How social capital matters for receiving social support: on the complementary role of civil society in the COVID-19 pandemic

The Covid-19 pandemic has created a widespread need for social support. Similar to previous crises, we can observe activation in society to meet these needs: citizens have offered practical, emotional, and financial support, often within their social networks, but also to strangers and civil society organizations. In this paper, we examine the role of social capital in receiving social support during the Covid-19 pandemic in Germany using unique micro-level survey data. We investigate the importance of three aspects of social capital – the size of one’s support network, social trust, and organizational membership – for receiving (sufficient) social support. We focus on three types of support networks: family and friends, neighbors, and civil society actors. First, we find that while all three elements of social capital matter for receiving social support, a larger support network and organizational embeddedness matter primarily for receiving support beyond family and friendship networks. Second, civil society actors have been less likely to provide sufficient support in the pandemic, mainly acting in addition to strong ties and providing complementary support for individuals in particular need

How social capital matters for receiving social support

The Covid-19 pandemic has created a widespread need for social support. Similar to previous crises, we can observe activation in society to meet these needs: citizens have offered practical, emotional, and financial support, often within their social networks, but also to strangers and civil society organizations. In this paper, we examine the role of social capital in receiving social support during the Covid-19 pandemic in Germany using unique micro-level survey data. We investigate the importance of three aspects of social capital – the size of one’s support network, social trust, and organizational membership – for receiving (sufficient) social support. We focus on three types of support networks: family and friends, neighbors, and civil society actors. First, we find that while all three elements of social capital matter for receiving social support, a larger support network and organizational embeddedness matter primarily for receiving support beyond family and friendship networks. Second, civil society actors have been less likely to provide sufficient support in the pandemic, mainly acting in addition to strong ties and providing complementary support for individuals in particular need.Peer Reviewe

How social capital matters for receiving social support: on the complementary role of civil society in the COVID-19 pandemic

The Covid-19 pandemic has created a widespread need for social support. Similar to previous crises, we can observe activation in society to meet these needs: citizens have offered practical, emotional, and financial support, often within their social networks, but also to strangers and civil society organizations. In this paper, we examine the role of social capital in receiving social support during the Covid-19 pandemic in Germany using unique micro-level survey data. We investigate the importance of three aspects of social capital – the size of one’s support network, social trust, and organizational membership – for receiving (sufficient) social support. We focus on three types of support networks: family and friends, neighbors, and civil society actors. First, we find that while all three elements of social capital matter for receiving social support, a larger support network and organizational embeddedness matter primarily for receiving support beyond family and friendship networks. Second, civil society actors have been less likely to provide sufficient support in the pandemic, mainly acting in addition to strong ties and providing complementary support for individuals in particular need

Protesting Against the War in Ukraine: Evidence from a conjoint experiment

Since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we observe significant protest mobilization (not only) in Germany, expressing solidarity with Ukrainians. While some of these protests continue the pacifist legacy of the 1980s peace movement, others break with this legacy by making more militaristic demands (such as demanding sanctions, re-armament, or weapon deliveries). These different measures, which are hotly debated in German public discourse, are also reflected in different calls for demonstrations, and by different mobilizing actors. Moreover, many calls for action link the mobilization against the war in Ukraine with further policy areas, most importantly, climate and migration policy. Overall, the situation involves major trade-offs and potential dilemmas for protest organizers as certain demands might be associated with alienating certain parts of the public. We are interested in better understanding the mobilising potential of different demands and actors, as well as understanding the differentiated crowds that can be found within the resurgent and fragmented peace movement. To investigate these questions, we place a conjoint experiment in a representative online survey among the adult German population, recruiting respondents from the online access panel respondi. To assess the protest potential in the population, and to understand which crowds may be mobilized by which demands, we include a 4x3x2 conjoint between-subjects experiment that presents respondents with hypothetical calls for demonstrations with three treatments. This experiment tests the mobilising potential of 1) varying primary demands directly related to the war (on a scale of pacifism-interventionism), 2) adding second-order cross-cutting issues (does adding demands on climate or migration mobilize or de-mobilize certain crowds), and 3) different actors (invoking the presence of the Ukrainian community vs. a broad spectrum of civil society actors)