Valuations of ‘Sustainably Produced’ Labels on Beef, Tomato, and Apple Products

This study evaluates consumer perceptions of what “sustainably produced†food labels imply and estimates corresponding demand for products carrying these labels. Results suggest that the typical U.S. consumer is not willing to pay a positive premium for beef, tomatoes, or apple products labeled as “sustainably produced.†Demand is particularly sensitive to inferences consumers make regarding what a “sustainably produced†food label implies. Suggestions for future work and implications of standardizing the definition of sustainability are provided.consumer perceptions, credence labeling, production practices, sustainable, U.S. consumer demand, willingness to pay, Marketing,

Integrating brand, retailer and end-customer perspectives

With increased retailer concentration, competition and the emphasis on private labels, it is easy to assume that manufacturers' brands are less important to retailers. Retailers manage their stores as brands and control the brand offering inside the store, coordinating the manufacturer's brand with the private label. However, manufacturers' brands are still important in determining retailer profitability and store image. This research paper seeks to clarify the value of manufacturers' brands to retailers within marketing channel relationships

Consumer Perceptions of Sustainable Farming Practices: A Best-Worst Scenario

This paper uses data collected in the summer and fall of 2010 from a national, web-based survey of 1002 households to initiate the process of examining consumer inferences and valuations of food products making "sustainably produced” claims. A Best-Worst scaling framework was implemented to identify what consumers believe “sustainably produced” labels mean and their preferences for each of the individual sustainable farming practices. The best-worst survey method forces respondents to make trade-offs by simultaneously choosing the most and least preferred attributes. The measured level of concern is then applied to a ratio scale. The ability of a firm to differentiate their product hinges critically on an accurate understanding of the perceptions consumers hold regarding what a credence labelling claim implies. Building upon existing work evaluating other food attribute labels (e.g., genetically-modified products, region of origin, use of growth hormones) and the impact of consumer inferences (e.g., implicit associations made from explicitly provided information), this work begins to address gaps in the literature regarding food products with “sustainably produced” claims.Sustainably Produced Food, Consumer Perceptions, Best-Worst, Agricultural and Food Policy, Consumer/Household Economics, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Q01, Q13, Q11,

Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court, A Quiet Revolution

Over the last twenty years, a quiet revolution has taken place in patent law. Traditionally, patents were rarely valid, but if valid, broadly enforced. Since Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 and vested it with exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction over patent appeals, patents have become routinely valid, but narrowly enforced. This article evaluates the economic consequences of this revolution. Focusing on the reasons for, and the costs of, uniformity in patent protection, this article shows that the revolution will tend to limit the patent system\u27s ability to ensure the expected profitability, and hence the existence, of desirable, but high cost innovation

Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court, A Quiet Revolution

Over the last twenty years, a quiet revolution has taken place in patent law. Traditionally, patents were rarely valid, but if valid, broadly enforced. Since Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 and vested it with exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction over patent appeals, patents have become routinely valid, but narrowly enforced. This article evaluates the economic consequences of this revolution. Focusing on the reasons for, and the costs of, uniformity in patent protection, this article shows that the revolution will tend to limit the patent system\u27s ability to ensure the expected profitability, and hence the existence, of desirable, but high cost innovation

The Trade Dress Emperor\u27s New Clothes: Why Trade Dress Does Not Belong on the Principal Register

We take it largely for granted today that the Trademark Act of 1946 permits the registration of trade dress on the principal register, but it has not always been the rule. Until 1958, the Patent and Trademark Office, following Congress\u27s intent expressed in the Act\u27s plain language and legislative history, excluded trade dress from the principal register as a matter of law. In 1958, Assistant Commissioner Daphne Robert Leeds changed the rule and allowed the registration of a product package as a trademark on the principal register. Unable to find any legitimate basis for reading the Trademark Act to permit trade dress on the principal register, Leeds simply asserted her desired result as conclusion, willfully replacing Congress\u27s decision on the issue with her own. In this Article, Professor Lunney argues that time has largely erased our memories of trade dress\u27s dubious claim to the principal register. And courts, over the last twenty years, have crafted an extensive regime of federal trade dress protection out of Leeds\u27s erroneous interpretation. Yet, even today, a fair-minded review of the Trademark Act of 1946 and its legislative history reveals that there is no lawful basis for allowing trade dress on the principal register. As with the Emperor and his new clothes, the only real question is whether, following its revelation, courts and the Patent and Trademark Office are willing to recognize this naked truth

Trademark Monopolies

Since 1742, when Lord Hardwicke seemingly equated trademark protection with monopoly in one of the first trademark cases, until the mid-1950s, concerns that trademarks represented a form of illegitimate monopoly effectively constrained the growth of trademark protection. In the twentieth century, Edward Chamberlin became the leading proponent of the trademark as monopoly view with the publication of his work, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, in 1933. In his work, Chamberlin argued that a trademark enabled its owner to differentiate her products and then to exclude others from using the differentiating feature. By doing so, trademark protection can effectively cede control over distinct product markets to individual producers and thereby generate for trademark owners the downward sloping demand curve of a monopolist, with its associated monopoly rents and deadweight losses. Although Chamberlin himself recognized the need for product differentiation and rejected the supposed ideal of the perfect competition model, his work became a common rallying point for the trademark as monopoly argument. During the legislative debates leading to the Trademark Act of 1946, his work served as a basis for the Justice Department\u27s opposition to broad trademark protection