Space Launch Reliability History

No abstract availabl

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk in Human Rated Launch Vehicles

No abstract availabl

Common Cause Failure Modeling in Space Launch Vehicles

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFs are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused for example by system environments, manufacturing, transportation, storage, maintenance, and assembly. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, they can be reduced, but are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and dependent CCF. Because common cause failure data is limited in the aerospace industry, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Team at Bastion Technology Inc. is estimating CCF risk using generic data collected by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Consequently, common cause risk estimates based on this database, when applied to other industry applications, are highly uncertain. Therefore, it is important to account for a range of values for independent and CCF risk and to communicate the uncertainty to decision makers. There is an existing methodology for reducing CCF risk during design, which includes a checklist of 40+ factors grouped into eight categories. Using this checklist, an approach to produce a beta factor estimate is being investigated that quantitatively relates these factors. In this example, the checklist will be tailored to space launch vehicles, a quantitative approach will be described, and an example of the method will be presented

Risk Assessment Challenges in the Ares I Upper Stage

NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is currently at work developing hardware and systems for the Ares I rocket that will send future astronauts into orbit. Built on cutting-edge launch technologies, evolved powerful Apollo and Space Shuttle propulsion elements, and decades of NASA spaceflight experience, Ares I is the essential core of a safe, reliable, cost-effective space transportation system -- one that will carry crewed missions back to the moon, on to Mars and out into the solar system. Ares I is an in-line, two-stage rocket configuration topped by the Orion crew vehicle and its launch abort system. In addition to the vehicle's primary mission -carrying crews of four to six astronauts to Earth orbit --Ares I may also use its 25-ton payload capacity to deliver resources and supplies to the International Space Station, or to "park" payloads in orbit for retrieval by other spacecraft bound for the moon or other destinations. Crew transportation to the International Space Station is planned to begin no later than 2014. The first lunar excursion is scheduled for the 2020 timeframe. This paper presents the challenges in designing the Ares I upper stage for reliability and safety while minimizing weight and maximizing performance

Characterizing Epistemic Uncertainty for Launch Vehicle Designs

NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has the task of estimating the aleatory (randomness) and epistemic (lack of knowledge) uncertainty of launch vehicle loss of mission and crew risk and communicating the results. Launch vehicles are complex engineered systems designed with sophisticated subsystems that are built to work together to accomplish mission success. Some of these systems or subsystems are in the form of heritage equipment, while some have never been previously launched. For these cases, characterizing the epistemic uncertainty is of foremost importance, and it is anticipated that the epistemic uncertainty of a modified launch vehicle design versus a design of well understood heritage equipment would be greater. For reasons that will be discussed, standard uncertainty propagation methods using Monte Carlo simulation produce counter intuitive results and significantly underestimate epistemic uncertainty for launch vehicle models. Furthermore, standard PRA methods such as Uncertainty-Importance analyses used to identify components that are significant contributors to uncertainty are rendered obsolete since sensitivity to uncertainty changes are not reflected in propagation of uncertainty using Monte Carlo methods.This paper provides a basis of the uncertainty underestimation for complex systems and especially, due to nuances of launch vehicle logic, for launch vehicles. It then suggests several alternative methods for estimating uncertainty and provides examples of estimation results. Lastly, the paper shows how to implement an Uncertainty-Importance analysis using one alternative approach, describes the results, and suggests ways to reduce epistemic uncertainty by focusing on additional data or testing of selected components

An Assessment of Launch Failures from 1989 - Present

No abstract availabl

Characterizing Epistemic Uncertainty for Launch Vehicle Designs

NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has the task of estimating the aleatory (randomness) and epistemic (lack of knowledge) uncertainty of launch vehicle loss of mission and crew risk, and communicating the results. Launch vehicles are complex engineered systems designed with sophisticated subsystems that are built to work together to accomplish mission success. Some of these systems or subsystems are in the form of heritage equipment, while some have never been previously launched. For these cases, characterizing the epistemic uncertainty is of foremost importance, and it is anticipated that the epistemic uncertainty of a modified launch vehicle design versus a design of well understood heritage equipment would be greater. For reasons that will be discussed, standard uncertainty propagation methods using Monte Carlo simulation produce counter intuitive results, and significantly underestimate epistemic uncertainty for launch vehicle models. Furthermore, standard PRA methods, such as Uncertainty-Importance analyses used to identify components that are significant contributors to uncertainty, are rendered obsolete, since sensitivity to uncertainty changes are not reflected in propagation of uncertainty using Monte Carlo methods. This paper provides a basis of the uncertainty underestimation for complex systems and especially, due to nuances of launch vehicle logic, for launch vehicles. It then suggests several alternative methods for estimating uncertainty and provides examples of estimation results. Lastly, the paper describes how to implement an Uncertainty-Importance analysis using one alternative approach, describes the results, and suggests ways to reduce epistemic uncertainty by focusing on additional data or testing of selected components

Common Cause Failure Modeling: Aerospace Versus Nuclear

Aggregate nuclear plant failure data is used to produce generic common-cause factors that are specifically for use in the common-cause failure models of NUREG/CR-5485. Furthermore, the models presented in NUREG/CR-5485 are specifically designed to incorporate two significantly distinct assumptions about the methods of surveillance testing from whence this aggregate failure data came. What are the implications of using these NUREG generic factors to model the common-cause failures of aerospace systems? Herein, the implications of using the NUREG generic factors in the modeling of aerospace systems are investigated in detail and strong recommendations for modeling the common-cause failures of aerospace systems are given

Component Specific Environmental Conversion Factors

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Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account system integration risks such as those attributable to manufacturing and assembly. These sources often dominate component level risk. While consequence of failure is often understood, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence may underestimate the actual risk. Managers and decision makers use the probability of occurrence to influence the determination whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. The actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be fully understood due to the absence of system level test data or operational data. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program