Synthesis, physical studies and crystal structure determination of Y(III) and Er(III) complexes of 1-(pyridin-2-yl)-2-(pyridine-2-ylmethylene)hydrazine

Two isotype mononuclear yttrium(III) and erbium(III) complexes, {[Y(HL)(OAc)2(H2O)2]. (H2O)∙(NO3)} (1) and {[Er(HL) (OAc)2(H2O)2].(H2O)∙(NO3)} (2), where HL is the neutral Schiff base ligand 1-(pyridin-2-yl)-2-(pyridine-2-ylmethylene)hydrazine, and OAc is the acetate anion, have been synthesized and characterized by physicochemical methods and single crystal X-ray determination. Both complexes crystallizes in the triclinic space group Pī with unit cell dimensions for complex of Y(III) a = 7.909 (2) Å, b = 11.718 (4) Å, c = 12.497 (3) Å,    α = 78.907 (3)°, b = 73.840 (3)°, γ = 72.074 (3)°, V = 1051.26 (6) Å3, Z = 2, R1 = 0.051 and    wR2 = 0.112 and for complex of Er(III)a = 7.913 (1) Å, b = 11.719 (2) Å, c = 12.487 (2) Å,          α = 78.832 (1)°, α = 73.674 (1)°, γ = 72.012 (1)°, V = 1049.64 (3) Å3, Z = 2, R1 = 0.028, and   wR2 = 0.062. In both complexes, the coordination polyhedra around Ln(III) atoms are best described as a distorted tricapped trigonal prism. Antioxidant activities of the ligand and its Y(III) and Er(III) complexes are studied

O-glycosylation in plant and mammal cells: the use of chemical inhibitors to understand the biosynthesis and function of O-glycosylated proteins

Glycosylation is the most common posttranslational modification of proteins and consists of the addition of sugar moiety to proteins. The resulting glycosylated proteins are often secreted to the extracellular compartment or integrated into different cell organelles. This modification was identified in plant as well as in mammalian cells.  A number of plant and mammal proteins are either N- or O-glycosylated. This review focuses on O-glycosylation which refers to linkage of a glycan to hydroxyl group of serine, threonine or proline residues. O-glycosylation can be altered by the action of chemical inhibitors. For instance, 3,4-dehydro-L-proline, ethyl 3,4-dehydroxy benzoate and a,a-dipyridyl inhibit the activity of prolyl4-hydroxylase, a key enzyme for plant O-glycosylation. In addition, a small molecule inhibitor designated 1-68A inhibits the polypeptide N-acetylgalactosaminyltransferases of mammalian cells. The aim of this review is to summarize the role and mechanism of action of these inhibitors of O-glycosylation and their impact on cell development in plants and mammals

Coordination mechanisms for COVID-19 in the WHO Regional office for Africa

Aim: this study describes the coordination mechanisms that have been used for management of the COVID-19 pandemic in the WHO AFRO region; relate the patterns of the disease (length of time between onset of coordination and first case; length of the wave of the disease and peak attack rate) to coordination mechanisms established at the national level, and document best practices and lessons learned. Method: We did a retrospective policy tracing of the COVID-19 coordination mechanisms from March 2020 (when first cases of COVID-19 in the AFRO region were reported) to the end of the third wave in September 2021. Data sources were from document and Literature review of COVID-19 response strategies, plans, regulations, press releases, government websites, grey and peer-reviewed literature. The data was extracted to Excel file database and coded then analysed using Stata (version 15). Analysis was done through descriptive statistical analysis (using measures of central tendencies (Mean, DS, and median) and measures of central dispersion (range)), multiple linear regression, and thematic analysis of qualitative data. Results: There are three distinct layered coordination mechanisms (strategic, operational, and tactical) that were either implemented singularly or in tandem with another coordination mechanism. 87.23% (n=41) of the countries initiated strategic coordination, and 59.57% (n=28) initiated some form of operational coordination. Some of countries (n=26,55.32%) provided operational coordination using functional Public Health Emergency Operation Centres (PHEOCs) which were activated for the response. 31.91% (n=15) of the countries initiated some form of tactical coordination which involved the decentralisation of the operations at the local/grassroot level/district/ county levels. Decentralisation strategies played a key role in coordination, as was the innovative strategies by the countries; some coordination mechanisms built on already existing coordination systems and the heads of states were effective in the success of the coordination process. Financing posed challenge to majority of the countries in initiating coordination. Conclusion: Coordinating an emergency is a multidimensional process that includes having decision-makers and institutional agents define and prioritise policies and norms that contain the spread of the disease, regulate activities and behaviour and citizens, and respond to personnel who coordinate prevention

