Fostering a European identity is unlikely to be a successful method for increasing citizens’ trust in the EU

The financial crisis has rekindled debates about the legitimacy of the European Union and, in particular, whether citizens trust the EU. Using Eurobarometer data, Eelco Harteveld analyses three possible sources for trust in the EU: rational evaluation, identity and projection. He proposes that as trust continues to decline in governments of all kinds, the strongest predictor of citizen trust in the EU is trust in national government

Does affective polarisation increase turnout? Evidence from Germany, The Netherlands and Spain

Polarisation is often seen as mainly negative for the functioning of democracies, but one of its saving graces could be that it raises the stakes of politics and encourages participation. This study explores the relationship between affective polarisation and turnout using three longitudinal designs. It makes use of three decades of repeated cross-sectional surveys in Germany, a two-wave panel study in Spain, and an eleven-wave panel study in the Netherlands. It tests whether affective polarisation increases turnout using varying operationalizations and specifications, and studies whether any boost in participation extends beyond the most politically sophisticated citizens. The findings suggest a sizeable independent effect of affective polarisation on turnout even when accounting for reverse causality and for the confounding impact of positive partisanship and ideological polarisation. Importantly, this effect might even be somewhat more pronounced among those who are least sophisticated. The concluding section discusses the normative and theoretical implications of these findings

Consequences of affective polarization: Avoidance, intolerance and support for violence in the United Kingdom and Norway

Affective polarization – that is, antipathy towards political opponents – sits high on the academic and political agenda. This is because it is thought to have a multitude of damaging consequences, both for how citizens view and approach each other and for how they relate to the political system. This study investigates some of the most mentioned and worrying potential consequences of affective polarization at the individual level. Zooming in on Europe, it sheds light on the substantive relationship between partisan antipathy and three kinds of norm-breaking escalation in the form of avoidance, intolerance and support for violence against party supporters. Methodologically, it unpacks the affective component of polarization, testing to what extent the traditional feeling thermometer performs as a predictor of these three potential outcomes. It then tests alternative expectations of the antecedents of such escalation derived from the intergroup emotions’ literature and the study of political radicalization. This is done using a broad range of both established and new survey items fielded in nationally representative panels between May and November 2020 in two contexts that score relatively low (Norway) and high (the United Kingdom) on affective polarization. They reveal that avoidance, intolerance and support for political violence can be validly measured, and are manifest, in these two European countries, but that they are only weakly correlated to mere dislike of the outgroup. Instead, more severe forms of norm-breaking escalation depend on the specific nature of the discrete emotions induced beyond dislike (anger, fear or disgust) and are rooted in factors such as relative deprivation, Manicheanism, and dark personality traits (psychopathy, Machiavellianism and narcissism). We discuss the implications for the way polarization is theorized and measured.publishedVersio

Affective Polarization and the Populist Radical Right: Creating the Hating?

Do populist radical right (PRR) parties fuel affective polarization? If so, how and under which circumstances? Based on a comparative cross-country analysis covering 103 elections in 28 European countries and an examination of longitudinal data from the Netherlands, we show that PRR parties occupy a particular position in the affective political landscape because they both radiate and receive high levels of dislike. In other words, supporters of PRR parties are uniquely (and homogeneously) negative about (supporters of) mainstream parties and vice versa. Our analyses suggest that these high levels of antipathy are most likely due to the combination of these parties' nativism and populism - two different forms of ingroup–outgroup thinking. Our findings also suggest that greater electoral success by PRR parties reduces dislike towards them, while government participation appears threatening to all voters except coalition partners

Gevoelige snaren: affectieve polarisatie in Nederland

Harteveld, E. (2022). Gevoelige snaren: affectieve polarisatie in Nederland. Page 86-100 in: Paul Dekker (ed.), Polarisatie in de polder. Utrecht: Wereldvenster

Replication Data for: "Why Women Avoid the Radical Right: Internalized Norms and Party Reputations"

Contains: (a) links to the three datasets used in this publication; (b) syntax (STATA DO-file) to replicate the analys

Replication Data for: "Gender Differences in Vote Choice: Social Cues and Social Harmony as Heuristics"

This is the DO-file for all main analyses of this article. I've tried to compile it as self-contained as possible, but do not hesitate to contact me if something does not work properly. The CSES data is publicly available after registration at CSES.org

Vertical vs Horizontal Affective Polarization: Disentangling Feelings Towards Elites and Voters

The way people feel towards other voters has garnered enormous attention with the rise of affective polarization, or hostility across political lines. As this literature grows increasingly comparative, scholars often rely on the widely available feeling thermometer towards political parties. This carries the strong assumption that (dis)affect towards parties ("vertical") extends to voters ("horizontal''). We test this assumption using 14 independent samples covering 10 countries. Firstly, we ask whether people differentiate between parties/politicians and their voters. We find that individuals consistently differentiate between elites and voters, though this is conditional on whether evaluations are towards in- or out-groups. Secondly, we examine which factors are associated with a greater gap in evaluations. We find that differentiation may be more related to the type of party-voter group being evaluated rather than individual-level features. Put together, these findings suggest researchers should be cautious when equating vertical and horizontal affective polarization