Who are the outsiders and what do they want? Welfare state preferences in dualized societies

This paper makes three contributions. First, it presents a new conceptualization and measurement of outsider-status, which is based on social class and which takes into account that the category of outsiders is composed differently in different countries, depending on labor markets and welfare states. Second, it argues theoretically and shows empirically that the class-based measure of insider-and outsider status has a stronger explanatory power with regard to individual-level welfare preferences than the measure based on labor market status. And third, it demonstrates empirically that dualization, combined with skill-levels, shapes people’s preferences with regard to different welfare policies: Outsiders have stronger preferences for redistribution and for social investment than insiders. The analyses are based on micro-level ISSP data.labour contract; political economy; social policy; unemployment; welfare state

Table of Contents

Table of Contents for Volume 5, Issue 1 of the Linfield Magazin

It's not the economy, stupid! Explaining the electoral success of the German right-wing populist AfD

Right-wing populism is on the rise. Everywhere? Until recently, the resilience of the German party system to such a party has been an exception to this general trend. The establishment of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in the wake of the Eurozone crisis put an end to this German exceptionalism. This paper tests the ‘losers of modernization’-thesis, one of the most dominant explanations for right-wing populist voting, for the case of the AfD. Based on district level data from the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development and official data on electoral outcomes, we examine whether the socio-economic characteristics of a district yield any explanatory power for the AfD’s electoral success in the federal elections of 2013 and the elections to the European Parliament in 2014. With this data, we avoid problems of representativeness and reliability of survey data with respect to socioeconomically marginalized groups and their voting behavior. Our findings suggest that the modernization thesis bears little relevance for the success of the populist right in Germany. By contrast, we find a strong correlation between the AfD’s electoral success and the success of radical right parties in previous elections in the same district. We explain this intriguing finding with a “tradition of radical right voting” and a specific political culture on which the AfD has been able to draw once the broader political and social context allowed for the creation of a right-wing populist party in Germany

'Don't play if you can't win': does economic inequality undermine political equality?

In this paper, we investigate whether income inequality negatively affects voter turnout. Despite some progress, the answer to this question is still debated due to methodological disagreements and differences in the selection of countries and time periods. We contribute to this debate by triangulating data and methods. More specifically, we use three kinds of data to resolve the question: first, we use cross-sectional aggregate data of 21 OECD countries in the time period from 1980 to 2014 to study the relationship between inequality and electoral participation. Second, we zoom in on the German case and examine local data from 402 administrative districts between 1998 and 2017. Focusing on within-country variation eliminates differences that are linked to features of the political system. Finally, we combine survey data with macro-data to investigate the impact of inequality on individual voting. This final step also allows us to test whether the effect of income inequality on voter turnout differs across income groups. Taken together, we offer the most comprehensive analysis of the impact of social inequality on political inequality to date. We corroborate accounts that argue that economic inequality exacerbates participatory inequality

High-skilled outsiders? Labor market vulnerability, education and welfare state preferences

Recent research has established that employment risk shapes social policy preferences. However, risk is often conceptualized as an alternative measure of the socio-economic status. We show that employment risk and socio-economic status are distinct, crosscutting determinants of social policy preferences. More specifically, we analyze the policy preferences of high-skilled labor market outsiders as a cross-pressured group. We first establish that labor market vulnerability has spread well into the more highly educated segments of the population. We then show that the effect of labor market vulnerability on social policy preferences even increases with higher educational attainment. We conclude that that labor market risk and educational status are not interchangeable and that the high skilled are particularly sensitive to the experience of labor market risk. Thereby, our findings point to a potential cross-class alliance between more highly and lower skilled vulnerable individuals in support of a redistributive and activating welfare state. Thus, they have far-reaching implications for our understanding of both the politicization of insider/outsider divides and the politics of welfare suppor

