A Policy-Oriented Narrative Approach to IR

Yamin and Depledge (2004) argue that the UNFCCC regime is characterised by formal and informal coalitions, alliances, and political groups. Blaxekjær and Nielsen (2014) have demonstrated how new groups since COP15 have transformed the narrative positions and negotiations space in the UNFCCC, creating bridges as well as new trenches between North and South in relation to the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility. As the UNFCCC regime readjusts after COP21, these new narrative positions and negotiations space should be re-examined. Through original data such as official statements from groups, observations at UN climate conferences (2011-2015), and interviews with delegates and experts, the paper analyses the narrative position of the Like Minded group of Developing Countries (LMDC), an influential political group under the UNFCCC established in 2012. Following Blaxekjær and Nielsen’s (2014) policy-oriented narrative approach to IR the paper analyses LMDC’s identity, the problems identified by LMDC and the solutions to these problems, and the paper identifies five central characteristics of the dominant LMDC narrative. The analysis also touches upon what narrative techniques are used in constructing the LMDC identity. This framework reveals the embeddedness of narratives in practice as they unfold in the formation of new alliances and ruptures in old ones. This paper contributes to the emerging Narrative in IR research agenda with a policy-oriented model of analysis. The paper also contributes to the broader research agenda on the post-Paris UNFCCC regime, and argues that as long as CBDR/RC is a major unresolved issue – an essentially contested concept – as long will the LMDC play a prominent role in the UNFCCC regime

Side-payments: an effective instrument for building climate clubs?

Climate clubs have been suggested as a gateway to substantial reductions in global emissions. The club approach begins with a small number of enthusiastic countries. This paper asks under what conditions such clubs are likely to evolve into effective cooperation through side-payments to new members. The question is addressed through a range of formal thought experiments using numerical simulations. The model is calibrated using empirical data on countries’ emissions, GDP, populations, and vulnerabilities. It is simple and stylized, but allows for complex and dynamic interactions between actors. Basic equity considerations can be accommodated. The results indicate that side-payments’ theoretical potential for facilitating effective clubs is large. One or two large emitters can initiate a club that grows to cover a substantial share of global emissions if the global benefit–cost ratio for mitigation is around 3 or larger. The size of stable clubs is larger if new members contribute to making side-payments, and somewhat lower if equity considerations constrain the set of possible transfers. Side-payments’ effect is enabled by the large asymmetries between countries. Total side-payment flows range from tens to hundreds of billions of US dollars annually

Under what conditions will the paris process produce a cycle of increasing ambition sufficient to reach the 2°c goal?

The Paris Agreement establishes a cycle where parties submit their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) every five years. First-round NDCs fail to put emissions on a path consistent with achieving the Agreement’s 2°C goal. This article presents a formal, dynamic model of reciprocity-based collective action among states and investigates the conditions under which the Paris process might deliver sufficient ambition ratchet-up to achieve the 2°C goal. The model is run under various assumptions about parties’ (1) willingness to increase ambition as a function of what others promise and deliver, (2) compliance with promises, (3) trust in the outcome of the review process, and (4) trust in the outcome of the periodic global stocktake. The results show that the Paris process delivers sufficient ambition ratchet-up to achieve the 2°C goal only under a very restricted set of conditions. At minimum, parties need to increase ambition by 4 percent of global emissions when they submit, confirm, or revise their 2030 targets in 2020

Konsekvenser av irregulær ytre geometri for bæresystemets klimagassregnskap på Gullhaug Torg

Oppgaven analyserer konsekvensene den irregulære ytre geometrien får for dimensjoneringen av bæresystemet og tilhørende klimagassutslipp på Gullhaug Torg, ved at originalbyggets sammenlignes et regulært referansebygg. Klimagassanalysene er basert på miljødata for materialene og inkluderer bæresystemene over bakkenivå. Utvalgte representative etasjer for byggene er dimensjonert, og gir estimater for totale mengder. Dimensjoneringen fokuserer på etterspente flatdekker, med bruk av programvaren ADAPT Floor Pro og håndberegninger med med ekvivalent rammemetode. Forenklet ytre geometri gir slankere bæresystem og omtrent 10% reduksjon i klimagassutslipp fra bæresystemet. Optimalisering av betongresept reduserer bæresystemets utslipp med omtrent 50% sammenlignet med bransjereferanse

