The Politics of Service Delivery Reform

This article identifies the leaders, the supporters and the resisters of public service reform. It adopts a principal–agent framework, comparing reality with an ‘ideal’ situation in which citizens are the principals over political policy-makers as their agents, and policy-makers are the principals over public service officials as their agents. Reform in most developing countries is complicated by an additional set of external actors — international financial institutions and donors. In practice, international agencies and core government officials usually act as the ‘principals’ in the determination of reforms. The analysis identifies the interests involved in reform, indicating how the balance between them is affected by institutional and sectoral factors. Organizational reforms, particularly in the social sectors, present greater difficulties than first generation economic policy reforms

The Political Economy of Tax Reform in Bangladesh: Political Settlements, Informal Institutions and the Negotiation of Reform

political economy, tax reform, political settlementsThis paper explores the political economy of tax reform in Bangladesh over several decades, shedding light on the complex factors that account for unusually effective and sustained resistance to significant reform. We contend that it is necessary to understand both deep-seated formal and informal institutions and the micro-level incentives that shape the negotiation of short-term reform in order to comprehend tax outcomes. We describe a tax system that is highly informal, largely manual and characterised by high levels of discretion and corruption. However, despite appearing highly dysfunctional on the surface, this system serves the core interests of powerful political, economic and administrative actors. Underpinned by robust informal institutions, the current system delivers low and predictable tax rates to businesses, provides extensive discretion and opportunities for corruption to the tax administration, and acts as an important vehicle for political elites to raise funds and distribute patronage and economic rents. While the tax system has not been without reform, individual reform efforts have been constrained by the parameters of this broader settlement, leaving competing interest groups to pursue strategic gains at the margins while seeking to satisfy external reform demands. This tax bargain reflects Bangladesh’s broader political economy, which is characterised by entrenched informal institutions underpinning the combination of generally weak governance and high levels of economic growth – the so-called ‘paradox of Bangladesh’.DfID, NORA

Donors, Aid and Taxation in Developing Countries: An Overview

Recent years have witnessed rapidly growing donor interest in tax issues in the developing world. This reflects a concern with revenue collection to finance public spending, but also recognition of the centrality of taxation to growth, redistribution and broader state-building and governance goals. Against this backdrop, this paper identifies a series of key issues that demand attention if donors are to improve the quality of their support for tax reform. The focus is not, primarily, on the technical design of tax interventions, but, instead, on seven ‘big picture’ considerations for the design of donor programmes: (a) supporting local leadership of reform efforts; (b) incorporating more systematic political economy analysis into the design and implementation of reform programmes; (c) designing tax reform programmes that seek to foster broader linkages between taxation, state-building and governance; (d) paying careful attention to the complexity of the relationship between aid and tax effort; (e) better designing tax-related conditionality, particularly by developing a more nuanced set of performance indicators; (f) ensuring the effective coordination of donor interventions; and (g) paying greater attention to the international policy context, and particularly the role of tax exemptions for donor projects, tax havens and tax evasion by multinational corporations (MNCs) in undermining developing country tax systems.DfI

Ideas, interests and practical authority in reform politics: Decentralization reform in South Korea in the 2000s

Ministry of Education, Singapore under its Academic Research Funding Tier

Opportunities and pitfalls for researchers to contribute to the design of evidence-based agricultural policies: lessons from Uganda

Agricultural policies in sub-Saharan Africa have paid insufficient attention to sustainable intensification. In Uganda, agricultural productivity has stagnated with aggregate increases in crop production being attributed to expansion of cultivated land area. To enhance sustainable crop intensification, the Ugandan Government collaborated with stakeholders to develop agricultural policies using an evidence-based approach. Previously, evidence-based decision-making tended to focus on the evidence base rather than evidence and its interactions within the broader policy context. We identify opportunities and pitfalls to strengthen science engagement in agricultural policy design by analysing the types of evidence required, and how it was shared and used during policy development. Qualitative tools captured stakeholders' perspectives of agricultural policies and their status in the policy cycle. Subsequent multi-level studies identified crop growth constraints and quantified yield gaps which were used to compute the economic analyses of policy options that subsequently contributed to sub-national program planning. The study identified a need to generate relevant evidence within a short time 'window' to influence policy design, power influence by different stakeholders and quality of stakeholder interaction. Opportunities for evidence integration surfaced at random phases of policy development due to researchers’ ’embededness’ within co-management and coordination structures