Incarnation, motricité et rapport au possible

International audienceFor Husserl, kinaesthetic capability is a key piece of the perception process. By ensuring the junction between the actual and the potential, it allows the exhibition of an object that is always more than what appears. Kinaesthetic capability preserves the transcendence of the object by preventing the phenomenon from being confined to pure actuality. This idea, however, poses significant challenges when one questions the nature of the possibilities that are at stake here. Especially, the perceived seems to enjoy a kind of emancipation from these capabilities as they actually are. How can one justify that the structures of the perceived world are the intentional correlate of the kinaesthetic skills of the subject, if such structures continue to regulate the sense of the appearing objects when those skills are neutralized? We will see that only a genetic perspective, assuming the intrinsically historical character of the subject, provides a satisfactory answer to this question, and that this perspective leads to question the actualist position that Husserl sometimes tends to adopt

Ingénierie des connaissances et critique de la raison artificielle.: De la simulation de l'intelligence à sa supplémentation

International audienceL'Ingénierie des Connaissances (IC) peut-elle, comme prétend parfois le faire l'Intelligence Artificielle (IA), nous renseigner sur les mécanismes de la connaissance ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous partirons des analyses que H.L. Dreyfus a consacrées à l'IA, en particulier dans son ouvrage What computers can't do, en essayant de déterminer si l'IC est en mesure de contribuer à la critique de la raison artificielle qu'il tenta de mettre en place. Nous chercherons à étayer l'idée que l'IC, bien que n'ayant pas comme l'IA pour projet de reproduire le comportement intelligent, peut néanmoins permettre de faire progresser notre compréhension des mécanismes de la connaissance, à travers l'entreprise d'augmentation ou de supplémentation de la cognition humaine qu'elle prétend réaliser

Why Medical Informatics (still) Needs Cognitive and Social Sciences.

International audienceOBJECTIVES: To summarize current excellent medical informatics research in the field of human factors and organizational issues. METHODS: Using PubMed, a total of 3,024 papers were selected from 17 journals. The papers were evaluated on the basis of their title, keywords, and abstract, using several exclusion and inclusion criteria. 15 preselected papers were carefully evaluated by six referees using a standard evaluation grid. RESULTS: Six best papers were selected exemplifying the central role cognitive and social sciences can play in medical informatics research. Among other contributions, those studies: (i) make use of the distributed cognition paradigm to model and understand clinical care situations; (ii) take into account organizational issues to analyse the impact of HIT on information exchange and coordination processes; (iii) illustrate how models and empirical data from cognitive psychology can be used in medical informatics; and (iv) highlight the need of qualitative studies to analyze the unexpected side effects of HIT on cognitive and work processes. CONCLUSION: The selected papers demonstrate that paradigms, methodologies, models, and results from cognitive and social sciences can help to bridge the gap between HIT and end users, and contribute to limit adoption failures that are reported regularly

Tactile-force-feedback integration as an exemplary case for the sense of touche in VE. A new T-FFD device to explore spatial irregularities

International audienceThe tactile-force-feedback (T-FFD) integration is pertinent for (at least) two situations in which the role of tactile should be explored: 1) grip control in tasks of prehension ; 2) exploration of spatial irregularities. We have identified and have begun to explore 4 major cases in which the T-FFD integration is important

Semantic Queries Expedite MedDRA Terms Selection Thanks to a Dedicated User Interface: A Pilot Study on Five Medical Conditions

