Take another little piece of my heart: a note on bridging cognition and emotions

Science urges philosophy to be more empirical and philosophy urges science to be more reflective. This markedly occurred along the “discovery of the artificial” (CORDESCHI 2002): in the early days of Cybernetics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers aimed at making machines more cognizant while setting up a framework to better understand human intelligence. By and large, those genuine goals still hold today, whereas AI has become more concerned with specific aspects of intelligence, such as (machine) learning, reasoning, vision, and action. As a matter of fact, the field suffers from a chasm between two formerly integrated aspects. One is the engineering endeavour involving the development of tools, e.g., autonomous systems for driving cars as well as software for semantic information retrieval. The other is the philosophical debate that tries to answer questions concerning the nature of intelligence. Bridging these two levels can indeed be crucial in developing a deeper understanding of minds. An opportunity might be offered by the cogent theme of emotions. Traditionally, computer science, psychological and philosophical research have been compelled to investigate mental processes that do not involve mood, emotions and feelings, in spite of Simon’s early caveat (SIMON 1967) that a general theory of cognition must incorporate the influences of emotion. Given recent neurobiological findings and technological advances, the time is ripe to seriously weigh this promising, albeit controversial, opportunity

Predictive brains: forethought and the levels of explanation

Is any unified theory of brain function possible? Following a line of thought dat- ing back to the early cybernetics (see, e.g., Cordeschi, 2002), Clark (in press) has proposed the action-oriented Hierarchical Predictive Coding (HPC) as the account to be pursued in the effort of gain- ing the “Grand Unified Theory of the Mind”—or “painting the big picture,” as Edelman (2012) put it. Such line of thought is indeed appealing, but to be effectively pursued it should be confronted with experimental findings and explana- tory capabilities (Edelman, 2012). The point we are making in this note is that a brain with predictive capa- bilities is certainly necessary to endow the agent situated in the environment with forethought or foresight, a crucial issue to outline the unified account advocated by Clark. But the capacity for fore- thought is deeply entangled with the capacity for emotions and when emotions are brought into the game, cogni- tive functions become part of a large-scale functional brain network. However, for such complex networks a consistent view of hierarchical organization in large-scale functional networks has yet to emerge (Bressler and Menon, 2010), whilst heterarchical organization is likely to play a strategic role (Berntson et al., 2012). This raises the necessity of a multilevel approach that embraces causal relations across levels of explanation in either direc- tion (bottom–up or top–down), endorsing mutual calibration of constructs across levels (Berntson et al., 2012). Which, in turn, calls for a revised perspective on Marr’s levels of analysis framework (Marr, 1982). In the following we highlight some drawbacks of Clark’s proposal in address- ing the above issues

Attentive monitoring of multiple video streams driven by a Bayesian foraging strategy

In this paper we shall consider the problem of deploying attention to subsets of the video streams for collating the most relevant data and information of interest related to a given task. We formalize this monitoring problem as a foraging problem. We propose a probabilistic framework to model observer's attentive behavior as the behavior of a forager. The forager, moment to moment, focuses its attention on the most informative stream/camera, detects interesting objects or activities, or switches to a more profitable stream. The approach proposed here is suitable to be exploited for multi-stream video summarization. Meanwhile, it can serve as a preliminary step for more sophisticated video surveillance, e.g. activity and behavior analysis. Experimental results achieved on the UCR Videoweb Activities Dataset, a publicly available dataset, are presented to illustrate the utility of the proposed technique.Comment: Accepted to IEEE Transactions on Image Processin

Affective Facial Expression Processing via Simulation: A Probabilistic Model

Understanding the mental state of other people is an important skill for intelligent agents and robots to operate within social environments. However, the mental processes involved in `mind-reading' are complex. One explanation of such processes is Simulation Theory - it is supported by a large body of neuropsychological research. Yet, determining the best computational model or theory to use in simulation-style emotion detection, is far from being understood. In this work, we use Simulation Theory and neuroscience findings on Mirror-Neuron Systems as the basis for a novel computational model, as a way to handle affective facial expressions. The model is based on a probabilistic mapping of observations from multiple identities onto a single fixed identity (`internal transcoding of external stimuli'), and then onto a latent space (`phenomenological response'). Together with the proposed architecture we present some promising preliminary resultsComment: Annual International Conference on Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures - BICA 201

Coping with levels of explanation in the behavioral sciences

This Research Topic aimed at deepening our understanding of the levels and explanations that are of interest for cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, psychologists, behavioral scientists, and philosophers of science. Indeed, contemporary developments in neuroscience and psychology suggest that scientists are likely to deal with a multiplicity of levels, where each of the different levels entails laws of behavior appropriate to that level (Berntson et al., 2012). Also, gathering and modeling data at the different levels of analysis is not sufficient: the integration of information across levels of analysis is a crucial issue. Given such state of affairs, a number of interesting questions arise. How can the autonomy of explanatory levels be properly understood in behavioral explanation? Is reductionism a satisfactory strategy? How can high-level and low-level models be constrained in order to be actually explanatory of both behavioral and neurological or molecular evidence? What is the kind of relationship between those models

Detecting expert’s eye using a multiple-kernel Relevance Vector Machine

Decoding mental states from the pattern of neural activity or overt behavior is an intensely pursued goal. Here we applied machine learning to detect expertise from the oculomotor behavior of novice and expert billiard players during free viewing of a filmed billiard match with no specific task, and in a dynamic trajectory prediction task involving ad-hoc, occluded billiard shots. We have adopted a ground framework for feature space fusion and a Bayesian sparse classifier, namely, a Relevance Vector Machine. By testing different combinations of simple oculomotor features (gaze shifts amplitude and direction, and fixation duration), we could classify on an individual basis which group - novice or expert - the observers belonged to with an accuracy of 82% and 87%, respectively for the match and the shots. These results provide evidence that, at least in the particular domain of billiard sport, a signature of expertise is hidden in very basic aspects of oculomotor behavior, and that expertise can be detected at the individual level both with ad-hoc testing conditions and under naturalistic conditions - and suitable data mining. Our procedure paves the way for the development of a test for the “expert’s eye”, and promotes the use of eye movements as an additional signal source in Brain-Computer-Interface (BCI) systems

Inferring Causal Factors of Core Affect Dynamics on Social Participation through the Lens of the Observer

A core endeavour in current affective computing and social signal processing research is the construction of datasets embedding suitable ground truths to foster machine learning methods. This practice brings up hitherto overlooked intricacies. In this paper, we consider causal factors potentially arising when human raters evaluate the affect fluctuations of subjects involved in dyadic interactions and subsequently categorise them in terms of social participation traits. To gauge such factors, we propose an emulator as a statistical approximation of the human rater, and we first discuss the motivations and the rationale behind the approach.The emulator is laid down in the next section as a phenomenological model where the core affect stochastic dynamics as perceived by the rater are captured through an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process; its parameters are then exploited to infer potential causal effects in the attribution of social traits. Following that, by resorting to a publicly available dataset, the adequacy of the model is evaluated in terms of both human raters' emulation and machine learning predictive capabilities. We then present the results, which are followed by a general discussion concerning findings and their implications, together with advantages and potential applications of the approach