40 research outputs found
A Procurement Auction Model Under Supplier Uncertainty
As business-to-business commerce shifts to the Internet, newer suppliers with cheaper but unreliable technologies enter the market place to win orders from firms by beating the price of their perfectly reliable (but expensive) competitors. The dilemma facing purchasing firms is the allocation of the tender across suppliers of varying supply reliability. We model the procurement problem as a sealed-bid auction where the buyer has to allocate purchases between an expensive but reliable supplier and a cheaper but unreliable supplier, and the suppliers specify prices for different proportions of the tender awarded to them. A unique feature of our model is that it allows the purchasing firm to reserve the right to change the size of the total tender awarded depending on the nature of the bids received from the suppliers. We prove that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of efficient outcomes, and for strictly convex cost functions, the outcome is unique. Further, we show that the possibility of implicit supplier collusion is strengthened in that the suppliers may structure their bids forcing the buyer to allocate the tender resulting in the worst-case (highest price) scenario for him. We also show that the Anton-Yao (A-Y, 1989) model can be interpreted as a limiting case of our model and that the efficient outcome derived in this paper is the only robust outcome in the A-Y model.
A Procurement Auction Model Under Supplier Uncertainty
As business-to-business commerce shifts to the Internet, newer suppliers with cheaper but unreliable technologies enter the market place to win orders from firms by beating the price of their perfectly reliable (but expensive) competitors. The dilemma facing purchasing firms is the allocation of the tender across suppliers of varying supply reliability. We model the procurement problem as a sealed-bid auction where the buyer has to allocate purchases between an expensive but reliable supplier and a cheaper but unreliable supplier, and the suppliers specify prices for different proportions of the tender awarded to them. A unique feature of our model is that it allows the purchasing firm to reserve the right to change the size of the total tender awarded depending on the nature of the bids received from the suppliers. We prove that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of efficient outcomes, and for strictly convex cost functions, the outcome is unique. Further, we show that the possibility of implicit supplier collusion is strengthened in that the suppliers may structure their bids forcing the buyer to allocate the tender resulting
in the worst-case (highest price) scenario for him. We also show that the Anton-Yao (A-Y, 1989) model can be interpreted as a limiting case of our model and that the
efficient outcome derived in this paper is the only robust outcome in the A-Y model
A Procurement Auction Model Under Supplier Uncertainty
As business-to-business commerce shifts to the Internet, newer suppliers with cheaper but unreliable technologies enter the market place to win orders from firms by beating the price of their perfectly reliable (but expensive) competitors. The dilemma facing purchasing firms is the allocation of the tender across suppliers of varying supply reliability. We model the procurement problem as a sealed-bid auction where the buyer has to allocate purchases between an expensive but reliable supplier and a cheaper but unreliable supplier, and the suppliers specify prices for different proportions of the tender awarded to them. A unique feature of our model is that it allows the purchasing firm to reserve the right to change the size of the total tender awarded depending on the nature of the bids received from the suppliers. We prove that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of efficient outcomes, and for strictly convex cost functions, the outcome is unique. Further, we show that the possibility of implicit supplier collusion is strengthened in that the suppliers may structure their bids forcing the buyer to allocate the tender resulting
in the worst-case (highest price) scenario for him. We also show that the Anton-Yao (A-Y, 1989) model can be interpreted as a limiting case of our model and that the
efficient outcome derived in this paper is the only robust outcome in the A-Y model
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Supply contracts in manufacturerâretailer interactions with manufacturerâquality and retailer effortâinduced demand
We consider a decentralized distribution channel where demand depends on the manufacturerâchosen quality of the product and the selling effort chosen by the retailer. The cost of selling effort is private information for the retailer. We consider three different types of supply contracts in this article: priceâonly contract where the manufacturer sets a wholesale price; fixedâfee contract where manufacturer sells at marginal cost but charges a fixed (transfer) fee; and, general franchise contract where manufacturer sets a wholesale price and charges a fixed fee as well. The fixedâfee and general franchise contracts are referred to as twoâpart tariff contracts. For each contract type, we study different contract forms including individual, menu, and pooling contracts. In the analysis of the different types and forms of contracts, we show that the price only contract is dominated by the general franchise menu contract. However, the manufacturer may prefer to offer the fixedâfee individual contract as compared to the general franchise contract when the retailer's reservation utility and degree of information asymmetry in costs are high. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 200
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Service Provision in Distribution Channels
Consumers may need help using an inherently complex or information-intensive product after purchase. This paper studies the incentive for a manufacturer or a retailer to invest in pre-sales service effort that would reduce the consumer's likelihood of seeking after-sales support. Because providing pre-sales and after-sales support would incur costs for the provider, it is not evident whether the manufacturer or the retailer would be more effective in doing so, and whether both services should be provided by the same firm. We consider different models in which the pre-sales service and the after-sales support is provided by the same or different firms, and show that the service configuration in which both pre-sales service and after-sales support is provided by the retailer is desirable to both the retailer and the manufacturer. Interestingly, in this service configuration, although the pre-sales service is provided at the highest level among all configurations, consumers can show up in the largest numbers to seek after-sales support. We also study the possibility of the firms collaborating in providing pre-sales service, by allowing the manufacturer to share a portion of the retailer's cost of providing pre-sales service. As expected, if the manufacturer provides the after-sales support, cost-sharing by the manufacturer may increase both channel members' profits. However, if the retailer provides after-sales support, cost-sharing by the manufacturer helps increase the manufacturer's profit but, surprisingly, reduces the retailer's profit. In this case, the overall channel can still be better off, and as such, the manufacturer may be able to implement cost-sharing by providing an appropriate transfer to the retaile