Background: Searching into the MedDRA terminology is usually limited to a hierarchical search, and/or a string search. Our objective was to compare user performances when using a new kind of user interface enabling semantic queries versus classical methods, and evaluating term selection improvement in MedDRA.Methods: We implemented a forms-based web interface: OntoADR Query Tools (OQT). It relies on OntoADR, a formal resource describing MedDRA terms using SNOMED CT concepts and corresponding semantic relations, enabling terminological reasoning. We then compared time spent on five examples of medical conditions using OQT or the MedDRA web-based browser (MWB), and precision and recall of the term selection.Results: OntoADR Query Tools allows the user to search in MedDRA: One may enter search criteria by selecting one semantic property from a dropdown list and one or more SNOMED CT concepts related to the range of the chosen property. The user is assisted in building his query: he can add criteria and combine them. Then, the interface displays the set of MedDRA terms matching the query. Meanwhile, on average, the time spent on OQT (about 4 min 30 s) is significantly lower (−35%; p < 0.001) than time spent on MWB (about 7 min). The results of the System Usability Scale (SUS) gave a score of 62.19 for OQT (rated as good). We also demonstrated increased precision (+27%; p = 0.01) and recall (+34%; p = 0.02). Computed “performance” (correct terms found per minute) is more than three times better with OQT than with MWB.Discussion: This pilot study establishes the feasibility of our approach based on our initial assumption: performing MedDRA queries on the five selected medical conditions, using terminological reasoning, expedites term selection, and improves search capabilities for pharmacovigilance end users. Evaluation with a larger number of users and medical conditions are required in order to establish if OQT is appropriate for the needs of different user profiles, and to check if conclusions can be extended to other kinds of medical conditions. The application is currently limited by the non-exhaustive coverage of MedDRA by OntoADR, but nevertheless shows good performance which encourages continuing in the same direction

Le possible peut-il être perçu ?

International audienceDifférentes théories psychologiques de la perception soutiennent aujourd'hui que le possible est quelque chose que nous percevons. Pour l'approche écologique par exemple, la perception fournit un accès direct aux possibilités d'action potentialisées par les structures de l'environnement. Cette idée est-elle légitime ? Peut-on réellement percevoir le possible ? Si la perception nous branche sur le réel, ne faut-il pas justement se libérer de la perception pour accéder au possible ? Dès lors, le possible n'est-il pas plutôt pensé que perçu, l'objet d'un savoir et non pas d'un voir ? Répondre à ces questions nécessite d'examiner si la thèse que le possible est perçu est en cohérence avec : (a) la structure phénoménologique de l'objet perçu ; (b) nos modèles du fonctionnement de la perception, en particulier le modèle causal standard. Cet examen permet de montrer que si, dans un sens phénoménologique strict, le possible n'est pas quelque chose qui apparaît sur le mode de l'objectité perçue, il contribue néanmoins à déterminer l'organisation et la sémantique de l'environnement perçu. Le possible comme tel n'est pas perçu, mais il confère structure, forme et sens au monde qui apparaît dans la perception

