Natural resource rent and stakeholder politics in Africa: towards a new conceptualisation

YesThis paper critically revisits the debate on natural resource rent, curse and conflict, interrogating some of the key assumptions that have become received knowledge in extant discourses. The paper demonstrates how orthodox theories’ preoccupation with issues of resource rent and resource curse tend to be marred by slants of ahistoricity and state-centricity. Adopting a stakeholder approach to the issues of resource rent and conflict in Africa, the author argues that natural resource rents produce and attract a multiplicity of competitive stakeholders, both domestic and external, in the resource-rich states. The competition and jostling of stakeholders for access to, and appropriation of, rentier resources is too often an antagonistic process in many emerging economies that has consequences and implications for violent conflict. The paper attempts a new conceptual explanation of how natural resource rents dialectically generate stakes, stakeholders and political conflict. The paper concludes by proposing the need for the more conflict-prone African rentier states to transition to a more functional state model, the transformative state

Natural resource rent and stakeholder politics in Africa: towards a new conceptualisation

YesThis paper critically revisits the debate on natural resource rent, curse and conflict, interrogating some of the key assumptions that have become received knowledge in extant discourses. The paper demonstrates how orthodox theories’ preoccupation with issues of resource rent and resource curse tend to be marred by slants of ahistoricity and state-centricity. Adopting a stakeholder approach to the issues of resource rent and conflict in Africa, the author argues that natural resource rents produce and attract a multiplicity of competitive stakeholders, both domestic and external, in the resource-rich states. The competition and jostling of stakeholders for access to, and appropriation of, rentier resources is too often an antagonistic process in many emerging economies that has consequences and implications for violent conflict. The paper attempts a new conceptual explanation of how natural resource rents dialectically generate stakes, stakeholders and political conflict. The paper concludes by proposing the need for the more conflict-prone African rentier states to transition to a more functional state model, the transformative state

New Petro‐aggression in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia in the Spotlight

That hydrocarbon abundance may lead to more violence is an established truism in the literature on the resource curse. Looking at the Middle East, however, the literature relates bellicose state behaviour entirely to oil-producing revolutionary republics. Instead, dynastic monarchies are claimed to be the more peacefully behaving actors. Current developments turn this conclusion upside down, however. Since 2015 at the latest, the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia, the leading monarchy in the Middle East, has transformed from multi-dependence to petro-aggression. By discussing this striking transformation, the paper puts forward a framework looking at the interaction of three crucial dimensions: first, the decreasing power projection towards the Middle East by the United States, the decade-long hegemon, due to gradual changes in world energy markets and war fatigue at home; second, the lasting fiscal potency of the Saudi regime; and, third, the personalization of the Saudi monarchy under King Salman as a historically contingent result of transferring power to the generation of Ibn Saud's grandsons

Constraints to Economic Development and Growth in the Middle East and North Africa

When comparing the speed and extent of economic development in different geographic regions of the world over the past 20 years, the under-average performance of Arab countries in general and Arab Mediterranean countries in particular is striking. This is despite an overall favorable geo-strategic situation at the crossroads of three continents, with excellent connections to sea and waterways and in direct proximity to the European Union, one of the world’s economic hubs. It is also despite the minor importance of negative factors such as a high-burden diseases or high levels of ethnic fractionalization. In this paper, I focus on identifying the most important constraints on Arab Mediterranean economic development. I use state-of-the-art econometric tools to quantify constraints that have been identified through economic theory and studies of the political economy characteristics of the region. The empirical results offer support for the central hypothesis that limited technological capacities and political economy structures are the primary constraints on economic development. With a view to international structural adjustment efforts, my findings imply that the limited success of the Euro-Mediterranean policy to stimulate the economic development of the Arab Mediterranean countries might be because structural adjustment efforts do not tackle—or at least do not sufficiently tackle— these constraints.Vergleicht man Geschwindigkeit und Umfang der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der verschiedenen Weltregionen in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren, so fällt insbesondere das unterdurchschnittliche Abschneiden der arabischen Länder im Allgemeinen und der arabischen Mittlemeerländer im Besonderen ins Auge, und dies trotz einer insgesamt vorteilhaften geographischen Lage im Schnittpunkt dreier Kontinente mit exzellenten Anschlussmöglichkeiten an See- und Wasserwege, trotz der direkten Nachbarschaft zum Weltwirtschaftsdrehkreuz Europäische Union und trotz der relativ geringen Bedeutung wichtiger entwicklungshemmender Faktoren, beispielsweise ethnische Zersplitterung oder massive Ausbreitung von Krankheiten wie AIDS oder Malaria. In diesem Aufsatz wird versucht, von den unterschiedlichen Hemmfaktoren wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung, die in der wirtschaftstheoretischen Literatur und/oder in MENARegionalstudien diskutiert werden, diejenigen herauszuarbeiten, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung am stärksten behindern oder möglicherweise stärker als andere. Dabei benutze ich modernste ökonometrische Verfahren, um den Einfluss der verschiedenen erklärenden Variablen zu quantifizieren. Die Ergebnisse stützen die Eingangshypothese, dass insbesondere mangelnde technologische Kapazitäten und Fähigkeiten sowie regionalspezifische politökonomische Strukturen die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in den arabischen Mittelmeerländern behindern