Observing, reporting, and deciding in networks of sentences

In prior work we considered networks of agents who prove facts from their knowledge bases and report them to their neighbors in their common languages in order to help a decider verify a single sentence. In report complete networks, the signatures of the agents and the links between agents are rich enough to verify any decider\u27s sentence that can be proved from the combined knowledge base. This paper introduces a more general setting where new observations may be added to knowledge bases and the decider must choose a sentence from a set of alternatives. We consider the question of when it is possible to prepare in advance a finite plan to generate reports within the network. We obtain conditions under which such a plan exists and is guaranteed to produce the right choice under any new observations

Craig interpolation for networks of sentences

The Craig Interpolation Theorem can be viewed as saying that in first order logic, two agents who can only communicate in their common language can cooperate in building proofs. We obtain generalizations of the Craig Interpolation Theorem for finite sets of agents with the following properties. (1) The agents are vertices of a directed graph. (2) The agents have knowledge bases with overlapping signatures. (3) The agents can only communicate by sending to neighboring agents sentences that they know and that are in the common language of the two agents

Common assumption of rationality

In this paper, we provide an epistemic characterization of iterated admissibility (IA), i.e., iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We show that rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR) in complete lexicographic type structures implies IA, and that there exist such structures in which RCAR can be satisfied. Our result is unexpected in light of a negative result in Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler (2008) (BFK) that shows the impossibility of RCAR in complete continuous structures. We also show that every complete structure with RCAR has the same types and beliefs as some complete continuous structure. This enables us to reconcile and interpret the difference between our results and BFK’s. Finally, we extend BFK’s framework to obtain a single structure that contains a complete structure with an RCAR state for every game. This gives a game-independent epistemic condition for IA.Epistemic game theory; rationality; admissibility; iterated weak dominance; assumption; completeness; Borel Isomorphism Theorem; o-minimality

Randomizations of models as metric structures

The notion of a randomization of a first order structure was introduced by Keisler in the paper Randomizing a Model, Advances in Math. 1999. The idea was to form a new structure whose elements are random elements of the original first order structure. In this paper we treat randomizations as continuous structures in the sense of Ben Yaacov and Usvyatsov. In this setting, the earlier results show that the randomization of a complete first order theory is a complete theory in continuous logic that admits elimination of quantifiers and has a natural set of axioms. We show that the randomization operation preserves the properties of being omega-categorical, omega-stable, and stable