21,224 research outputs found
Riggs on strong justification
In 'The Weakness of Strong Justification' Wayne Riggs claims that the requirement that justified beliefs be truth conducive (likely to be true) is not always compatible with the requirement that they be epistemically responsible (arrived at in an epistemically responsible manner)1. He supports this claim by criticising Alvin Goldman's view that if a belief is strongly justified, it is also epistemically responsible. In light of this, Riggs recommends that we develop two independent conceptions of justification, one that insists upon the requirement that beliefs be truth conducive and another that insists that they be epistemically responsible. It will then, on his view, be possible to properly evaluate beliefs with regard to each conception of justification. Riggs, however, is mistaken in supposing that the two epistemic requirements are independent. If a belief is responsibly arrived at, it is therefore likely to be true. He is thus also mistaken in supposing that the two epistemic requirements are incompatible. This mistake arises because Riggs assumes that justification is possible or, at least, that it involves standards that are akin to our own. Moreover, once this assumption is made explicit, we can see why a notion of justification that connects epistemic practice with likely truth is significant
Application of formal power series to some classical problems of mechanics Final report
Formal power series application to classical problems of celestial mechanic
Analytical investigation of supersonic turbomachinery blading. 2 - Analysis of impulse turbine-blade sections
Surface Mach numbers, inlet flow angle, and specific heat ratio effects on geometric features of supersonic impulse turbine blade sections in Mach range 1.5 to 5.
Analytical investigation of blade efficiency for two-dimensional supersonic turbine rotor blade sections
Blade efficiency in producing vortex flow within two dimensional supersonic rotor blade section
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