Practical Knowledge and Luminosity

Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on general principles about the nature of knowledge rather than on intuitions about fringe cases, the recent responses that have been given to defuse the force of Davidson’s objection are silent against it. Moreover, the argument suggests that even weaker theses connecting practical entities with knowledge are also false. Recent defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and intentional action are motivated by the insight that this connection is non-accidental. I close with a positive proposal to account for the non-accidentality of this link without appeal to necessary connections by drawing an extended analogy between practical and perceptual knowledge

Reason in Action in Aristotle: A Reading of EE V.12/NE VI.12

I present a reading of EE 5.12/NE 6.12 according to which Aristotle argues for an executive account of φρόνησις (practical wisdom) to show why it is useful to possess this virtue. On this account, the practically wise person's actions are expressive of his knowledge of the fine, a knowledge that only the practically wise person has. This is why he must not only be a good deliberator, but also cunning (δεινότης), able to execute his actions well. An important consequence of this reading is that the debate about whether Aristotle holds a Humean account of practical reason presupposes assumptions about the scope of rationality that Aristotle rejects

Alienation or regress: on the non-inferential character of agential knowledge

A central debate in philosophy of action concerns whether agential knowledge, the knowledge agents characteristically have of their own actions, is inferential. While inferentialists like Sarah Paul hold that it is inferential, others like Lucy O’Brien and Kieran Setiya argue that it is not. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for the view that agential knowledge is non-inferential, by posing a dilemma for inferentialists: on the first horn, inferentialism is committed to holding that agents have only alienated knowledge of their own actions; on the second horn, inferentialism is caught in a vicious regress. Neither option is attractive, so inferentialism should be rejected

Authoritative Knowledge

This paper investigates ‘authoritative knowledge’, a neglected species of practical knowledge gained on the basis of exercising practical authority. I argue that, like perceptual knowledge, authoritative knowledge is non-inferential. I then present a broadly reliabilist account of the process by which authority yields knowledge, and use this account to address certain objections

Acquittal from Knowledge Laundering

Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical stakes, has been charged with ‘knowledge laundering’: together with widely held knowledge-transmission principles, SSI appears to allow improper knowledge acquisition. I argue that this objection fails because it depends on faulty versions of transmission principles that would raise problems for any view. When transmission principles are properly understood, they are shown to be compatible with SSI because they do not give rise to improper knowledge acquisition. The upshot is a better understanding of the nature and structure of these transmission principles

A Fitting Definition of Epistemic Emotions

Philosophers and psychologists sometimes categorize emotions like surprise and curiosity as specifically epistemic. Is there some reasonably unified and interesting class of emotions here? If so, what unifies it? This paper proposes and defends an evaluative account of epistemic emotions: what it is to be an epistemic emotion is to have fittingness conditions that distinctively involve some epistemic evaluation. We argue that this view has significant advantages over alternative proposals and is a promising way to identify a limited and interesting class of emotions

A large microRNA cluster on chromosome 19 is a transcriptional hallmark of WHO type A and AB thymomas

BACKGROUND: Thymomas are one of the most rarely diagnosed malignancies. To better understand its biology and to identify therapeutic targets, we performed next-generation RNA sequencing. METHODS: The RNA was sequenced from 13 thymic malignancies and 3 normal thymus glands. Validation of microRNA expression was performed on a separate set of 35 thymic malignancies. For cell-based studies, a thymoma cell line was used. RESULTS: Hierarchical clustering revealed 100% concordance between gene expression clusters and WHO subtype. A substantial differentiator was a large microRNA cluster on chr19q13.42 that was significantly overexpressed in all A and AB tumours and whose expression was virtually absent in the other thymomas and normal tissues. Overexpression of this microRNA cluster activates the PI3K/AKT/mTOR pathway. Treatment of a thymoma AB cell line with a panel of PI3K/AKT/mTOR inhibitors resulted in marked reduction of cell viability. CONCLUSIONS: A large microRNA cluster on chr19q13.42 is a transcriptional hallmark of type A and AB thymomas. Furthermore, this cluster activates the PI3K pathway, suggesting the possible exploration of PI3K inhibitors in patients with these subtypes of tumour. This work has led to the initiation of a phase II clinical trial of PI3K inhibition in relapsed or refractory thymomas (http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT02220855)

Water oxidation at hematite photoelectrodes: the role of surface states

Hematite (α-Fe2O3) constitutes one of the most promising semiconductor materials for the conversion of sunlight into chemical fuels by water splitting. Its inherent drawbacks related to the long penetration depth of light and poor charge carrier conductivity are being progressively overcome by employing nanostructuring strategies and improved catalysts. However, the physical–chemical mechanisms responsible for the photoelectrochemical performance of this material (J(V) response) are still poorly understood. In the present study we prepared thin film hematite electrodes by atomic layer deposition to study the photoelectrochemical properties of this material under water-splitting conditions. We employed impedance spectroscopy to determine the main steps involved in photocurrent production at different conditions of voltage, light intensity, and electrolyte pH. A general physical model is proposed, which includes the existence of a surface state at the semiconductor/liquid interface where holes accumulate. The strong correlation between the charging of this state with the charge transfer resistance and the photocurrent onset provides new evidence of the accumulation of holes in surface states at the semiconductor/electrolyte interface, which are responsible for water oxidation. The charging of this surface state under illumination is also related to the shift of the measured flat-band potential. These findings demonstrate the utility of impedance spectroscopy in investigations of hematite electrodes to provide key parameters of photoelectrodes with a relatively simple measurement