Constructions of some minimal finite element systems

Within the framework of finite element systems, we show how spaces of differential forms may be constructed, in such a way that they are equipped with commuting interpolators and contain prescribed functions, and are minimal under these constraints. We show how various known mixed finite element spaces fulfill such a design principle, including trimmed polynomial differential forms, serendipity elements and TNT elements. We also comment on virtual element methods and provide a dimension formula for minimal compatible finite element systems containing polynomials of a given degree on hypercubes.Comment: Various minor changes, based on suggestions of paper referee

If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers

This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative losses associated with free riding. In practice, the outcomes of our experiment, while quite closely tracking theory in the effective absence of an option to resolicit, differed dramatically from theory when a significant probability of resolicitation was introduced: The option to resolicit reduced the costs of free riding fairly substantially. Both the raider offers and the shareholder tendering responses generally exceeded equilibrium predictions.Corporations - Finance ; Game theory

Fabrication of lightweight parabolic concentrators from a glass master Final report

Forming of optical lightweight solar concentrator on glass master - spray technique for resin substrate layer

Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation

We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently, but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsidercontrolled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider, adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board designs where the efficient Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria.

Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: experimental evidence

We model experimentally the governance of an institution. The optimal management of this institution depends on the information possessed by insiders. However, insiders, whose interests are not aligned with the interests of the institution, may choose to use their information to further personal rather than institutional ends. Researchers (e.g., Palfrey 1990) and the business press have both argued that multiagent mechanisms, which inject trustworthy but uninformed “watchdog” agents into the governance process and impose penalties for conflicting recommendations, can implement institutionally preferred outcomes. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. In the experimental treatments in which watchdog agents were included, the intuitionally preferred allocation was implemented in the vast majority of cases. Surprisingly, implementation occurred even in the absence of penalties for conflicting recommendations.Corporations - Finance ; Game theory

If at first you don't succeed: an experimental investigation of the impact of repetition options on corporate takeovers

This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to "resolicit," that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative losses associated with free riding. In practice, the outcomes of our experiment, while quite closely tracking theory in the effective absence of an option to resolicit, differed dramatically from theory when a significant probability of resolicitation was introduced: The option to resolicit reduced the costs of free riding fairly substantially. Both the raider offers and the shareholder tendering responses generally exceeded equilibrium predictions

Upper-surface blowing nacelle design study for a swept wing airplane at cruise conditions

A study was made to design two types of overwing nacelles for an existing wing-body at a design condition of Mach = 0.8 and C sub L = 0.2. Internal and external surface contours were developed for nacelles having either a D-shaped nozzle or a high-aspect-ratio nozzle for upper-surface blowing in the powered-lift mode of operation. The goal of the design was the development of external nacelle lines that would minimize high-speed aerodynamic interference effects. Each nacelle type was designed for both two- and four-engine airplanes using an iterative process of aerodynamic potential flow analysis. Incremental nacelle drag estimates were made for flow-through wind tunnel models of each configuration

Soiling crops for milk production

Rapid increase in the price of grains and concentrates, used in feeding dairy cows for milk production, has quickened the interest of dairymen in the feeding problem. The urgent demand for human food has resulted in a more extended use of cereals for that purpose, a practice which has limited quite largely the quantities of grain available for live stock feeding. The curtailment in the use of grain demands that more reliance be placed upon roughages in the ration in order to supply the nutrients required by heavy producing dairy cows. The importance of leguminous hays and corn silage as a basis for any satisfactory winter ration, which has for its purpose the stimulation of the dairy cow to her most economical production and the efficient saving of grain, has been amply demonstrated. However, the practice in so far as summer feeding may be concerned, is more varied

Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: experimental evidence

We model experimentally the governance of an institution. The optimal management of this institution depends on the information possessed by insiders. However, insiders, whose interests are not aligned with the interests of the institution, may choose to use their information to further personal rather than institutional ends. Researchers (e.g., Palfrey 1990) and the business press have both argued that multiagent mechanisms, which inject trustworthy but uninformed "watchdog" agents into the governance process and impose penalties for conflicting recommendations, can implement institutionally preferred outcomes. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. In the experimental treatments in which watchdog agents were included, the intuitionally preferred allocation was implemented in the vast majority of cases. Surprisingly, implementation occurred even in the absence of penalties for conflicting recommendations