Fighting Fire with Fire? Inequality, Populism and Voter Turnout

In this article, we ask whether the presence of populist parties influences the negative effect of income inequality on voter turnout. A number of studies have shown that voter turnout is lower in unequal countries. In particular, citizens with fewer resources abstain at higher rates. Since populist parties seek to mobilize these groups, their success could lead to higher and less unequal turnout rates. To assess empirically whether this holds true, we analyzed a dataset encompassing data on 296 national parliamentary elections in 31 European countries between 1970 and 2016. The results show that there is neither a direct nor an indirect effect of populism on voter turnout. In elections with more successful populist parties, voter turnout was not significantly higher than in other elections. Higher vote shares of populist parties also do not mitigate the negative impact of income inequality on voter turnout. Finally, there does not seem to be a difference between elections with high left-wing or right-wing populist parties’ success. Neither variant of populism alters the relationship between inequality and turnout.In diesem Beitrag wird die Frage gestellt, ob populistische Parteien den negativen Zusammenhang zwischen Einkommensungleichheit und der Höhe der Wahlbeteiligung beeinflussen. Eine Reihe von Studien hat gezeigt, dass die Wahlbeteiligung in ungleichen Ländern niedriger ausfällt. Vor allem Bürgerinnen und Bürger mit weniger Ressourcen bleiben dort häufiger am Wahltag zu Hause. Da populistische Parteien darauf abzielen, jene Gruppen zu mobilisieren, die eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit haben, nicht zu wählen, könnte ihr Erfolg zu einer höheren und weniger ungleichen Wahlbeteiligung führen. Um diesen möglichen Zusammenhang empirisch zu überprüfen, wurde ein Datensatz von Informationen über 296 Parlamentswahlen in 31 europäischen Ländern für den Zeitraum von 1970 bis 2016 analysiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen jedoch, dass weder ein direkter noch ein indirekter Zusammenhang zwischen Populismus und Wahlbeteiligung besteht. Schneiden populistische Parteien besonders gut ab, fällt die Wahlbeteiligung nicht höher aus. Hohe Stimmenanteile dieser Parteien mildern auch nicht den negativen Zusammenhang zwischen Ungleichheit und Wahlbeteiligung ab. Schließlich konnten auch keine unterschiedlichen Effekte zwischen links- und rechtspopulistischen Parteien gefunden werden. Keine der beiden Varianten verändert die grundlegenden Zusammenhang zwischen Einkommensungleichheit und der Höhe der Wahlbeteiligung.Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster (1056)Peer Reviewe

Labor market insecurity among the middle class: a cross-pressured group

The political relevance of labor market insecurity has been questioned because (a) insider-outsider divides were considered to be a divide within the low-skilled and politically less active working class and (b) labor market insecurity runs through the middle of the household. Outsiders might therefore align their preferences with those of insiders. This contribution provides, first, evidence that labor market insecurity extends well into the higher-skilled middle class, in particular to high-skilled young adults and high-skilled women. Second, the contribution sheds light on the “household question”, that is the question whether mixed households dampen the political relevance of labor market insecurity. If labor market insecurity is concentrated in specific social groups (young adults, women) that tend to cohabit with secure insiders, the political relevance of labor market insecurity might depend on whether or not outsiders align their preferences with those of the household. In this contribution, I discuss recent work on the relevance of the household in translating labor market divides into preferences divides presenting recent work that shows that the household does not render insider-outsider divides politically irrelevant. In sum, insider-outsider divides have all the potential to become politically relevant

Labor Market Dualization and Insider-Outsider Divides – Why This New Conflict Matters

Reflecting the importance of inequality for individuals’ lives, the implications of labor market inequality for core elements of democracy are crucial topics in comparative politics and comparative political economy. This article critically reviews the main findings of the emerging literature on insider–outsider divides to highlight its possible contributions to adjacent fields, in particular the research on party politics, the literatures on economic voting, political participation, and democratic representation or the study of social movements. The conflict between labor market insiders and outsiders demonstrates that in today’s societies with their diversified risk structure and sophisticated welfare states, distributive conflicts are about specific social and regulatory policies that have different implications for individuals depending on their situation on the labor market. By drawing our attention to new divides within the social democratic electorate, the insider–outsider literature reveals an additional argument why the social democratic parties find it hard to mobilize their voters and to win elections. Moreover, the insider–outsider literature can help to bring the economic dimension of politics back to the study of social movements and to light on the relationship between contentious and conventional politics