A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Border Corruption in the Conflict Regions in Georgia and Moldova

Corruption is perceived as one of the worst factors inhibiting the statebuilding process. It, however, poses a significant threat to young democracies. Some theorists argue that, under certain circumstances, corruption might bring some benefits that can even overweigh its costs. For example, minorities denied certain services that might profit from corruption by bribing their way through. This can contribute to lessening tensions between groups. This article examines two cases of frozen conflicts and the role corruption might have played in the conflict resolution process over the last decade: South Ossetia in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova. After analyzing the "soft approach" of the Moldovan state and the "hard power" of the Georgian state towards corruption and smuggling on the borders with the secessionist regions, we argue that the costs young democracies pay for their unwillingness to combat corruption is significantly higher than the modest benefits they can derive from handling these challenges with caution 2

Introduction: Experiencing Europe at the Periphery

The EU is a civilising experiment that must be praised for successfully overcoming struggles between nation states and projecting peace and stability, even beyond its borders,for more than half a century.The recent blatant,old-style aggression of Russia in Ukraine has once again proved the moral superiority, and the practical importance, of the EU in the positive transformation of states and societies

Replication Data for: Vodka or Bourbon? Foreign Policy Preferences Toward Russia and the US in Georgia

Many small states find themselves the objects of great power designs and efforts to export their preferred regimes. These attempts are well studied in the literature. However, mass opinion in small states where great powers compete for influence remains under-theorized as a factor that can shape preferences over foreign alliances and policies. This paper investigates the causes of individual-level variation in foreign policy preferences toward major powers in small states with big neighbors. Using recent public opinion data from Georgia, we propose a conceptual framework based on three factors—political paternalism, economic status and religiosity—to explain why some individuals in small states prefer closer ties with different major powers. We find support for all three factors influencing foreign policy attitudes towards Russia, but not America. As great powers continue to pursue policies that encourage their preferred political orders in small states, the analysis of foreign policy preferences in such states will become increasingly vital to our understanding of world politics