Eléments pour une interprétation phénoménologique de la pesanteur

Elements for a phenomenological interpretation of weightiness. The aim of this text is to set up a certain number of elements which may serve as the foundation for a phenomenological interpretation of weightiness ; in other words, a characterisation of the phenomena of gravity and weight as they appear and are meaningful for an individual in his daily, “ pre-reflexive” relation with the world. Although the thoughts presented here are primarily philosophical in nature, we invoke a set of observations which derive from empirical science, in particular psychology, in order to support the chain of reasoning. We will first show, on the basis of a number of results from experimental psychology, that the “ weight” of an object that is being manipulated is spontaneously evaluated/ perceived by the individual on the basis of the effort that is required to lift it ; and that the amplitude of the effort that must be furnished in order to produce a given level of force is itself proportional to the maximal force that the individual is capable of producing. This leads us to propose an initial phenomenological characterisation of weightiness. We then seek to identify the structures which, on the part of the perceiving subject, make it possible for something like “ weight” to become manifest. Two main ideas become patent. On one hand, “ weight” can be understood as one of the ways by which an individual can make his world intelligible, by referring the object he is manipulating to the latitude of his capacity to act, in other words to the purchase he has on the object. On the other hand, since a weight is not something that one can see but something one has to bear, something which can only be perceived by taking charge of it, only a perceiver who is able to relate to himself as to a finite power, a being who is perpetually exhausted, will have the requisite conformation for encountering something like “ weight” – in order to open up a world where weightiness reigns.Ce texte vise à mettre en place une série d’éléments devant servir de fondement à une interprétation phénoménologique de la pesanteur, à savoir une caractérisation de la pesanteur telle qu’elle se montre et fait sens pour l’individu dans son rapport quotidien, «préréflexif » , au monde. Bien que les réflexions ici proposées soient prioritairement à rattacher à la philosophie, nous convoquerons une série d’observations issues des sciences empiriques – au premier chef la psychologie – pour appuyer leur cheminement. Après avoir montré, sur la base d’un ensemble de résultats de la psychologie, que le poids d’un objet manipulé est spontanément évalué/ perçu par l’individu sur la base de l’effort requis pour le soulever, et que l’amplitude de l’effort devant être fourni pour développer un niveau de force donné est elle-même proportionnée à la capacité de production de force variable dont dispose l’individu, nous proposerons une première caractérisation phénoménologique de la pesanteur. Nous chercherons à partir de là à mettre en lumière les structures qui, du côté du sujet percevant, rendent possible la manifestation de quelque chose de tel que le poids. Deux idées principales s’imposeront : d’une part, la pesanteur peut être comprise comme une des manières dont l’individu se rend intelligible son monde en référant l’objet qu’il manipule à la prise dont il dispose, au sens de la latitude de son pouvoir d’action ; d’autre part, parce que le poids n’est pas quelque chose que l’on voit mais quelque chose que l’on supporte, quelque chose qui pour être perçu doit être pris en charge, seul un percevant capable de se rapporter à soi comme à une puissance finie, un être en perpétuel épuisement, aura la conformation requise pour rencontrer quelque chose de tel que le poids – pour ouvrir un monde où règne la pesanteur.Declerck Gunnar. Eléments pour une interprétation phénoménologique de la pesanteur. In: Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive, n°53-54, 2010/1-2. Philosophie, Technologie et Cognition. pp. 401-432

Physique de l'espace et phénoménologie de l'espace

International audienceQu'est-ce que l'espace ? Pourquoi y a-t-il de l'espace plutôt que rien ? La physique prétend aujourd'hui répondre à ces questions en se passant de toute référence à l'espace phénoménal du sujet, et donc en totale rupture avec son sens phénoménologique. Nous tiendrons que cette élision, pour traditionnelle qu'elle soit dans les sciences de la Nature, condamne par avance toute tentative d'explication de l'espace. Et nous montrerons que l'espace que nous construisons comme à notre insu dans la perception est de part en part structuré par un rapport au possible, la spatialisation consistant dans son principe à se rendre intelligible les étants en représentant dans la structuration même du monde les possibilités dont nous disposons

Why motor simulation cannot explain affordance perception

International audienceAccording to several authors in psychology and neurosciences, our ability to perceive affordances is subtended by motor simulation mechanisms. Such mechanisms provide dynamic representations of feasible actions, thus enabling to scale the surrounding structures on the behavioural repertoire and capacities supported by our body. This attractive hypothesis has been taken up in robotics, to build intelligent systems able to determine in advance if a given action would be successful given the current state of the environment and their own skills. Several arguments however suggest that the motor simulation framework is not sufficient to explain affordance perception: (i) it rests on a misunderstanding of what affordances are: not actions that are currently feasible, but actions that are possible; (ii) it is computationally unrealistic: motor simulation is too costly in terms of computational resources to explain how one can access prospectively to actions that are potentiated by surrounding structures; (iii) it only covers the part of the perceptual field within the scope of our attention, but the affordances we perceive do not reduce to the object or state of affairs our attention is focused on at time t; (iv) it can only work if a first layer of affordances is available: motor simulation cannot explain affordance perception, because its very functioning presupposes such perception. Other mechanisms must consequently be hypothesized