The Compatibility of Downward Causation and Emergence

In this paper, I shall argue that both emergence and downward causation, which are strongly interconnected, presuppose the presence of levels of reality. However, emergence and downward causation pull in opposite directions with respect to my best reconstruction of what levels are. The upshot is that emergence stresses the autonomy among levels while downward causation puts the distinction between levels at risk of a reductio ad absurdum, with the further consequence of blurring the very notion of downward. Therefore, emergence and downward causation are not fit to each other vis-a-vis the concept of level

The virtue of running a marathon

Running a marathon is not solely a personal achievement; rather it sets an example. Because of the nature of this example, it constitutes an achievement that deserves our praise (contrary to what has recently been argued in this Journal)

Necessitarianism and Dispositions

In this paper, I argue in favor of necessitarianism, the view that dispositions, when stimulated, necessitate their manifestations. After introducing and clarifying what necessitarianism does and does not amount to, I provide reasons to support the view that dispositions once stimulated necessitate their manifestations according to the stimulating conditions and the relevant properties at stake. In this framework, I will propose a principle of causal relevance and some conditions for the possibility of interference that allow us to avoid the use of ceteris paribus clauses. I then defend necessitarianism from recent attacks raised by, among others, Mumford and Anjum, noting that the antecedent strengthening test is a test for causal relevance that raises no difficulties for necessitarianism

The Beliefs of Mute Animals

In this paper I argue that it is possible to attribute beliefs and other intentional states to mute animals. This kind of attribution is substantial, in that it does allow for some minimal form of co-referential failure

Type-identity conditions for phenomenal properties

In this essay I shall argue that the crucial assumptions of Kripke's argument, i.e. the collapse of the appearance/reality distinction in the case of phenomenal states and the idea of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, imply an objective principle of identity for mental-state types. This principle, I shall argue, rather than being at odds with physicalism, is actually compatible with both the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. Finally, I shall sketch a version of the type-identity theory

Você Está Aqui: Dor e sua Localização

When we consider bodily pain, it seems we are uniquely in the realm of the first person only, with no space for a second person. In this paper, I shall argue that it is in the interplay between the first and second persons, the social dimension of language, that our use of locative spatial terms inherits its rules and constraints. This interplay, in a form of triangulation proposed by Davidson, could provide us with a viable solution to the problem of the location of bodily pain. The solution lies in adopting representationalism while recognizing the limits of the representational system.Quando consideramos a dor corporal, parece que estamos exclusivamente no reino da primeira pessoa, sem espaço para uma segunda pessoa. Neste artigo, argumentarei que é da interação entre a primeira e a segunda pessoas, a dimensão social da linguagem, que nosso uso de termos espaciais locativos herda suas regras e restrições. Essa interação, em uma forma de triangulação proposta por Davidson, poderia nos fornecer uma solução viável para o problema da localização da dor corporal. A solução está em adotar o representacionalismo enquanto se reconhece os limites do sistema representacional

Kim on Events

According to Kim, events are constituted by objects exemplifying property(ies) at a time. In this paper I wish to defend Kim's theory of events from one source of criticism, extending it by taking into account a number of ideas developed by Davidson. In particular, I shall try to avoid events proliferation – one of the most serious problems in Kim's theory – by using a suggestion Kim himself advances, that is, by taking adverbs and the like to be events' rather than properties' modifiers

Conscious Primitives and Their Reality

In The Varieties of Consciousness, Kriegel argues that it is possible to devise a method to sort out the irreducible primitive phenomenologies that exist. In this paper I argue that his neutrality notwithstanding, Kriegel assumes a form of realism that leaves unresolved many of the conundrums that characterize the debate on consciousness. These problems are evident in the centrality he assigns to introspection and his characterization of cognitive phenomenology