Wissenschaftliche Fairness : Wissenschaft zwischen Integrität und Fehlverhalten

Plagiate und andere Fälle wissenschaftlichen Fehlverhaltens landen regelmäßig in den Medien und geben auch Außenstehenden Einblicke in problematische Forschungsprozesse. Während diese Skandale ein Schlaglicht auf offensichtliche oder absichtliche Fehler werfen, sind die alltäglichen Herausforderungen wissenschaftlicher Praxis weitaus komplexer. Die Autor*innen analysieren die Vielschichtigkeit und Verwobenheit von fragwürdigen Forschungspraktiken, Machtstrukturen und Fehlverhalten. Ihr Konzept der wissenschaftlichen Fairness dient als Folie zur Analyse bestehender Problematiken und zeigt in einem Gegenentwurf Handlungsoptionen für mehr Integrität, Verantwortung und wissenschaftsethisch gute Forschung auf

Comparison of handling, pressure and wearing comfort of different compression devices for decongestion therapy

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Worin besteht Kants Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft?

Im Rahmen der in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790) entwickelten Teleologie der Natur führt der Begriff eines Naturzwecks auf ein Problem, das in der Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft seinen Ausdruck findet. Doch einige Unklarheiten des Textes haben das Verständnis eines der Kernstücke der dritten Kritik immer wieder erschwert. Ich möchte im Folgenden eine Lesart von §§ 69-71 entwickeln, die eine schlüssige Auslegung der Antinomie erlaubt. Dazu werde ich mich in erster Linie auf notorisch dunkle Passagen in Kants Text konzentrieren und bisher in der Forschung vertretene Deutungen präzisieren und ergänzen. Die zentralen Deutungsschwierigkeiten hinsichtlich der Frage, worin die Antinomie bestehe, lassen sich zugunsten der mittlerweile verbreiteten Auffassung der Antinomie als eines genuinen und der Auflösung bedürfenden Widerspruchs zwischen zwei regulativen Prinzipien aufklären. In his Critique of Judgment (1790) Kant develops a teleology of nature. The concept of natural purpose leads him to the problem of the antinomy of teleological judgment. However, some ambiguity about what is said in the paragraphs  concerned has frequently caused difficulties for the understanding of one of the core parts of the 3rd Critique. I argue that a coherent reading of §§ 69-71 can nevertheless be achieved. In order to critically review and complete previous  research I will primarily be focusing on those passages which are notorious for their lack of clarity. The main problems regarding the interpretation of the antinomy’s identity can be solved. The results of this paper speak in favour of the currently prevailing view that holds the antinomy to be a genuine contradiction between two regulative principles

Wittgenstein on grammar: the significance and authority of rules

This thesis examines the notion of ‘grammar’ and, in particular, the notion of ‘rules of grammar’ in the context of the Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Despite the prominence that the latter notion seems to have in Wittgenstein’s philosophical practice, one might doubt whether it can bear the kind of burden that Wittgenstein seems to place upon it – dissolving philosophical problems. This thesis separates out some of the reasons for doubting that ‘rules of grammar’ can be used to dissolve philosophical problems, in order to see which have a sound basis and which not. Chapter 1 presents Wittgenstein’s distinctive understanding of ‘grammar’ and its relation to philosophical problems. I present an initial simple account of ‘grammar’ and two different conceptions of Wittgenstein’s idea of a ‘grammatical investigation’. Chapter 2 examines the idea that language is rule-governed. I argue that the centrality of ‘rules of grammar’ in Wittgenstein is compatible with several reservations that one might have against the idea of rule-governedness. Chapter 3 interprets Wittgenstein’s concepts of ‘language-game’ and ‘form of life’. I show that the former concept stresses the importance of rules but also points to other significant aspects of our language use. The concept of ‘form of life’ brings out the importance of attending to the broader practical settings in which we pursue our linguistic and other activities. Chapter 4 outlines the phenomenon of ‘projection’. I argue that the possibility of intelligible projective uses of a word undermines the idea that the rules of grammar authoritatively decide in advance which uses of a word are meaningful. Chapter 5 discusses Wittgenstein’s understanding of nonsense and offers a view of the role that the rules of grammar play in identifying nonsense and removing philosophical problems. I also present cases that throw doubt on the persuasive power of citing such rules in philosophical disagreements. Chapter 6 examines further the role of rules of grammar in Wittgensteinian philosophical criticism. I argue that what might seem to be two substantially different views of that role are in fact very similar. On this basis, I identify several general difficulties that a Wittgensteinian critical practice faces in attempting to solve philosophical problems, but also show that such a practice can be retained. Chapter 7 points to two outstanding issues that are relevant to assessing the later Wittgenstein’s idea of a grammatical investigation

Worin besteht Kants Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft? Anmerkungen zu §§ 69-71 der Kritik der Urteilskraft

In his Critique of Judgment (1790) Kant develops a teleology of nature. The concept of natural purpose leads him to the problem of the antinomy of teleological judgment. However, some ambiguity about what is said in the paragraphs concerned has frequently caused difficulties for the understanding of one of the core parts of the 3rd Critique. I argue that a coherent reading of §§69-71can nevertheless be achieved. In order to critically review and complete previous research I will primarily be focusing on those passages which are notorious for their lack of clarity. The main problems regarding the interpretation of the antinomy’s identity can be solved. The results of this paper speak in favour of the currently prevailing view that holds the antinomy to be a genuine contradiction between two regulative principles