Alternative Facts, Alternative Sciences: The Development of the Concept in Medieval Islam and Its Historical Consequences

The perception of reality, and of what is real and what false, as unproblematic and self-evident in stable societies hides the fact that reality as perceived by members of a society is socially and politically generated. The generation through political fiat of an alternative reality presented as alternative facts in the Unites States during the Trump administration, and the astounding espousal of that alternative reality by nearly half of the population, is a striking demonstration of this fact. In this paper, the development inmedieval Islam of the concept of alternative facts as alternative scientific reality is traced to the historical developments in the Middle East in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, with an account of their consequences which persist to the present day

Alternative Facts, Alternative Sciences: The Development of the Concept in Medieval Islam and Its Historical Consequences

The perception of reality, and of what is real and what false, as unproblematic and self-evident in stable societies hides the fact that reality as perceived by members of a society is socially and politically generated. The generation through political fiat of an alternative reality presented as alternative facts in the Unites States during the Trump administration, and the astounding espousal of that alternative reality by nearly half of the population, is a striking demonstration of this fact. In this paper, the development inmedieval Islam of the concept of alternative facts as alternative scientific reality is traced to the historical developments in the Middle East in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, with an account of their consequences which persist to the present day

Sanctioning Knowledge

In this paper, I discuss stories about rulers and princes of three dynasties - Abbasid, Norman and Timurid – and their narrative representation as prime knowers of the mathematical sciences, geography and history. I argue that they constitute one set of positive forms of sanctioning or contesting knowledge in those societies by prescribing hierarchies of knowledge forms and hierarchies of people and institutions that decide about the veracity of knowledge. I suggest that these stories share their origin and meaning in an environment of legitimizing propaganda for the various rulers and princes. I also claim that the value and position of scientific knowledge in these stories differ, starting from what apparently were personal interests of a ruler and leading to its integration into what was considered necessary for the education of a prince and the cultured behaviour of a ruler. Hence, these stories about knowledge and rulers present images of knowledge that delineate the status of scholars in those three societies and thus define possibilities and set boundaries for learning and practicing scholarly fields.En este artículo se estudian historias sobre gobernantes y príncipes de tres dinastías - ‛abbāsí, normanda y timurí – y su representación narrativa como conocedores de las ciencias matemáticas, la geografía y la historia. Se argumenta que constituyen un conjunto de formas positivas de aprobar o impugnar el conocimiento en esas sociedades, prescribiendo jerarquías de formas de conocimiento y jerarquías de gentes e instituciones que deciden acerca de la veracidad del conocimiento. Se sugiere que esas historias comparten su origen y significado en un contexto de propaganda legitimadora para varios gobernantes y príncipes. También se afirma que el valor y la posición del conocimiento científico en esas historias difieren, empezando por lo que en apariencia eran los intereses personales de un gobernante hasta su integración en lo que se consideraba necesario para la educación de un príncipe y la conducta cultivada de un gobernante. Por tanto, esas historias sobre conocimiento y gobernantes presentan imágenes del conocimiento que delinean el status de los sabios en esas tres sociedades, definiendo posibilidades y estableciendo límites para el aprendizaje y los campos de estudio que se podían practicar

Concepts of Authorship in Pre-Modern Arabic Texts

The objective of the contributions presented in this volume is the investigation of authorship in pre-modern Arabic texts. From several angles and different perspectives it has been asked how the author in his various facets and aspects, and as a principle of organization and guidance, can be traced and understood. The author can be perceived as a historical individual, a singular genius, or a gifted anthologist; he can claim authority or pass it on to others. The author can be invisible, applying textual strategies for steering the reader’s perception and interpretation, trying to leave the reader oblivious to his authorial interference. Although authors can be proud to present their knowledge and their opinions, they can also be reluctant to show themselves and can even disclaim their responsibility, depending on the issue at hand. The contributions gathered in this volume provide a fresh view on the multilayered nature of authorial functions and open up new perspectives on our understanding of the rich and diverse pre-modern Arabic culture and literature

Meaning and definition:Skepticism and semantics in twelfth-century Arabic Philosophy

The theory of essential definitions is a fundamental anti-sceptic element of the Aristotelian-Avicennian epistemology. In this theory, when we distinguish the genus and the specific differentia of a given essence we thereby acquire a scientific understanding of it. The aim of this article is to analyse systematically the sceptical reasons, arguments and conclusions against real definitions of three major authorities of twelfth-century Arabic philosophy: Fahr al-Din al-Razi, Sihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi and Abu l-Barakat al-Badadi. I focus on showing how their refutation of our capacity to provide essential definitions of things is rooted in their semantic theory: we only know things under certain descriptions which are identical to the meanings of the words that we use to refer to them, yet these descriptions do not capture the essences of things in themselves. The best result one can achieve with Aristotelian-Avicennian scientific definitions is a "nominal definition". With this, Razi, Suhrawardi and Abu l-Barakat will put some serious epistemic limitations on our capacity to attain scientific knowledge of things, at least as Aristotle and Avicenna would have it