Population scenarios and policy implications for South Mediterranean countries, 2010-2050

Four population scenarios were derived describing changes in indicators of demographic behaviour should people come to live in different future political-economic contexts. Focus of this policy brief is on expected trends in (1) population growth at regional and national levels, (2) working age populations in view of demographic dividend potential for the economy, and (3) population of elderly persons in view of the future financial burden this group might impose on societies. Results show that different economic-political development scenarios do have large effects on population growth, at least up to 2030). This is due to the socalled population momentum effect in the relatively young age-structures of most SMCs. In the short term, up to 2030, and depending on which economic-political unfolds, SMCs expected to grow from 280 million people to a figure between 362 and 349 million people. Thus, in a period of about 20 years SMC populations are expected to grow with a figure between 69 and 83 million. In that same period, EU27 populations will grow with 21 million only from about 500 to 521 million people. Between 2030 and 2050, additional population growth is foreseen in SMCs, between 48 and 62 million people, while EU27 populations are expected to grow with only 4 million during that period. SMCs appear to vary widely regarding demographic transition profiles so that demographic dividend potentials also vary. For instance, Egypt has considerably demographic dividend potential ahead in the coming decades as working age population shares will rise from 63% (2010) to a peak level of about 68% by 2045. In Turkey though, the working age population share is already high (68%) and near the expected peak level of 69% (by 2025) after which a decline sets in. The window of opportunity -the period when working age population shares rise to peak levels and remain at a high level- is starting to close for Lebanon and Tunisia though levels will remain high up to 2035 after which a decline sets in due to ageing of these populations. Ageing implies an increase of the economic burden to economies as elderly generally do not contribute any longer to economies as they did during their working age years. Old-age dependency ratios, the share of elderly in relation to the working age population, are still low compared to EU27 ratios but will increase after 2035. Should SMCs remain politically, economically and environmentally fragile in the coming decades, these lower dependency ratios will impose a relatively higher social and financial burden to societies than the high dependency ratios in EU countries

Population scenarios 2010-2050 for MED11 countries: a MEDPRO WP3 research report

The focus of this report is on population and development scenarios of MED11 countries for the period 2010-2050. More specifically, we address (1) design aspects of the MEDPRO population and development scenarios, and projection methodology, (2) main results of population scenarios for MED11 countries, including comparison with results of the UN medium variant projection and EUROSTAT EU-27 population projection, and (3) we reflect on the implications of the scenarios for policy and planning, and elaborate on what the effect of the current dramatic political and societal events in the region might be on the results of our population scenarios. Section 2 describes the MEDPRO framework for development scenarios. Sections 3 and 4 describe how demographic behaviour might respond if people in MED11 countries would live in four different macro-economic and political contexts. Focus in section 3 is on developing story lines, i.e. qualitative population scenarios, about how demographic behaviour may change if the development context change, and we operationalize these in the form of quantitative population scenarios. In section 4 we briefly describe the population projection methodology and we present and analyse main results of the population scenarios 2010-2050 for MED11 countries. In section 5 we discuss address the implications of the population scenarios and reflect on the plausibility of the results in light of the dramatic political transitions in the region.

On being Dutch and Muslim: descendants of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants speak out about identity and religion

It's quite possible for descendants of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants (i.e.the Second Generation) to combine strong feelings of belonging to different social groups, such as feeling "Amsterdammer", "Rotterdammer", "Dutch" and Muslim.A fair percentage of the Second Generation does not practise their religion by praying and are of the opinion that religion should play no role, or only a minor one, in today's society and in politics. Many find the use of religious symbols in schools acceptable, but only a minority say that Muslim women should wear a head scarf outside the home.

Arbeidsmigratiedruk in Turkije

De migratie naar de Europese Unie (EU) wordt vandaag de dag beheerst door grote stromen migranten die vanwege oorlog, onderdrukking of armoede een nieuw bestaan willen opbouwen in de EU. Via de Turkije-Griekenland-route wordt geprobeerd om andere EU-lidstaten te bereiken, zoals Duitsland, Engelanden Nederland. Sinds 20 maart 2016 helpt Turkije om deze stromen beter te beheersen. Als tegenprestatie schaffen EU-landen waarschijnlijk de Schengen-visumplicht voor Turkije af

Mokumer én moslim: Amsterdammers en Rotterdammers van Marokkaanse of Turkse afkomst over identiteit en godsdienst

Tweede generatie Turken en Marokkanen kunnen zich zowel Amsterdammer, Rotterdammer, Nederlander als moslim voelen. Een niet gering deel van de volwassen tweede generatie Turken en Marokkanen beleeft het geloof niet door te bidden en vindt dat godsdienst geen of slechts een beperkte rol zou moeten hebben in politiek en samenleving. Het gebruik van religieuze symbolen op scholen vinden velen acceptabel maar minder vaak vindt men dat islamitische vrouwen buitenshuis een hoofddoek moeten dragen