Framing the future of the COVID-19 response operations in 2022 in the WHO African region

With the evolving epidemiological parameters of COVID-19 in Africa, the response actions and lessons learnt during the pandemic's past two years, SARS-COV 2 will certainly continue to circulate in African countries in 2022 and beyond. As countries in the African continent need to be more prepared and plan to 'live with the virus' for the upcoming two years and after and at the same time mitigate risks by protecting the future most vulnerable and those responsible for maintaining essential services, WHO AFRO is anticipating four interim scenarios of the evolution of the pandemic in 2022 and beyond in the region. In preparation for the rollout of response actions given the predicted scenarios, WHO AFRO has identified ten strategic orientations and areas of focus for supporting member states and partners in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa in 2022 and beyond. WHO analysed trends of the transmissions since the first case in the African continent and reviewed lessons learnt over the past months. Establishing a core and agile team solely dedicated to the COVID-19 response at the WHO AFRO, the emergency hubs, and WCOs will improve the effectiveness of the response and address identified challenges. The team will collaborate with the various clusters of the regional office, and other units and subunits in the WCOs supported with good epidemics intelligence. COVID-19 pandemic has afflicted global humanity at unprecedented levels. Two years later and while starting the third year of the COVID-19 response, we now need to change and adapt our strategies, tools and approaches in responding timely and effectively to the pandemic in Africa and save more lives

Recommendations for the COVID-19 Response at the National Level Based on Lessons Learned from the Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The tenth outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in North Kivu, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was declared 8 days after the end of the ninth EVD outbreak, in the Equateur Province on August 1, 2018. With a total of 3,461 confirmed and probable cases, the North Kivu outbreak was the second largest outbreak after that in West Africa in 2014-2016, and the largest observed in the DRC. This outbreak was difficult to control because of multiple challenges, including armed conflict, population displacement, movement of contacts, community mistrust, and high population density. It took more than 21 months to control the outbreak, with critical innovations and systems put into place. We describe systems that were put into place during the EVD response in the DRC that can be leveraged for the response to the current COVID-19 global pandemic

The role of emergency medical teams in Eswatini during the COVID-19 pandemic

The paper documents experiences and lesson learned in responding to COVID-19 pandemic in Eswatini with the support of the Emergency Medical Teams. WHO databases, operation reports and hospitalization records were reviewed. The WHO Emergency medical Teams built the capacity for the local response teams in Eswatini. The conclusion is that following the intervention of the WHO Emergency Response Teams, Eswatini is better prepared to respond to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and future outbreaks

Attrition, physical integrity and insecticidal activity of long-lasting insecticidal nets in sub-Saharan Africa and modelling of their impact on vectorial capacity

Long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) are the primary malaria prevention and control intervention in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. While LLINs are expected to last at least 3 years under normal use conditions, they can lose effectiveness because they fall out of use, are discarded, repurposed, physically damaged, or lose insecticidal activity. The contributions of these different interrelated factors to durability of nets and their protection against malaria have been unclear.; Starting in 2009, LLIN durability studies were conducted in seven countries in Africa over 5 years. WHO-recommended measures of attrition, LLIN use, insecticidal activity, and physical integrity were recorded for eight different net brands. These data were combined with analyses of experimental hut data on feeding inhibition and killing effects of LLINs on both susceptible and pyrethroid resistant malaria vectors to estimate the protection against malaria transmission-in terms of vectorial capacity (VC)-provided by each net cohort over time. Impact on VC was then compared in hypothetical scenarios where one durability outcome measure was set at the best possible level while keeping the others at the observed levels.; There was more variability in decay of protection over time by country than by net brand for three measures of durability (ratios of variance components 4.6, 4.4, and 1.8 times for LLIN survival, use, and integrity, respectively). In some countries, LLIN attrition was slow, but use declined rapidly. Non-use of LLINs generally had more effect on LLIN impact on VC than did attrition, hole formation, or insecticide loss.; There is much more variation in LLIN durability among countries than among net brands. Low levels of use may have a larger impact on effectiveness than does variation in attrition or LLIN degradation. The estimated entomological effects of chemical decay are relatively small, with physical decay probably more important as a driver of attrition and non-use than as a direct cause of loss of effect. Efforts to maximize LLIN impact in operational settings should focus on increasing LLIN usage, including through improvements in LLIN physical integrity. Further research is needed to understand household decisions related to LLIN use, including the influence of net durability and the presence of other nets in the household

