19 research outputs found
EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean - Cooperation against All Odds?
Focusing on the Euro-Mediterranean relations since the early 1990s, this paper investigates in how far the EU has been able to shape its relations with third countries according to its democracy promotion policy. The paper traces the evolution of the EUâs provisions for democracy promotion and compares the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with seven (semi-)authoritarian regimes (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) since the early 1990s. A clear regional trend to more intensive cooperation lends credibility to the claim that the EU possesses a certain agenda setting power in international relations. A systematic comparison across countries and over time explores the explanatory power of interdependence, political liberalisation, and statehood for the remaining country variation. The paper finds that the degree of political liberalisation in target countries is the most important scope condition for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion and points to the need of further investigating (domestic) factors to account for the EUâs differential ânormative powerâ in international relations.closer cooperation; closer cooperation; democracy; Mediterranean; Europeanization; Europeanization
the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network as an intermediary actor
This paper focuses on the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) that
tries to promote civil society co-operation and human rights within the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). To this end, it explores the EMHRNâs
âactornessâ and role in Euro-Mediterranean transnational relations in three
respects: its linkage to the intergovernmental politics of the EMP, its
participation in transnational civil society activities, and its part in the
local human rights activism of its members. Methodologically, the empirical
analysis relies primarily on document analysis and interviews and narrows its
focus down to Morocco for the last aspect. The networkâs identity and
activities as an umbrella organisation for human rights are closely linked to
the EMP. It pursues a mix of strategies, including the lobbying and
consultancy, awareness-raising campaigns, service-provision to its members,
and international networking in the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations.
It assumes various functions vis-Ă -vis European institutions, national
governments, its members, and other transnational actors, leaving its nature
ambiguous and potentially compromising the effectiveness of its different
strategies. Despite all these limitations, the EMHRN definitely contributes to
âtransnationalisingâ Euro-Mediterranean (human rights) politics, bringing
parts of civil society closer to the EMP â and vice versa
cooperation against all odds?
Focusing on the Euro-Mediterranean relations since the early 1990s, this paper
investigates in how far the EU has been able to shape its relations with third
countries according to its democracy promotion policy. The paper traces the
evolution of the EUâs provisions for democracy promotion and compares the
implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with seven
(semi-)authoritarian regimes (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria,
and Tunisia) since the early 1990s. A clear regional trend to more intensive
cooperation lends credibility to the claim that the EU possesses a certain
agenda setting power in international relations. A systematic comparison
across countries and over time explores the explanatory power of
interdependence, political liberalisation, and statehood for the remaining
country variation. The paper finds that the degree of political liberalisation
in target countries is the most important scope condition for cooperation in
the field of democracy promotion and points to the need of further
investigating (domestic) factors to account for the EUâs differential
ânormative powerâ in international relations
More than cheap talk? Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on human rights and democracy
Malgrat els esforços de la UE en la promociĂł de la democrĂ cia i un compromĂs comĂș per la democrĂ cia i els drets humans al EMP, no hi ha signes de convergĂšncia cap al model liberal democrĂ tic propugnat per la UE. No obstant aixĂČ, l'abast i la intensitat de la cooperaciĂł multilateral, transnacional i bilateral han augmentat constantment en tota la regiĂł des de mitjans de 1990. La cooperaciĂł en el camp de la promociĂł de la democrĂ cia es caracteritza per la forta dinĂ mica de normativa sectorial, i la diferenciaciĂł geogrĂ fica, perĂČ estĂ clarament situada en un marc regional i altament estandarditzat. Si bĂ© la convergĂšncia polĂtica o la polĂtica sembla poc probable en el curt o mitjĂ termini, democrĂ cia i drets humans estan fermament establerts en una agenda regional comĂșDespite the EU's democracy promotion efforts and a joint commitment to democracy and human rights in the EMP, there are no signs of convergence towards the liberal democratic model advocated by the EU. However, the scope and intensity of multilateral, transnational, and bilateral cooperation have steadily increased across the region since the mid 1990s. Cooperation in the field of democracy promotion is marked by strong dynamics of sectoral, normative, and geographical differentiation, but it is clearly situated in a regional and highly standardised framework. While policy or polity convergence seems unlikely in the short or medium term, democracy and human rights are firmly established on a joint regional agend
EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean: cooperation against all odds?
"Focusing on the Euro-Mediterranean relations since the early 1990s, this paper investigates in how far the EU has been able to shape its relations with third countries according to its democracy promotion policy. The paper traces the evolution of the EU's provisions for democracy promotion and compares the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with seven (semi-)authoritarian regimes (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) since the early 1990s. A clear regional trend to more intensive cooperation lends credibility to the claim that the EU possesses a certain agenda setting power in international relations. A systematic comparison across countries and over time explores the explanatory power of interdependence, political liberalisation, and statehood for the remaining country variation. The paper finds that the degree of political liberalisation in target countries is the most important scope condition for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion and points to the need of further investigating (domestic) factors to account for the EU's differential 'normative power' in international relations." (author's abstract
From External Promotion to Internal Protection?
