R2P in the UN Security Council: Darfur, Libya and beyond

It has been argued that consensus on the responsibility to protect (R2P) was lost in the UN Security Council as a result of the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011. This argument assumes that there was more agreement on R2P before the Libyan intervention than there was afterwards. Yet a close examination of the Security Council’s use of language on R2P shows the opposite: R2P was highly contentious within the Security Council prior to the Libyan intervention, and less so afterwards. Not only has the Council used R2P language more frequently since 2011, but also negotiating this language has become quicker and easier. To demonstrate this I compare negotiations on Darfur with deliberations during and after the Arab Spring. Resolution 1706 on Darfur was the first time the Security Council referred to R2P in a country-specific resolution – and indeed it was the only country-specific resolution to refer to R2P before 2011 – making it an apt point of comparison. Via focused analysis on how the language used in Security Council resolution evolves over time, this article demonstrates that the Council has found ‘agreed language’ on R2P that is acceptable to members, both for thematic resolutions and country-specific resolutions. Language on R2P in Security Council resolutions has shifted from contentious to commonplace

The purpose of United Nations Security Council practice: Contesting competence claims in the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect.

Practice theory provides important insight into the workings of the Security Council. The contribution is currently limited however by the conjecture that practice theory operates on ‘a different analytical plane’ to norm / normative theory (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). Building on existing critiques (Duval and Chowdhury 2011; Schindler and Wille 2015) we argue that analyzing practices separately from normative positions risks misappropriating competence and reifying practice that is not fit for purpose. This risk is realized in Adler-Nissen and Pouliot’s (2014) practice based account Libya crisis. By returning the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to the analytical foreground, and by drawing on a pragmatic conception of 'ethical competence' (Frost 2009), we find that pre-reflexive practices uncritically accepted as markers of competence – e.g. ‘penholding’ – can contribute to the Council’s failure to act collectively in the face of mass atrocity. Drawing on extensive interview material we offer an alternative account of the Libya intervention, finding that the practices of the permanent three (France, UK and US) did not cultivate the kind of collective consciousness that is required to implement R2P. This is further illustrated by an account of the Security Council’s failure in Syria, where the P3’s insistence on regime change instrumentalized the Council at the expense of R2P-appropriate practice. This changed when elected members became ‘penholders’. Practice theory can facilitate learning processes that help the Council meet its responsibilities, but only through an approach that combines its insights with those of norm / normative theory

Assessing the influence of the Responsibility to Protect on the UN Security Council during the Arab Spring

This article challenges those perspectives which assert first, that the Security Council’s engagement with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) during the Arab Spring evidences a generally positive trend, and second, that the response to the Arab Spring, particularly Syria, highlights the need for veto restraint. With respect to the first point, the evidence presented in this article suggests that the manner in which R2P has been employed by the Security Council during this period evidences three key trends: first, a willingness to invoke R2P only in the context of Pillar I; second, a pronounced lack of consensus surrounding Pillar III; and third, the persistent prioritisation of national interests over humanitarian concerns. With respect to veto restraint, this article argues that there is no evidence that this idea will have any significant impact on decision-making at the Security Council; the Council’s response to the Arab Spring suggests that national interests continue to trump humanitarian need

Spatially resolved acoustic spectroscopy for rapid imaging of material microstructure and grain orientation

Measuring the grain structure of aerospace materials is very important to understand their mechanical properties and in-service performance. Spatially resolved acoustic spectroscopy is an acoustic technique utilizing surface acoustic waves to map the grain structure of a material. When combined with measurements in multiple acoustic propagation directions, the grain orientation can be obtained by fitting the velocity surface to a model. The new instrument presented here can take thousands of acoustic velocity measurements per second. The spatial and velocity resolution can be adjusted by simple modification to the system; this is discussed in detail by comparison of theoretical expectations with experimental data

The responsibility to protect and the use of force: remaking the procrustean bed?

The emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) owed much to the need to enhance the UN’s ability to act forcibly in the face of the most extreme cases of gross human suffering. Too often in the past such responses were emasculated or thwarted by the necessity to successfully navigate the UN Charter’s prescriptions over the use of force, by the unwillingness of member states to provide military forces, or by a combination of the two. In accepting that certain types of inhuman activity can lead to the legitimate use of force within the UN Charter framework, the adoption of R2P appeared to resolve at least some of these problems, and as such it offered hope to those wishing to see the UN adopt a more assertive response to the grossest of human rights abuses. But, using stalemate over Syria as its backdrop, this article demonstrates the dubiousness of the claim that such a normative development can ever trump the hard edged political and strategic factors which determine when states will accept and/or participate in the use of force, and it suggests a radical solution to the dangers inherent in R2P’s intimate association with military intervention