral agent or the artist, i.e. whether the moral act or work of art was intentional or accidental, for objective judgments (e.g., quality) versus subjective judgments (e.g., preference). We show that (1) intent matters more for objective versus subjective judgments, in ethics and aesthetics, and (2) overall, intent matters more for moral judgments than aesthetic evaluations. These findings suggest that an objective-subjective dimension may similarly describe judgments in both ethics and aesthetics, and that in general we may be more influenced by the mind of the moral agent than by the mind of the artist when evaluating their impact on the world

Whose Mind Matters More—The Agent or the Artist? An Investigation of Ethical and Aesthetic Evaluations

<div><p>Theory of mind, the capacity for reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions, represents a critical input to ethical and aesthetic evaluations. Did the agent cause harm <i>on purpose</i>? Were those brushstrokes <i>intentional</i>? The current study investigates theory of mind for moral and artistic judgments within the same paradigm. In particular, we target the role of intent for two kinds of judgments: “objective” judgments of quality and “subjective” judgments of preference or liking. First, we show that intent matters more for objective versus subjective judgments in the case of ethics and aesthetics. Second, we show that, overall, intent matters more for ethical versus aesthetic evaluations. These findings suggest that an “objective-subjective” dimension describes judgments across both domains, and that observers assign more weight to the mind of the moral agent than the mind of the artist when making the relevant evaluations.</p></div

Sample Moral Scenarios.

<p>Positive moral stories on left, negative moral stories on right. Figure 2 consists of samples of the moral scenarios used. It is arranged by intentionality (intentional vs. accidental). The positive moral stories are located on the left, and the negative ones on the right.</p

The role of intent in subjective and objective aesthetic and moral judgments.

<p><i>Y-axis</i>: IA Difference scores (judgment of intentional act/art minus judgment of accidental act/art) for subjective versus objective judgments, for art and morality. Intent had a greater impact on morality than on art, and on objective than subjective judgments. Figure 3 is a graph of the role of intent in subjective and objective aesthetic and moral judgments. The graph shows the difference scores for subjective vs. objective judgments for art and morality. The graph shows that intent had a greater impact on morality than on art, and on objective than subjective judgments.</p

Sample “Good” Art Image, with narratives.

<p>Figure 1 consists of a sample of the stimuli used. The sample is an artwork belonging to the category of “good” art. The image is accompanied by the intentional and accidental narratives.</p

Behavioral norms for condensed moral vignettes

Moral judgment is an evaluation of the actions and character of a person made with respect to societal norms. Although many types of vignettes have been used in previous studies on moral beliefs and judgment, what is missing is a set of standardized common vignettes based in real life. The goal of this study was to provide researchers with stimuli that have values on several dimensions pertaining to moral judgment and whose underlying components are known. These values will allow researchers to select stimuli based on standardized ratings rather than on the results of pilot studies, while avoiding the limitations of the classic, abstract moral scenarios. Our study was composed of three phases, (i) collecting and shortening the vignettes, (ii) obtaining ratings of the vignettes on several dimensions including emotional intensity, degree of social norm violation, and level of harm or benefit caused and (iii) determining the underlying components of the vignettes by performing a factor analysis. We found three components that accounted for most of the variance: norm violation, social affect and intention. The resulting vignettes can be used in future parametric studies on moral judgment in behavioral, neuropsychological and functional imaging experiments