Political independence, accountability, and the quality of regulatory decision-making

Recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory agencies, which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies relative to government departments. Yet, the hypothesis that more independent regulators do better work has hardly been tested. We examine the link using a comprehensive measure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries, and new data on the design of these organizations. We find that formal independence has a positive and significant effect on quality. Contrary to expectations, though, formal political accountability does not boost regulatory quality, and there is no evidence that it increases the effect of independence by reducing the risk of slacking. The quality of work is also enhanced by increased staffing, more extensive regulatory powers, and spillover effects of a more capable bureaucratic system

Competition and Antitrust Policy in the Enlarged European Union: A Level Playing Field?

With the central and eastern European countries (CEECs) increasingly included into the international division of labour in the European economic space, we are prompted to ask whether this integration operates on a level playing field with respect to competition policy. In fact, our analysis reveals that effectiveness of implementation of competition law and policy and intensity of competition are lower in the CEECs. We find no reason to believe that the new eastern EU members struggle with the recent reforms of competition policy in the EU, nor do we see the necessity for policy action to spur effective implementation. Copyright (c) 2009 The Author(s). Journal compilation (c) 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.