Infinity

Prose by Eric Baugh. Finalist in the 2018 Manuscripts Prose Contest

Organ Donation: The Gift, the Weight and the Tyranny of Good Acts

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/72413/1/j.1600-6143.2006.01731.x.pd

Interpretation and Social Explanation

In this article I focus on those aspects of Keith Dowding’s book that are most concerned with interpretive approaches to the study of politics. I argue that, in ways not adequately captured by Dowding’s descriptions, the historical study of political concepts tells us something about their historical political effects and for this reason has a distinct value for how we think about and study politics. Furthermore, I argue, concepts of and about politics, including the concepts of political science, cannot be fully separated from the political contexts of which they are a part. Concepts which function as generalisable explanations at one point in time can shape the thinking and behaviour of political actors and thus be very particular causes. A philosophy or method of political science unaware of or inattentive to this dimension of politics and political science is incomplete

Hegel and global politics: communitarianism or cosmopolitanism?

This article discusses Hegel’s views on global politics by relating them to the ‘communitarianism versus cosmopolitanism’ debate. I distinguish between three different theoretical positions and three different readings of Hegel, which I associate with the notions of ‘communitarianism,’ ‘strong cosmopolitanism’ and ‘weak cosmopolitanism’ respectively. Contrary to a commonly held view that Hegel is not a cosmopolitan thinker at all, in any sense of the term, I argue that he is best thought of as a weak cosmopolitan thinker rather than a communitarian or a strong cosmopolitan advocate of the idea of a world-state. In passing, the article refers to the relationship which exists between Hegel’s ideas and those of three Twentieth Century theorists who might be associated with these theoretical positions and these different readings of Hegel, namely, Carl Schmitt, Alexandre Kojève and Jurgen Habermas. The article also refers to the methodological problems which are confronted by readers of Hegel’s writings who wish to apply his ideas to the problems of global politics today. Here I refer to a distinction which I have made elsewhere between different kinds of reading, namely the interpretation, appropriation and the reconstruction of texts, which is especially relevant for readers of the works of Hegel

The Obligation of Physicians to Medical Outliers: A Kantian and Hegelian Synthesis

Background Patients who present to medical practices without health insurance or with serious co-morbidities can become fiscal disasters to those who care for them. Their consumption of scarce resources has caused consternation among providers and institutions, especially as it concerns the amount and type of care they should receive. In fact, some providers may try to avoid caring for them altogether, or at least try to limit their institutional or practice exposure to them. Discussion We present a philosophical discourse, with emphasis on the writings of Immanuel Kant and G.F.W. Hegel, as to why physicians have the moral imperative to give such outliers considerate and thoughtful care. Outliers are defined and the ideals of morality, responsibility, good will, duty, and principle are applied to the care of patients whose financial means are meager and to those whose care is physiologically futile. Actions of moral worth, unconditional good will, and doing what is right are examined. Summary Outliers are a legitimate economic concern to individual practitioners and institutions, however this should not lead to an evasion of care. These patients should be identified early in their course of care, but such identification should be preceded by a well-planned recognition of this burden and appropriate staffing and funding should be secured. A thoughtful team approach by medical practices and their institutions, involving both clinicians and non-clinicians, should be pursued

Beyond a Dichotomy of Perspectives: Understanding Religion on the Basis of Paul Natorp’s Logic of Boundary

Based on Paul Natorp’s (1854–1924) late post-Neo-Kantian “Logic of Boundary” (German: “Grenzlogik”) I will offer a methodically controlled, non-reductionist and equally anti-essentialist reconstruction of the notion of religion. The pre-eminent objective of this reconstructive work is to overcome the well-known epistemological as well as methodological problem of a dichotomy between inside and outside perspectives on the subject of religion. Differently put, the objective consists in an attempt to demonstrate that there actually is “reason in religion” that is intellectually accessible for academic knowledge production. Following Natorp’s splendid formulation I will argue that religion operates neither ‘within’ nor ‘beyond’ the ‘boundary of humanity’ but exactly on [or ‘in’] this boundary. More precisely, I will explicate that religious praxis (including its specific production of knowledge) from Natorp’s standpoint can be understood as the performative realization, and habitual embodiment of the (contextually concrete) boundary of humanity or human reason itself. Due to its principial self-referentiality this boundary carries the crucial sense of a first and last positive and, therefore, both in theoretical terms definitive and in practical terms eminently instructive notion of boundary with no outside. This paradoxically all-enclosing, positive boundary, while explicitly including life’s inevitable negativity but, nonetheless, able to ideally sublate it, is the reason why the practice of religion, as empirical evidence unmistakably documents, can provide an incommensurably fulfilling, significant and meaningful closure with regards to the innermost self-perception of its practitioners (concerning their self-determination or agency)

Getting nowhere fast: a teleological conception of socio-technical acceleration

It has been frequently recognized that the perceived acceleration of life that has been experienced from the Industrial Revolution onward is engendered, at least in part, by an understanding of speed as an end in itself. There is no equilibrium to be reached – no perfect speed – and as such, social processes are increasingly driven not by rational ends, but by an indeterminate demand for acceleration that both defines and restricts the decisional possibilities of actors. In Aristotelian terms, this is a final cause – i.e. a teleology – of speed: it is not a defined end-point, but rather, a purposive aim that predicates the emergence of possibilities. By tracing this notion of telos from its beginnings in ancient Greece, through the ur-empiricism of Francis Bacon, and then to our present epoch, this paper seeks to tentatively examine the way in which such a teleology can be theoretically divorced from the idea of historical progress, arguing that the former is premised upon an untenable ontological privileging of becoming