[Abstract] Sentencing intoxicated offenders: does alcoholism excuse drunkenness?

Criminal responsibility is founded on the volitional control of action, yet many offences are committed whilst intoxicated. Alcohol is a widely-used intoxicant known to impair behavioural control and memory, opening the door to claims of partial or absent responsibility. Criminal law rules have developed to resist such claims. In particular, findings of criminal responsibility in intoxicated offenders frequently call on ‘prior fault’ logic: the intoxicated offender may claim to have been irrational, but culpability can be imported from their earlier, rational choice to consume intoxicants (Robinson, 1985). That drunkenness does not excuse derives from an unforced choice to become drunk. Yet this raises questions over the extent to which an alcoholic’s choice to drink is unforced. Current neurobiological models of addiction stress compulsion as a primary component, bringing into question the volitional nature of continued consumption (Volkow & Fowler, 2000; Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011). At the same time, some legal scholars have noted that the potentially fatal nature of alcoholic withdrawal could likewise undermine suggestion that consumption is voluntary, drawing analogy to a defence of duress where actions have been forced under the threat of death (Husak, 1999; Yaffe, 2013). We asked 290 UK Magistrates to consider a criminal sentencing scenario in which evidence of a defendant’s state of intoxication at the time of the offence was presented in tandem with information that they were either teetotal, a casual drinker or an alcoholic. We found that intoxication reduced blameworthiness for criminal acts if the offender had no previous experience with alcohol whilst, in direct contrast, intoxication served to aggravate offending if the defendant was an alcoholic. The likelihood of our defendant receiving a reduced sentence was over ten times greater in the event that, though intoxicated, they were not also an alcoholic. Leniency was blocked by alcoholism despite Magistrates’ qualitative responses suggesting its understanding as a generally mitigating factor, revealing a disconnect between expressed opinion and sentencing behaviour in practice. Our results indicate that, far from excusing drunkenness, the state of being an alcoholic is more frequently deemed to aggravate offending, being associated with harsher sentencing even where the offence in question was committed whilst sober

Dealing with False Memories in Children and Adults: Recommendations for the Legal Arena

Children are often viewed as poor eyewitnesses. Fact-finders, lawyers, and researchers assume that children are exceptionally prone to accept external suggestive (leading) questions and to create false memories. Is this assumption justified? This review will show it is not. First, studies on spontaneous false memories— elicited without any suggestive pressure—reveal that children are less likely than adults to produce them. Second, under certain circumstances, children are even less prone to accept external suggestions than adults. This counterintuitive finding happens when false suggestions contain information that is associatively related but in actuality not experienced by children or adults. Using empirically-based interview protocols can maximize the retrieval of accurate memories in children and adults. Furthermore, expert witnesses should use alternative scenarios in order to better evaluate whether statements by children or adults are based on truth or fiction

Defending the delusional, the irrational, and the dangerous

Simon Taj began drinking heavily on Friday 29 January 2016 and continued into the early hours of Saturday 30 January. At roughly 2 pm on Sunday 31st January 2016, Taj came across the broken-down vehicle of Mohammed Awain. The vehicle was smoking, and Awain was standing beside it. Unfortunately, Taj mistook the wires and equipment he saw in the open boot of Awain’s car (Mr Awain is an electrician) as the components of a terrorist bomb which he was on the point of assembling to explode. Taj called the police, who attended the scene, to find that Awain was entirely innocent. Taj initially drove away following police assurances as to Awain’s innocence, but soon returned, still convinced that Awain was indeed a terrorist. Taj felt that he must do something to stop him. At 2.46 pm, Taj launched a ferocious attack on Awain with a metal tyre lever, almost killing him. When police arrived and restrained Taj, he expressed surprise – ‘why are you arresting me he's the terrorist’. Taj was so calm and lucid at interview, the police officers present did not arrange for blood samples to be taken. He was charged with attempted murder, but claimed to have acted in self-defence on the basis of his mistaken belief

[Abstract] Impact of disease model of addiction on judgements of criminal responsibility: pivotal role of perceived choice

Debates continue over whether the prevailing neuroscientific model of addiction as a brain disease informs questions around moral and criminal responsibility, but little empirical work has been conducted with those tasked to address this question in practical terms on a daily basis. We have explored this point over two studies, respectively sampling 110 and 276 Magistrates active in the UK. In the first study we asked them to consider a criminal sentencing scenario in which evidence of a defendant’s brain damage and impaired impulse control was presented. This neurological damage was attributed to either a (fictional) disease or to addiction. When the same neuropsychiatric profile resulted from disease, rather than heroin use and addiction, custodial sentences were significantly reduced. The pivotal factor denying addiction the mitigating power of disease was perceived choice in the initial acquisition; removing choice from addiction dramatically increased the odds of sentence reduction, while attaching choice to disease tended to aggravate or reverse earlier leniency. The second study presented another criminal sentencing scenario in which the defendant exhibited similar neurological impairment, but additionally included ‘mixed’ aetiologies in which either disease led to addiction or addiction led to disease. Our results confirm the dramatic effect which the aetiology of impairment can have on judgements of criminal responsibility, whilst moreover give suggestion that drug-use tips the balance in favour of the punitive element when weighing criminal sentencing decisions

Current practice of first-trimester ultrasound screening for structural fetal anomalies in developed countries

Objectives: First-trimester ultrasound screening is increasingly performed to detect fetal anomalies early in pregnancy, aiming to enhance reproductive autonomy for future parents. This study aims to display the current practice of first-trimester ultrasound screening in developed countries. Method: An online survey among 47 prenatal screening experts in developed countries. Results: First-trimester structural anomaly screening is available in 30 of the 33 countries and is mostly offered to all women with generally high uptakes. National protocols are available in 23/30 (76.7%) countries, but the extent of anatomy assessment varies. Monitoring of scan quality occurs in 43.3% of the countries. 23/43 (53.5%) of the respondents considered the quality of first-trimester ultrasound screening unequal in different regions of their country. Conclusions: First-trimester screening for structural fetal anomalies is widely offered in developed countries, but large differences are reported in availability and use of screening protocols, the extent of anatomy assessment, training and experience of sonographers and quality monitoring systems. Consequently, this results in an unequal offer to parents in developed countries, sometimes even within the same country. Furthermore, as offer and execution differ widely, this has to be taken into account when results of screening policies are scientifically published or compared.</p