Whether the European Union (EU) really lives up to its image of
âtransformative powerâ is still an open empirical question. There is no doubt
that the EU has been active in setting and promoting norms that go far beyond
the objective of regional economic integration. It prescribes and promotes
standards for national governance institutions related to democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law. However, in comparison to other regional
organizations, the EU used to focus on the transformation of domestic
governance institutions beyond rather than within its borders, targeting
accession candidates, neighboring countries, and third states alike. Only
recently did the EU start to develop policies and instruments explicitly
aiming to protect the same norms and values within its own member states that
it seeks to transfer externally. This paper traces the evolution of the EUâs
external and internal governance transfer. While the external dimension is
still better developed institutionally, regional integration provides the EU
with effective policies and instruments to protect its fundamental values
within the member states.Ob die EuropĂ€ische Union (EU) tatsĂ€chlich dem Anspruch einer âtransformativen
Machtâ gerecht wird, ist eine offene empirische Frage. Die EU setzt und
fördert jedoch ohne Zweifel aktiv Normen, die weit ĂŒber das Ziel regionaler
wirtschaftlicher Integration hinaus gehen. Dazu gehören Standards fĂŒr
nationale Governance-Institutionen mit Blick auf Demokratie, Menschenrechte,
und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Regionalorganisationen
konzentrierte sie sich dabei ursprĂŒnglich vor allem auf die Transformation
nationaler Governance-Institutionen jenseits ihrer Grenzen in
Beitrittskandidaten, NachbarlÀndern und Drittstaaten. Erst seit Kurzem
entwickelt die EU auch Strategien und Instrumente, die explizit auf den Schutz
dieser Normen und Werte in ihren eigenen Mitgliedstaaten zielen. Dieses Papier
zeichnet die Entwicklung des externen und internen Governance-Transfers der EU
nach. Obwohl die externe Dimension institutionell nach wie vor besser
entwickelt ist, stehen der EU im Rahmen des Integrationsprozesses effektive
Instrumente zum Schutz ihrer Grundwerte in den Mitgliedstaaten zur VerfĂŒgung
Following a Global Script?
Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations and states have
developed programs to promote (good) governance at the country level. Regional
organizations have gained an important role in governance transfer because
they constitute an intermediary level of agency between the nation-state and
global institutions. This paper maps the governance transfer of nine regional
organizations in the Americas, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. We analyze
the objectives, approaches, and instruments used to promote the creation and
transformation of governance institutions in target countries. This comparison
shows that similar standards and instruments have been adopted throughout the
areas of study, in line with the notion of a global governance script. At the
same time, we find important differences with regard to when and how the
regional organizations prescribe and promote âgoodâ governance institutions at
the national level. Research on diffusion and comparative regionalism is ill-
equipped to account for this double finding of increasing similarities and
persisting differences. The paper calls for a more agency-centered approach
that conceptualizes governance transfer as an institutional choice by states.
We identify factors that elicit statesâ demand for governance transfer, on the
one hand, and that shape its institutional design, on the other.Seit Ende des Kalten Krieges haben Internationale Organisationen und Staaten
Programme entwickelt, um âGutes Regierenâ in Mitgliedstaaten und DrittlĂ€ndern
zu fördern. Regionalorganisationen sind als Vermittler zwischen nationalen und
globalen Institutionen wichtig fĂŒr solche Governance-Transfers. Dieses Papier
erfasst den Governance-Transfer von neun Regionalorganisationen in den
Amerikas, Afrika, Asien und im Nahen Osten. Dabei analysieren wir die Ziele,
AnsĂ€tze und Instrumente fĂŒr die Schaffung oder VerĂ€nderung von Institutionen
in ZiellĂ€ndern. Dieser Vergleich zeigt Ăhnlichkeiten bei Standards und
Instrumenten, was auf die Ausbreitung eines âglobalen Skriptsâ fĂŒr Governance
hindeutet. Allerdings unterscheiden sich Organisationen auch darin, wie und
wann sie bestimmte Governance-Institutionen in Mitgliedstaaten vorschreiben
und fördern. Die Diffusions- und Vergleichende Regionalismusforschung ist auf
einen solchen Doppelbefund schlecht vorbereitet. Unser Papier schlÀgt einen
stÀrker auf Akteure fokussierten Ansatz vor, der Governance-Transfer als
Konsequenz staatlicher Entscheidungen ansieht. Wir identifizieren Faktoren,
die einerseits die Nachfrage nach solchen Prozessen und andererseits ihre
institutionelle Ausgestaltung beeinflussen
The limits of the transformative power of Europe
1\. Introduction 6 2\. Membership Matters, but When and How? 7 3\. Zooming
into the European Neighborhood: Going Against the Tide? 11 4\. EU External
Governance â Does it Make a Difference? 14 5\. Conclusions 17 Literature 19The EUâs Eastern Enlargement is considered to be one of the (few) successful
experiments of promoting good â both effective and legitimate â governance. By
contrast, the EUâs transformative power appears to be weak or non-existent
vis-Ă -vis its (old) neighbors in the South and its (new) neighbors in the
East. Both are not only marked by âbad governanceâ but also lack a (credible)
membership perspective. While the Western Balkans and Turkey have made
significant progress towards good governance, both with regard to government
effectiveness and democratic legitimacy, the European Neighborhood Countries