Operationalizing Equity in the 2015 Agreement : Report from Nordic-Belgian Workshop on 24.-25.10.2013 in Stockholm, Sweden

The Nordic Council of Ministers and the Government of Belgium organized a workshop on Operationalizing Equity in the 2015 Agreement on 24.-25.10.2013 in Stockholm, Sweden. The workshop aimed to focus on implementing equity in a practical way, rather than having abstract, theoretical discussions. The first day was devoted to academic presentation and follow-up discussions. The second day featured a roundtable discussion between negotiators under Chatham House Rules

The domestic politics of international climate commitments : which factors explain cross-country variation in NDC ambition?

First published online: 11 February 2020Under the Paris Agreement, parties self-determine their mitigation ambition level by submitting Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Extant assessments find that the collective ambition of current pledges is not line with the Agreement’s goals and that individual ambition varies greatly across countries, but there have not been attempts at explaining this variation. This paper identifies several potential drivers of national climate ambition, and tests whether these can account for differences in the ambition level of countries’ mitigation targets under the Paris Agreement. After outlining theorized relationships between a set of domestic political characteristics and climate policy ambition, regression analysis is used to assess the effects of different potential drivers across a dataset of 170 countries. We find that a country’s level of democracy and vulnerability to climate change have positive effects on NDC ambition, while coal rent and GDP have negative effects. Our findings suggest that these objective factors are more important than subjective factors, while the most influential subjective factor is the cosmopolitanism-nativism value dimension

Public support for air travel restrictions to address COVID-19 or climate change

An improved understanding of public support is essential to design effective and feasible climate policies for aviation. Our motivation is the contrast between high support for air travel restrictions responding to the COVID-19 pandemic and low support for restrictions to combat climate change. Can the same factors explain individuals’ support for restrictive measures across two different problems? Using a survey, we find that largely the same factors explain support. Support increases with expected effectiveness, perceived threat and imminence of the problem, shorter expected duration of the measure, knowledge, and trust, while support decreases with expected negative consequences for self and the poor. When controlling for all perceptions, there is no significant residual difference in support depending on whether the measures address climate change or COVID-19. The level of support differs because COVID-19 is perceived as a more imminent threat, and because measures are expected to be shorter-lasting and more effective

Public acceptance for environmental taxes: Self-interest, environmental and distributional concerns

While strongly recommended by economists, it has often been politically difficult to impose taxes on externalities. There is a substantial literature on public attitudes towards environmental taxes. There has, however, been few comprehensive attempts to understand attitudes towards environmental taxes. The main research question in this paper is which factors influence support for fuel taxation. We propose a model of attitudes towards fuel taxation, and test this model as well as more specific hypotheses, using data from a representative survey of the adult Norwegian population. Our results suggest that support for fuel taxation is best predicted by beliefs about environmental consequences, followed by beliefs about consequences to others. Beliefs about consequences to self (self-interest) is the factor that explains the least variation in support for fuel taxation. The academically interesting result that support cannot be well explained without capturing a broad range of motivational factors is also highly policy relevant. It implies that there is no magic formula for increasing public support for environmental taxes. There are, however, some issues which can be addressed: trust in how well the government spends the revenue, and the perception that taxation does very little to change behaviour and thus to reduce environmental problems.Public support Environmental taxes Fuel taxes

Equity and spectrum of mitigation commitments in the 2015 agreement

To what extent and how can equity be operationalized in a spectrum of mitigation commitments? We approach this question through academic literature review and analysis of Parties' submissions and statements. We argue that a potentially feasible and constructive way forward is a mutual recognition approach. This approach implies that parties should accept a set or norms, and a range of interpretations of these norms, as legitimate. Parties should also respect a principle of reciprocity, which means that any (interpretation of a) principle of fairness invoked by oneself can legitimately be invoked also by others. We apply this approach to the issue of equity indicators, and propose a non-coercive template of indicators approach, building on two critical components: transparency and open, critical review of Parties' pledges and justifications thereof