The outcome of individual wage bargaining and the influence of managers' bargaining power: evidence from union data

We analyze unique data that identify whether individuals have participated in decentralized wage setting and whether they have negotiated their own wages. Wages are significantly higher for those who have been part of a formalized wage-setting process compared with non-participants, but only in the public sector. Employees who negotiate their own wages have higher wages than non-negotiators. Wages are also significantly higher for those who negotiate with a manager who has the power to set wages, compared with those who negotiate with a manager who has no power over wages. This concerns employees in the public and the private sectors. Quantile regression results reveal that the outcome of individual bargaining increases over the wage distribution. Percentile wage differences are significant only among workers who negotiate with a manager who has the power to set wages. Estimated wage differences between negotiators and non-negotiators are 4.6% on average, 5.6% in the 90th percentile, and 2.3% at the 10th percentile.wage bargaining; earnings equations; decentralized wage setting; quantile regression

Mandatory Earnings-Related Insurance Rights, Human Capital and the Gender Earnings Gap in Sweden

Most labour market analyses take money wages as the sole measure of compensation for labour, thus excluding fringe benefits. We examine an extended compensation measure by incorporating mandatory collective earnings-related insurance rights: the rights of individual old age pension, sickness benefit insurance and survivors’ pension. We estimate the return on investment in human capital and the gender earnings gap in a traditional earnings equation. The money wage and the extended wage are used as dependent variables in joint regressions, where a SUR framework enables proper joint cross-equation tests. The main finding is that the inclusion of earnings-related insurance rights does affect the return on education. When these non-wage benefits are included, the gender wage gap decreases by 21 per cent. However, the gender differences in returns to education are severely underestimated when money wage is used as a compensation measure.Non-wage benefits; Gender gap; Human capital; Occupational welfare

Atomic-resolution spectroscopic imaging of ensembles of nanocatalyst particles across the life of a fuel cell

The thousandfold increase in data-collection speed enabled by aberration-corrected optics allows us to overcome an electron microscopy paradox - how to obtain atomic-resolution chemical structure in individual nanoparticles, yet record a statistically significant sample from an inhomogeneous population. This allowed us to map hundreds of Pt-Co nanoparticles to show atomic-scale elemental distributions across different stages of the catalyst aging in a proton-exchange-membrane fuel cell, and relate Pt-shell thickness to treatment, particle size, surface orientation, and ordering.Comment: 28 pages, 5 figures, accepted, nano letter

Den nya lönebildningen ur ett akademikerperspektiv. (Kommentar till Juhana Vartiainen)

Kommentar till Juhana Vartianens artikel Ny lönebildning och nya partsrelationer (Arbetsmarknad & Arbetsliv 2007, årg 13, nr 3-4, sid 57-64

The outcome of individual bargaining and the influence of managers' bargaining power: evidence from union data

We analyze unique data that identify whether individuals have participated in decentralized wage setting and whether they have negotiated their own wages. Wages are significantly higher for those who have been part of a formalized wagesetting process compared with non-participants, but only in the public sector. Employees who negotiate their own wages have higher wages than nonnegotiators. Wages are also significantly higher for those who negotiate with a manager who has the power to set wages, compared with those who negotiate with a manager who has no power over wages. This concerns employees in the public and the private sectors. Quantile regression results reveal that the outcome of individual bargaining increases over the wage distribution. Percentile wage differences are significant only among workers who negotiate with a manager who has the power to set wages. Estimated wage differences between negotiators and non-negotiators are 4.6% on average, 5.6% in the 90th percentile, and 2.3% at the 10th percentile

The Impact on Efficiency and Distribution of a Base-Broadening and Rate-Reducing Tax Reform

We analyze a base-broadening, rate-reducing, and simplifying tax reform, which may be revenue-neutral, or which may keep the average tax rates constant. Such a reform generally improves efficiency under reasonable conditions but not necessarily if the average tax rate is calculated on taxable incomes or if revenue-neutrality refers to aggregate tax payments only. In most cases, an efficiency-improving reform probably increases inequality unless the marginal rate reduction greatly affects low-income taxpayers. So in some cases, there might be a utilitarian case for increasing, rather than reducing the marginal tax rate. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002tax reform, efficiency, inequality,

Decentralized Wage Formation in Sweden

Recent Swedish collective bargaining agreements have incorporated provisions for local pay review talks and opportunities for individuals to negotiate their own wages. Using trade union data, we show that members who participate in local pay review talks and members who negotiate their own wages have significantly higher monthly wages than those who do not. Pay decentralization either improves an individual's bargaining position or attracts more productive trade union members. Either way, trade union wage policies to increase individual-level wage variance are achieving their intended effects. Copyright (c) Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2008.