(ENCs) appear to be stuck in transition or never got that far in the first
place. Even when the effectiveness of their governance institutions has
improved, they remain well behind the other regions and especially their
democratic legitimacy is still wanting or even in decline. The paper shows
that there is a correlation between an EU membership perspective and the
successful transformation of neighboring countries. Therefore, it has been
argued that the ineffectiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is
due to the lack of this âgolden carrotâ. However, we argue that the prospects
of EU membership stabilizes rather than drives the move towards effective and
legitimate governance in candidate countries. Thus, a membership perspective
is unlikely to either turn around negative or speed up positive developments
in the EUâs neighborhood. Even if the ENCs received a membership perspective,
it would be unlikely to push them significantly towards democratic and
effective governance as long as there is no endogenously driven process of
change. Given the EUâs preference for stability and state-building, the ENP
does not provide an alternative for promoting good governance either. The ENP
clearly lacks transformative power and where it might have some domestic
impact, it risks consolidating rather than undermining authoritarian regimes
by helping to strengthen their capacities for effective governance
Good governance and bad neighbors? The limits of the transformative power of Europe
The EUâs Eastern Enlargement is considered to be one of the (few) successful experiments of promoting good â both effective and legitimate â governance. By contrast, the EUâs transformative power appears to be weak or non-existent vis-Ă -vis its (old) neighbors in the South and its (new) neighbors in the East. Both are not only marked by âbad governanceâ but also lack a (credible) membership perspective. While the Western Balkans and Turkey have made significant progress towards good governance, both with regard to government effectiveness and democratic legitimacy, the European Neighborhood Countries (ENCs) appear to be stuck in transition or never got that far in the first place. Even when the effectiveness of their governance institutions has improved, they remain well behind the other regions and especially their democratic legitimacy is still wanting or even in decline. The paper shows that there is a correlation between an EU membership perspective and the successful transformation of neighboring countries. Therefore, it has been argued that the ineffectiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is due to the lack of this âgolden carrotâ. However, we argue that the prospects of EU membership stabilizes rather than drives the move towards effective and legitimate governance in candidate countries. Thus, a membership perspective is unlikely to either turn around negative or speed up positive developments in the EUâs neighborhood. Even if the ENCs received a membership perspective, it would be unlikely to push them significantly towards democratic and effective governance as long as there is no endogenously driven process of change. Given the EUâs preference for stability and state-building, the ENP does not provide an alternative for promoting good governance either. The ENP clearly lacks transformative power and where it might have some domestic impact, it risks consolidating rather than undermining authoritarian regimes by helping to strengthen their capacities for effective governance
The European Unionâs Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus
In dieser Ausgabe wird untersucht, unter welchen Bedingungen die BemĂŒhungen
externer Akteure zum Staatsaufbau (state-building) in RĂ€umen begrenzter
Staatlichkeit effektiv sind. Wir argumentieren, dass die LegitimitÀt der
extern geförderten Norm unter lokalen Akteuren wesentlich fĂŒr den
erfolgreichen Aufbau von StaatskapazitĂ€ten ist. Internationale Normen mĂŒssen
anschlussfĂ€hig sein an dominante innerstaatliche Diskurse ĂŒber politische
Reformen. Empirisch untersuchen wir die Anti-Korruptions-Programme der
EuropÀischen Union (EU) und ihre Implementation in einer der korruptesten
Regionen der Welt, dem SĂŒdkaukasus. Wir zeigen, dass LegitimitĂ€t erklĂ€ren
kann, warum die BemĂŒhungen der EU in Georgien zur Verringerung von Korruption
beigetragen haben, nicht aber in Armenien. In beiden LĂ€ndern konnten
politische Eliten die Anti-Korruptions-Programme selektiv als Instrument gegen
politische Gegner nutzen und mit Hilfe vergröĂerter StaatskapazitĂ€ten das
Regime stabilisieren. Allerdings wurde nur in Georgien die
KorruptionsbekÀmpfung durch eine dauerhafte innerstaatliche Mobilisierung
unterstĂŒtzt, die zusĂ€tzlichen Druck auf politische Eliten zur effektiven
Umsetzung institutioneller Reformen aufbaute.This paper asks under which conditions the state-building efforts of external
actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that
the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local
actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities.
International norms need to resonate with the dominant domestic discourse on
political reforms. To substantiate our argument, we focus on the European
Unionâs (EU) anti-corruption programs and their implementation in one of the
most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that
legitimacy can explain why the EUâs fight against corruption helped reduce
corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites
could selectively use anti-corruption programs as an instrument against
political opponents using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent
regime. Only in Georgia, however, the fight against corruption was facilitated
by sustained domestic mobilization for anti-corruption policies that added
pressure on political elites âfrom below.