Coordination and Management of COVID-19 in Africa through Health Operations and Technical Expertise Pillar: A Case Study from WHO AFRO One Year into Response

Abstract: Background: following the importation of the first Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) case into Africa on 14 February 2020 in Egypt, the World Health Organisation (WHO) regional office for Africa (AFRO) activated a three-level incident management support team (IMST), with technical pillars, to coordinate planning, implementing, supervision, and monitoring of the situation and progress of implementation as well as response to the pandemic in the region. At WHO AFRO, one of the pillars was the health operations and technical expertise (HOTE) pillar with five sub-pillars: case management, infection prevention and control, risk communication and community engagement, laboratory, and emergency medical team (EMT). This paper documents the learnings (both positive and negative for consideration of change) from the activities of the HOTE pillar and recommends future actions for improving its coordination for future emergencies, especially for multi-country outbreaks or pandemic emergency responses. Method: we conducted a document review of the HOTE pillar coordination meetings’ minutes, reports, policy and strategy documents of the activities, and outcomes and feedback on updates on the HOTE pillar given at regular intervals to the Regional IMST. In addition, key informant interviews were conducted with 14 members of the HOTE sub pillar. Key Learnings: the pandemic response revealed that shared decision making, collaborative coordination, and planning have been significant in the COVID-19 response in Africa. The HOTE pillar’s response structure contributed to attaining the IMST objectives in the African region and translated to timely support for the WHO AFRO and the member states. However, while the coordination mechanism appeared robust, some challenges included duplication of coordination efforts, communication, documentation, and information management. Recommendations: we recommend streamlining the flow of information to better understand the challenges that countries face. There is a need to define the role and responsibilities of sub-pillar team members and provide new team members with information briefs to guide them on where and how to access internal information and work under the pillar. A unified documentation system is important and could help to strengthen intra-pillar collaboration and communication. Various indicators should be developed to constantly monitor the HOTE team’s deliverables, performance and its members

Transitioning the COVID-19 response in the WHO African region: a proposed framework for rethinking and rebuilding health systems

The onset of the pandemic revealed the health system inequities and inadequate preparedness, especially in the African continent. Over the past months, African countries have ensured optimum pandemic response. However, there is still a need to build further resilient health systems that enhance response and transition from the acute phase of the pandemic to the recovery interpandemic/preparedness phase. Guided by the lessons learnt in the response and plausible pandemic scenarios, the WHO Regional Office for Africa has envisioned a transition framework that will optimise the response and enhance preparedness for future public health emergencies. The framework encompasses maintaining and consolidating the current response capacity but with a view to learning and reshaping them by harnessing the power of science, data and digital technologies, and research innovations. In addition, the framework reorients the health system towards primary healthcare and integrates response into routine care based on best practices/health system interventions. These elements are significant in building a resilient health system capable of addressing more effectively and more effectively future public health crises, all while maintaining an optimal level of essential public health functions. The key elements of the framework are possible with countries following three principles: equity (the protection of all vulnerable populations with no one left behind), inclusiveness (full engagement, equal participation, leadership, decision-making and ownership of all stakeholders using a multisectoral and transdisciplinary, One Health approach), and coherence (to reduce the fragmentation, competition and duplication and promote logical, consistent programmes aligned with international instruments)