Optimal Inflation Targeting Rules

This paper characterizes optimal monetary policy for a range of alternative economic models in terms of a flexible inflation targeting rule, with a target criterion that depends on the model specification. It shows which forecast horizons should matter, and which variables besides inflation should be taken into account, for each specification. The likely quantitative significance of the various factors considered in the general discussion is then assessed by estimating a small, structural model of the U.S. monetary transmission mechanism with explicit optimizing foundations. An optimal policy rule is computed for the estimated model, and shown to correspond to a multi-stage inflation-forecast targeting procedure. The degree to which actual U.S. policy over the past two decades has conformed to the optimal target criteria is then considered.

Has Monetary Policy Become More Effective?

Recent research provides evidence of important changes in the U.S. economic environment over the last 40 years. This appears to be associated with an alteration of the monetary transmission mechanism. In this paper we investigate the implications for the evolution of monetary policy effectiveness. Using an identified VAR over the pre- and post-1980 periods we first provide evidence of a reduction in the effect of monetary policy shocks in the latter period. We then present and estimate a fully specified model that replicates well the dynamic response of output, inflation, and the federal funds rate to monetary policy shocks in both periods. Using the estimated structural model, we perform counterfactual experiments to determine the source of the observed change in the monetary transmission mechanism, as well as in the economy's response to supply and demand shocks. The main finding is that monetary policy has been more stabilizing in the recent past, as a result of both the way it has responded to shocks, but also by ruling out non-fundamental fluctuations.

Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: II. Applications

In this paper we calculate robustly optimal monetary policy rules for several variants of a simple optimizing model of the monetary transmission mechanism with sticky prices and/or wages. We discuss representations of optimal policy both in terms of interest-rate feedback rules that generalize the well-known Taylor rule,' and in terms of commitment to a target criterion of the kind discussed in familiar proposals for flexible inflation targeting.' Optimal rules, however, require that policy be history-dependent in ways not contemplated by many well-known proposals. We furthermore find that a robustly optimal policy rule is almost inevitably an implicit rule, that requires the central bank to use a structural model to project the economy's evolution under the contemplated policy action. Finally, our numerical examples suggest that optimal rules do not place nearly as much weight on projections of inflation or output many quarters in the future as occurs under the current practice of inflation-forecast targeting central banks.

Sticky prices and monetary policy : evidence from disaggregated U.S. data

This paper uses factor-augmented vector autoregressions (FAVAR) estimated using a large data set to disentangle fluctuations in disaggregated consumer and producer prices which are due to macroeconomic factors from those due to sectorial conditions. This allows us to provide consistent estimates of the effects of US monetary policy on disaggregated prices. While sectorial prices respond quickly to sector-specific shocks, we find that for a large number of price series, there is a significant delay in the response of prices to monetary policy shocks. In addition, price responses display little evidence of a “price puzzle,” contrary to existing studies based on traditional VARs. The observed dispersion in the reaction of producer prices is relatively well explained by the degree of market power, as predicted by models with monopolistic competition. JEL Classification: E32, E5

Optimal Interest-Rate Rules in a Forward-Looking Model, and Inflation Stabilization versus Price-Level Stabilization

This paper characterizes the properties of various interest-rate rules in a basic forward-looking model. We compare simple Taylor rules and rules that respond to price-level fluctuations (called Wicksellian rules). We argue that by introducing an appropriate amount of history dependence in policy, Wicksellian rules perform better than optimal Taylor rules in terms of welfare, robustness to alternative shock processes, and are less prone to equilibrium indeterminacy. A simple Wicksellian rule augmented with a high degree of interest rate inertia resembles a robustly optimal rule, i.e., a monetary policy rule that implements the optimal plan and that is also completely robust to the specification of exogenous shock processes.

Optimal Inflation Targeting Rules

This paper characterizes optimal monetary policy for a range of alternative economic models in terms of a flexible inflation targeting rule, with a target criterion that depends on the model specification. It shows which forecast horizons should matter, and which variables besides inflation should be taken into account, for each specification. The likely quantitative significance of the various factors considered in the general discussion is then assessed by estimating a small, structural model of the U.S. monetary transmission mechanism with explicit optimizing foundations. An optimal policy rule is computed for the estimated model, and shown to correspond to a multi-stage inflation-forecast targeting procedure. The degree to which actual U.S. policy over the past two decades has conformed to the optimal target criteria is then considered

How Has the Euro Changed the Monetary Transmission?

This paper characterizes the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks across countries of the euro area, documents how this mechanism has changed with the introduction of the euro, and explores some potential explanations. The factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) framework used is sufficiently rich to jointly model the euro area dynamics while permitting the transmission of shocks to be different across countries. We find important heterogeneity across countries in the effect of monetary shocks before the launch of the euro. In particular, we find that German interest-rate shocks triggered stronger responses of interest rates and consumption in some countries such as Italy and Spain than in Germany itself. According to our estimates, the creation of the euro has contributed 1) to a greater homogeneity of the transmission mechanism across countries, and 2) to an overall reduction in the effects of monetary shocks. Using a structural open-economy model, we argue that the combination of a change in the policy reaction function -- mainly toward a more aggressive response to inflation and output -- and the elimination of an exchange-rate risk can explain the evolution of the monetary transmission mechanism observed empirically.

Some Unpleasant General Equilibrium Implications of Executive Incentive Compensation Contracts

We consider a simple variant of the standard real business cycle model in which shareholders hire a self-interested executive to manage the firm on their behalf. Delegation gives rise to a generic conflict of interest mediated by a convex (option-like) compensation contract which is able to align the interests of managers and their shareholders. With such a compensation contract, a given increase in the firm's output generated by an additional unit of physical investment results in a more than proportional increase in the manager's income. We find that incentive contracts of this form can easily result in an indeterminate general equilibrium, with business cycles driven by self-fulfilling fluctuations in the manager's expectations. These expectations are unrelated to fundamentals. Arbitrarily large fluctuations in macroeconomic variables may possibly result.