Estimating damages from price-fixing: the value of transaction data

We use a unique private data set of about 340,000 invoice positions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the value of such transaction data for an estimation of cartel damages. In particular, we investigate, first, how structural break analysis can be used to identify the exact end of the cartel agreement and, second, how an application of before-and-after approaches to estimate the price overcharge can benefit from such rich data sets. We conclude that transaction data allows such a detailed assessment of the cartel and its impact on direct customers that its regular application in private antitrust cases is desired as long as data collection and preparation procedures are not prohibitively expensive

Media control: a case for privatization in transitional economies

The television market can be one of the most dynamic industries if country-specific regulations allow for private competitors to enter the market. The entry of competition changes the market from monopolistic to oligopolistic, which has positive performance implications for the industry. Our research analyzes the development of the Croatian TV market from the monopolistic stage to the current oligopolistic stage. Econometric models in this article aim to estimate the current trend of market concentration and its future potential. The authors’ research focusing on the industry from a market concentration perspective provides guidance for the practitioner in regard to profitable investment opportunities. They also illustrate for other transitional economies that to move toward a “free” society, media must be free from government control which will evolve rapidly once privatized. © 2016 Taylor & Francis

A methodology for the evaluation of competition policy

The paper develops a methodology for the evaluation of competition policy. Based on the existing literature and experiences with policy evaluations in other areas of economic activity, the three-step / nine-building-blocks methodology provides guidance for evaluation projects and also assists in the identification of avenues for further academic research

Three Economist’s Tools for Antitrust Analysis: A Non-Technical Introduction

The importance of economics to the analysis and enforcement of competition policy and law has increased tremendously in the developed market economies in the past forty years. In younger and developing market economies, competition law itself has a history of twenty to twenty-five years at most – sometimes much less – and economic tools that have proven useful to competition law enforcement in developed market economies in focusing investigations and in assisting decision makers in distinguishing central from secondary issues are inevitably less well understood. This paper presents a non-technical introduction to three economic tools that have become widespread in competition law enforcement in general and in the analysis of proposed mergers in particular: critical loss analysis, upward pricing pressure, and the vertical arithmetic